Opinion
C/A 6:24-cv-01737-HMH-KFM
07-15-2024
Gaylan Flottemesch, Plaintiff, v. Phillip S. Jones, All other parties, Defendants.[1]
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Kevin F. McDonald United States Magistrate Judge
The plaintiff, a non-prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and submit findings and recommendations to the district court. The plaintiff's complaint was entered on the docket on April 8, 2024 (doc. 1). By order filed June 6, 2024, the plaintiff was informed that her complaint was subject to summary dismissal because it failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and that she could attempt to cure the defects identified in the complaint by filing an amended complaint within 14 days (doc. 24). The plaintiff was informed that if she failed to file an amended complaint or otherwise cure the deficiencies outlined in the order, the undersigned would recommend that her case be dismissed (id. at 6-7). On June 27, 2024, the plaintiff's amended complaint was entered on the docket (doc. 31). Because the plaintiff's amended complaint likewise fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the undersigned recommends dismissal of the instant matter.
ALLEGATIONS
This is a civil action filed by the plaintiff, a non-prisoner, seeking damages from the defendants for false arrest and false imprisonment (doc. 31). Of note, the plaintiff's claims appear to involve charges in the Greenville County General Sessions Court. See Greenville County Public Index, https://publicindex.sccourts.org/ Greenville/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (enter the plaintiff's name and 2023A2330206604, 2023A2330206605) (last visited July 12, 2024). The plaintiff pled guilty to assault and battery third degree (a lesser included offense of her original charge of domestic violence first degree) in exchange for the dismissal of her other charge (possession of a weapon during a violent crime). Id.
Phillips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (courts “may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record.”); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (“We note that ‘[t]he most frequent use of judicial notice . . . is in noticing the content of court records.'”).
The plaintiff alleges that her rights were violated when she was arrested in July 2023, based on “non-evidence” and “non-credible probable cause” by the defendants (doc. 31 at 4, 5). The plaintiff alleges that her family witnessed her arrest and that she has no physical injuries, but has suffered from “mental dilemmas” due to the defendants' actions (id. at 6). For relief, the plaintiff seeks money damages (id.). Attached to the plaintiff's amended complaint are letters involving requests for dismissal of her criminal charges (see doc. 31-1).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or malicious,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). As a pro se litigant, the plaintiff's pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
This complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
DISCUSSION
As noted above, the plaintiff filed the instant action pursuant to § 1983, seeking damages from the defendants. However, the plaintiff's amended complaint is subject to summary dismissal.
The plaintiff's amended complaint is barred by Heck v. Humphrey
To the extent the plaintiff seeks money damages from the defendants for her arrest in July 2023, her claims are barred by Heck. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Heck, the United States Supreme Court held that in order to recover damages for imprisonment in violation of the Constitution, the imprisonment must first be successfully challenged. Id. The Court stated:
We hold that, in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, . . . a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.Id. at 486-87 (footnote omitted); see also Edwards v. Balisock, 520 U.S. 641 (1997) (the preclusive rule of Heck extended to § 1983 claims challenging procedural deficiencies which necessarily imply the invalidity of the judgment). This is known as the “favorable termination” requirement. See Wilson v. Johnson, 535 F.3d 262, 263 (4th Cir. 2008). Judicially-noticed, publicly-available online records for the Greenville County General Sessions Court indicate that the plaintiff pled guilty to a lesser included offense to one of her charges in exchange for the dismissal of her other charge. See Greenville County Public Index (enter the plaintiff's name and 2023A2330206604, 2023A2330206605) (last visited July 12, 2024). The plaintiff's guilty plea to a lesser included offense of her domestic violence charge (by pleading guilty to assault and battery third degree) in exchange for the dismissal of her other charge (possession of a weapon during a violent crime) fails to indicate a favorable termination of her charges; thus, her damages claim is barred by Heck. The plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim for relief
In addition to the foregoing, the plaintiff's amended complaint is also subject to summary dismissal for failure to state a claim.
Fourth Amendment Claims
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. “Except in certain well-defined circumstances, a search or seizure . . . is not reasonable unless it is accomplished pursuant to a judicial warrant issued upon probable cause.” Skinnerv. Ry. Lab. Execs.'Assn, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989). Section 1983 actions premised on malicious prosecution, false arrest, and/or false imprisonment are analyzed as actions claiming unreasonable seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362, 367-68 (4th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that a plaintiff alleging a § 1983 false arrest claim needs to show that the officer decided to arrest him without probable cause to establish an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment); Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279, 294 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating claims of false arrest and false imprisonment “are essentially claims alleging a seizure of the person in violation of the Fourth Amendment”).
