Appellant, Florida Carry, Inc., appeals the trial court's “Order Partially Granting and Partially Denying Motion to Dismiss; Summary Judgment of Dismissal of Motor Vehicle Claims; and Summary Judgment for Defendants on Housing Claims.” Appellant raises three issues on appeal: (1) the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees, the University of Florida (“UF”) and Bernie Machen, UF's President at the time Appellant's lawsuit was filed, on the basis that Appellees are not violating Florida law by prohibiting the possession of firearms in housing located on university property; (2) the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in Appellees' favor on the basis that there was no actual case or controversy in need of adjudication with respect to Appellant's claim that UF's policies as to the possession of firearms in vehicles located on university property violated our opinion in Florida Carry, Inc. v. University of North Florida, 133 So.3d 966 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (en banc) (“UNF decision”); and (3) the trial court erred in granting in part Appellee Machen's motion to dismiss on the basis that Appellee Machen is immune from liability for damages pursuant to sections 768.28(9)(a) and 790.33, Florida Statutes (2013).

33, Florida Statutes (2015), which—with certain exceptions not applicable here—preempts regulation of firearms by entities other than the Florida Legislature. Appellants' complaint cited our decision in Florida Carry, Inc. v. University of North Florida , 133 So.3d 966 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (en banc) ( UNF ), in support of their contention that the promulgation of certain portions of the Student Conduct Code violated Florida law. Appellants alleged in the complaint that Appellees knew or should have known that they were "without authority to regulate the possession of firearms on the FSU campus."

After the passage of the 2011 amendments, an agency may regulate firearms and ammunition only under a "specific" grant of rulemaking authority. See Fla. Carry, Inc. v. Univ. of N. Fla., 133 So.3d 966, 972-73 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (en banc) (explaining that a state agency, even one deriving its authority directly from the state constitution, is not authorized to enact rules or policies restricting the right to bear arms without a specific legislative delegation). And absent a specific grant of rulemaking authority, any agency action that contravenes section 790.33 is ultra vires and therefore null and void.

"The judiciary cannot extend the terms of an unambiguous statute beyond its express terms or reasonable and obvious implications under Florida's strict separation of powers delineated in article II, section three, of the Florida Constitution." Fla. Carry, Inc. v. Univ. of N. Fla. , 133 So. 3d 966, 971 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (en banc).

Norman v. State , 215 So. 3d 18, 41 (Fla. 2017) ; see alsoFla. Carry, Inc. v. Univ. of N. Fla. , 133 So. 3d 966, 985 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (Makar, J., concurring) (stating that under the Florida Constitution "[p]lacing limitations on the right to bear arms is a quintessentially legislative function"). The right to bear arms is not absolute but rather "is subject to the right of the people through their legislature to enact valid police regulations to promote the health, morals, safety and general welfare of the people."

See also [Barry A.] Miller, [ Sua Sponte Appellate Rulings: When Courts Deprive Litigants of An Opportunity To Be Heard , 39 San Diego L. Rev. 1253, 1256 (Fall 2002),] [ ] at 1307-08 (contrasting adversary process model, which focuses narrowly only on issues raised by parties and applies waiver rule rotely, with equity model, which focuses more broadly on achieving justice—or avoiding injustice—and applies waiver rule less strictly). Florida Carry, Inc. v. UNF , 133 So.3d 966, 988 n.29 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (Makar, J., concurring). Our Court has no formal protocol that defines a panel's discretion to broaden its scope of appellate review as to unraised issues; nor do we have a formal protocol for when supplemental briefs ought to be requested.

“A blanket prohibition on carrying [a] gun in public prevents a person from defending himself anywhere except inside his home,” and as such constitutes a “substantial ... curtailment of the right of armed self-defense.” See Moore, 702 F.3d at 940 ; see also Fla. Carry, Inc. v. Univ. of N. Fla., 133 So.3d 966, 976 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (stating that “restricting recreational activities is a far cry from restricting a fundamental, constitutional right to keep and bear arms for self-defense”). As such, we agree with the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that “the Second Amendment secures a right to carry a firearm in some fashion outside the home,” and that this right “ ‘could not rationally have been limited to the home.’ ” Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1153 (quoting Moore, 702 F.3d at 936 ).

This Court has ordered en banc review on the basis of exceptional importance in numerous cases despite the lack of established criteria; however, we have not necessarily explained why the case was found to meet that standard. See Fla. Carry, Inc. v. Univ. of N. Fla., 133 So.3d (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (challenging a university regulation prohibiting the storage of a firearm in a vehicle on the university's property); Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg, 122 So.3d 440 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (addressing a constitutional challenge to a worker's compensation statute); Haridopolos v. Citizens for Strong Schools, Inc., 81 So.3d 465 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (discussing a constitutional challenge to the adequacy of the educational system); Hall v. Maal, 32 So.3d 682 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (holding that a marital ceremony without a proper license did not constitute a legally cognizable marriage); Floridians Against Expanded Gambling v. Floridians for a Level Playing Field, 945 So.2d 553 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (challenging the legality of placing a proposed constitutional amendment on the ballot); Bush v. Holmes, 886 So.2d 340 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (discussing whether the Florida Opportunity Scholarship Program violated the state constitution); Brooks v. State, 816 So.2d 199 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (

"It is an established principle, often referred to as the 'tipsy coachman' rule, that a decision by a trial court must be affirmed if it is correct for any reason that is supported by the record." Fla. Carry, Inc. v. Univ. of North Fla., 133 So. 3d 966, 996 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013). --------

See Peter J. Rubin, Keynote Address: Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg: A Judge's Perspective, 70 Ohio St. L.J. 825, 832 (2009).Florida Carry, Inc. v. Univ. of N. Fla., 133 So.3d 966, 981 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (Wetherell, J., concurring). The majority examines, discusses, and makes significant legal statements on the standard for granting injunctive relief.