Opinion
No. C 01-1724 CRB (PR), (Docs # 33, 40 42)
October 10, 2002
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff, a prisoner currently incarcerated at Folsom State Prison in Represa, California, filed a First Amended Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("FAC") alleging that, while a pretrial detainee at the Santa Clara County Jail ("SCCJ"), defendants placed him in maximum security for several years without notice or a hearing in violation of his right to due process. Per order filed on January 30, 2002, the court found that plaintiff's allegations, when liberally construed, stated an "arguably cognizable claim for damages under § 1983" and ordered the United States Marshal to serve defendants. Defendants now move for summary judgment arguing, among other things, that they are entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law. Plaintiff did not file an opposition.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits show that there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Material facts are those which may affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.
The moving party for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings, discovery and affidavits which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where the moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, it must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party. But on an issue for which the opposing party will have the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need only point out "that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id.
Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and, by its own affidavits or discovery, "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). If the nonmoving party fails to make this showing, "the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323.
B. Analysis
Section 1983 provides a private right of action against correctional officers who, acting under color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights. However, the defense of qualified immunity protects § 1983 defendants from liability for civil damages when performing discretionary functions, unless such conduct violates a clearly established constitutional or statutory right of which a reasonable person would have known. Jackson v. City of Bremerton, 268 F.3d 646, 650 (9th Cir. 2001).
A qualified immunity analysis must begin with this threshold question: Based upon the facts taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, did the officer's conduct violate a constitutional right? Saucier v. Katz, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 2156 (2001). If no constitutional right was violated, the court need not inquire further. Id. If, however, a constitutional violation occurred, the second inquiry is whether the officer could nevertheless have reasonably but mistakenly believed that his or her conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional right. Id. at 2158-59.
Defendants claim that they are entitled to summary judgment on their qualified immunity defense because: (1) the law was not clearly established regarding the circumstances under which a pretrial detainee was entitled to a due process hearing concerning restrictive housing placements; and (2) the undisputed facts show that a reasonable officer could have believed that the process plaintiff received did not violate due process. In support, defendants submit several declarations and supporting evidence showing the following: Plaintiff was an inmate at SCCJ from April 1997 to November 2001. He was detained on charges of assault with a deadly weapon, but was also a convicted felon and parolee. In the spring of 1998, plaintiff was reclassified from the general population to maximum security as a result of an incident in which plaintiff assaulted another inmate. Plaintiff appealed his classification several times, but remained in maximum security for most of his confinement at SCCJ. During this time, classification officers reviewed plaintiff's housing status approximately every 30 days and elected to retain him in maximum security due to his assaultive behavior, gang activities, and information that plaintiff was planning a gang assault. The officers also elected to retain plaintiff in maximum security because on at least seven different occasions plaintiff was found guilty of infractions following formal hearings.
It is settled in our circuit that a pretrial detainee may not be placed in segregation or more restrictive housing as punishment for violation of jail rules and regulations without the procedural requirements of Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), which include notice and an opportunity to be heard. See Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75 F.3d 517, 523-26 (9th Cir. 1996). But it still is not settled whether any such process is required before a pretrial detainee is reclassified and placed in more restrictive housing for non-punitive reasons. Cf. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995) (convicted prisoner has right to procedural protections only if deprivation at issue is one of "real substance" so as to impose "atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life"). In general, there is no constitutional right to any particular classification. See Hernandez v. Johnston, 833 F.2d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Moody v. Dagget, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n. 9 (1976)).
Here, the undisputed facts show that plaintiff was reclassified and placed in maximum security for legitimate non-punitive reasons, that he had opportunity to contest his classification and placement, and that his classification and placement were reviewed periodically. In view of these facts and the state of the law, it would not have been clear to a reasonable officer that it was unlawful to reclassify plaintiff for legitimate non-punitive reasons without first giving him notice and a hearing. Accord Love v. Cook County, 82 F. Supp.2d 911, 919-20 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (granting defendants qualified immunity where plaintiff could not establish that placement in administrative segregation was for punitive reasons). Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on their qualified immunity defense. See Saucier, 121 S.Ct. at 2156-57 (defendants entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity if law did not put officer on notice that his conduct would be clearly unlawful).
Or, put slightly differently, a reasonable officer could properly believe that plaintiff's reclassification and placement in maximum security, under the circumstances of this case, would not violate a clearly established constitutional right. See Jackson, 268 F.3d at 653 n. 5.
Plaintiff's additional claim that he was denied due process in connection with a charge of possessing a razor blade is without merit. The undisputed facts show that plaintiff was afforded due process when he received notice of the charges and a full hearing. That the accusing officer did not produce the "weapon" at the hearing is of no relevance.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion for summary judgment (docs # 33 40) is GRANTED. All other pending motions (see, e.g., doc # 42) are dismissed as moot.The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of defendants and close the file.