However, under § 1983, “a public official cannot be charged with false arrest when he arrests a defendant pursuant to a facially valid warrant.” Porterfield v. Lott, 156 F.3d 563, 568 (4th Cir. 1998) (“[A] claim for false arrest may be considered only when no arrest warrant has been obtained.”); see Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (finding no Fourth Amendment violation when an arrest is based on probable cause); Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, 85 F.3d 178, 181-83 (4th Cir. 1996) (determining that when the arresting official makes the arrest with a facially valid warrant, it is not false arrest). The plaintiff's charges indicate that she was arrested pursuant to a warrant and the plaintiff's amended complaint contains no allegations that the warrant was invalid (see doc. 31). See Greenville County Public Index (enter the plaintiff's name and 2023A2330206604, 2023A2330206605) (last visited July 12, 2024).
Further, “an indictment, fair upon its face, returned by a properly constituted grand jury, conclusively determines the existence of probable cause.” Durham v. Horner, 690 F.3d 183, 189 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see Provet v. State of S.C., C/A No. 6:07-cv-01094-GRA-WMC, 2007 WL 1847849, at *5 (D.S.C. June 25, 2007) (section 1983 claims of false arrest and malicious prosecution were precluded because of indictment). This Court, as noted above, has taken judicial notice of the plaintiff's criminal proceedings in the Greenville County General Sessions Court, including a grand jury indictment on the charge for which she pled guilty (assault and battery third degree originally charged as domestic violence first degree). See Greenville County Public Index (enter the plaintiff's name and 2023A2330206604, 2023A2330206605) (last visited July 12, 2024). Although the plaintiff's charge for possession of a weapon during a violent crime was dismissed (and not indicted) based on the plaintiff's guilty plea to assault and battery third degree (Case Number 2023A2330206605), the lack of a grand jury indictment on this charge does not affect the plaintiff's false arrest claim because probable cause for the plaintiff's arrest has been established by the remaining charge, which was indicted. See Holloman v. City of Myrtle Beach, C/A No. 4:04-cv-01868, 2006 WL 4869353, at *7 (D.S.C. June 8, 2006) (noting that “where an arrestee is charged with multiple offenses, ‘if there was probable cause for any of the charges made then the arrest was supported by probable cause'” (internal citation and alterations omitted)), aff'd 235 Fed.Appx. 159 (4th Cir. 2007).
Of note, recently, the United States Supreme Court held that for malicious prosecution claims, the existence of probable cause for one charge in a criminal proceeding does not bar a malicious prosecution claim for another, alleged baseless, charge. See Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, 602 U.S. ---, 144 S.Ct. 1745, 1750 (2024). Here, however, even presuming the plaintiff had alleged a claim for malicious prosecution relating to the charge that was dismissed in return for her guilty plea to a separate charge (to which the holding in Chiaverini would apply), the plaintiff's claim would still fail because she has not alleged a favorable termination with respect to the dismissed charge because it was dismissed pursuant to a plea bargain. See Evan v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 647 (4th Cir. 2012) (noting that the elements of a malicious prosecution claim included that the defendant (1) caused (2) a seizure of the plaintiff pursuant to legal process unsupported by probable cause, and (3) the proceedings terminated in the plaintiff's favor (internal citation omitted)); Allen v. Pregel, C/A No. 6:20-cv-0338-DCC-KFM, 2020 WL 9607020, at *3 (D.S.C. Dec. 30, 2020) (noting that a charged dismissed as part of a plaintiff's guilty plea to other charges did not indicate a favorable termination), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2021 WL 2014866 (D.S.C. May 20, 2021). As such, the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claims are subject to summary dismissal.
Abandoned Claims
The plaintiff's amended complaint appears to abandon claims against the Greenville County Sheriff's Office because the amended complaint omits mention of this defendant (see doc. 31). The plaintiff was warned that an amended complaint replaces the complaint and “should be complete in itself (doc. 24 at 6 (citing Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 572 (4th Cir. 2001)). As such, the undersigned recommends dismissal of the plaintiff's abandoned claims against the Greenville County Sheriff's Office. To the extent the plaintiff did not intend to abandon claims against this defendant, for the reasons set forth in the court's prior order, the claims would still be subject to summary dismissal (see doc. 24 at 5).
RECOMMENDATION
By order issued June 6, 2024, the undersigned gave the plaintiff an opportunity to correct the defects identified in her complaint and further warned the plaintiff that if she failed to file an amended complaint or failed to cure the identified deficiencies, the undersigned would recommend to the district court that the action be dismissed with prejudice and without leave for further amendment for failure to state a claim. Despite filing an amended complaint, the plaintiff has not cured the deficiencies identified in the order dated June 6, 2024 (doc. 24). Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the district court decline to give the plaintiff further leave to amend her complaint and dismiss the plaintiff's claims without issuance and service of process as follows: The claims barred by Heck without prejudice and the remaining claims with prejudice. See Britt v. DeJoy, 45 F.4th 790, 791 (4th Cir. 2022) (published) (noting that “when a district court dismisses a complaint or all claims without providing leave to amend . . . the order dismissing the complaint is final and appealable”). The attention of the parties is directed to the important notice on the following page.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committees note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court 250 East North Street, Room 2300 Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).