Opinion
A19A0908
08-06-2021
FLANDERS v. The STATE.
Martha C. Hall Hall, Robert Lawrence Persse, Statesboro, for Appellant. Richard Ashley Mallard, Keith A. McIntyre, Statesboro, Daphne Jarriel Totten, Benjamin Troy Edwards, for Appellee.
Martha C. Hall Hall, Robert Lawrence Persse, Statesboro, for Appellant.
Richard Ashley Mallard, Keith A. McIntyre, Statesboro, Daphne Jarriel Totten, Benjamin Troy Edwards, for Appellee.
Miller, Presiding Judge. Christina Flanders entered an Alford plea to one count of aggravated assault ( OCGA § 16-5-21 ) and two counts of cruelty to children ( OCGA § 16-5-70 ). In Division 1 of our prior opinion in this case, we determined that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to address Flanders’ claim that the State committed a Brady violation by failing to turn over evidence of an interview in which the victim denied that Flanders injured her because Flanders untimely raised that claim in an amended motion to withdraw her guilty plea. The Supreme Court of Georgia, in Flanders v. State , 310 Ga. 619, 852 S.E.2d 853 (2020), reversed that determination, overruled the case law relied upon by this Court, and concluded that the Brady claim was timely raised. The Court then remanded the case to this Court with direction to address whether "the trial court erred in declining to address the Brady claim raised in her amended motion to withdraw her guilty plea." Id. at ––––, 852 S.E.2d 853.
North Carolina v. Alford , 400 U. S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970).
Brady v. Maryland , 373 U. S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).
The record shows that the trial court held a hearing on Flanders’ motion to withdraw her guilty plea during which Flanders’ Brady claim was extensively litigated, with both Flanders and the State presenting testimony and argument regarding the allegedly suppressed interview. The trial court subsequently entered a detailed order denying Flanders's motion to withdraw her guilty plea that addressed all of Flanders’ other claims of error, but it did not rule on, make factual findings regarding, or even mention, her Brady claim. "We are a court of review, not of first view[.]" (Citation omitted.) Luckie v. Berry , 305 Ga. 684, 685 n.2, 827 S.E.2d 644 (2019). "Our Supreme Court has instructed that we may remand for further factual findings where the trial court's order lacks sufficient detail to enable appellate review." Weintraub v. State , 352 Ga. App. 880, 889 (1), 836 S.E.2d 162 (2019). Given the trial court's failure to address Flanders’ Brady claim, we must vacate the trial court's order to the extent it at least implicitly denied that claim and remand for the trial court to address the claim in the first instance. We therefore vacate Division 1 of our previous opinion, adopt the opinion of the Supreme Court of Georgia as our own, vacate the trial court's order to the extent it denied Flanders’ Brady claim, and remand for the trial court to rule on that claim. No other part of our prior opinion is affected by the Supreme Court's decision, see Flanders , supra, 310 Ga. at ––––, 852 S.E.2d 853, and so we reinstate all of the remaining Divisions of our prior opinion.
We note that, although the trial court found that Flanders’ guilty plea was knowing and voluntary, a Brady violation by the State may nevertheless constitute grounds for withdrawing such a plea if it resulted in "manifest injustice" and materially contributed to that plea. See Carroll v. State , 222 Ga. App. 560, 562, 474 S.E.2d 737 (1996).
Judgment vacated in part and case remanded.
Rickman, C.J., and Gobeil, J., concur.