Opinion
CASE NO. 2:10-CV-189-WKW [WO].
May 5, 2011
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the court are Plaintiff Wiley Fisher's ("Mr. Fisher") motion to alter or amend the final judgment and motion to supplement the record (Docs. # 34, 36). Defendants, the City of Montgomery and Officers Loria, Peterson, and Stallworth, responded (Doc. # 40), and moved to strike (Doc. # 41) exhibit A of Mr. Fisher's motion to supplement the record. Mr. Fisher makes two arguments in his motion to alter or amend the final judgment: (1) that the court incorrectly calculated the statute of limitations; and (2) that the court improperly excluded Officer Peterson's conduct on March 2, 2008, in assessing Mr. Fisher's municipal liability claim for "denial of medical treatment." Finding no errors of law or fact in the Memorandum Opinion and Order ("Mem. Op." (Doc. # 32)), Mr. Fisher's motions are due to be denied.
Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs motions to alter or amend the judgment. "The only grounds for granting a Rule 59 motion are newly-discovered evidence or manifest errors of law or fact." Arthur v. King, 500 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). "A Rule 59(e) motion cannot be used to relitigate old matters, raise argument or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment." Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
A. Calculating Time for Purpose of the Statute of Limitations
Mr. Fisher argues that the court erred in finding that his non-continuing March 2, 2008 claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations. (Doc. # 35, at 1-2.) Mr. Fisher cites Rule 6(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that in calculating a time period that is "stated in days or a longer unit of time," the court "exclude[s] the day of the event that triggers the period." The court followed Rule 6(a)(1) when it found that by filing his suit on March 3, 2010, Mr. Fisher's March 2, 2008 claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations. (Mem. Op. 14.); see, e.g., Maloy v. Phillips, 64 F.3d 607, 608 (11th Cir. 1995). To put it simply, the day the triggering event occurs is "Day 0" for purposes of the statute of limitations, and the two-year anniversary of "Day 0" (not "Day 0" plus one day) is the last day of the statute of limitations period.
Mr. Fisher had until 11:59 p.m. on March 2, 2010, to file his suit for the claims that occurred and accrued on March 2, 2008, but he failed to do so. Mr. Fisher fails to demonstrate manifest error in part V.A of the Memorandum Opinion and Order, and his Rule 59(e) motion is due to be denied on this claim.
B. Municipal Liability for Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs
Mr. Fisher argues that the court erred in granting summary judgment on his municipal liability claim against the City for its policy or custom that allegedly proximately caused a "denial of medical treatment" violation. (Doc. # 35, at 3-5; see also Mem. Op. 20-21.) More specifically, Mr. Fisher claims that the court erred in finding that, "[b]ecause Mr. Fisher has not produced any evidence of the identity of the individuals causing his violation, the court is unable to conduct the threshold inquiry into whether there exists an underlying constitutional violation for a deliberate indifference to a medical need." (Mem. Op. 20-21.) Mr. Fisher now asserts that the requisite inquiry can be made for the purposes of municipal liability because Officer Peterson allegedly denied medical care to Mr. Fisher on March 2, 2008, outside the Montgomery City Jail. (Doc. # 35, at 3-4.) The City opposes this argument on the basis that Mr. Fisher made no deliberate indifference to medical needs claim against Officer Peterson, any such claim would be barred by the statute of limitations, and Mr. Fisher is attempting to "graft" Officer Peterson's identity onto the alleged actions of jail officials from March 2-3, 2008, in the Montgomery City Jail in order to escape summary judgment.
Mr. Fisher wrongly characterizes the Memorandum Opinion and Order as finding that the continuing violation doctrine "made viable both the March 2, 2008, and March 3, 2008, constitutional medical denial claims" underpinning his claim of municipal liability. (Doc. # 35, at 3.) The Memorandum Opinion and Order speaks for itself: "Mr. Fisher's allegations of constitutional violations for the City's medical inattention during his jail cell confinement from March 2 through March 3, 2008 constitute a continuing injury that did not accrue until he was removed from the jail cell on March 3, 2008." (Mem. Op. 16 (emphasis added).)
Mr. Fisher's argument fails. First, Officer Peterson played no role in Mr. Fisher's timely claims against the City for deliberate indifference to medical needs, and Mr. Fisher failed to provide evidence of the identities of the individuals involved in those timely claims. (Mem. Op. 18 ("Mr. Fisher has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that the Defendant police officers were personally involved in the events giving rise to his timely allegations of constitutional deprivations.") (emphasis added).) Perhaps the order would have been more clear had it stated, "Because Mr. Fisher has not produced any evidence of the identity of the individuals causing his [timely deliberate indifference to medical needs] violation, the court is unable to conduct the threshold inquiry into whether there exists an underlying constitutional violation for a deliberate indifference to a medical need." (Mem. Op. 20-21.) The conduct of Officer Peterson on March 2, 2008, is separate and distinct from the conduct of the jail officials on March 2-3, 2008. Any deliberate indifference to medical needs claim against Officer Peterson occurred and accrued on March 2, 2008, and is therefore barred by the statute of limitations. Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir. 2003) (discussing accrual of a § 1983 cause of action); ( see Mem. Op. 12-13.). Mr. Fisher cites no law, and the court is not aware of any, allowing a plaintiff to base a viable municipal liability claim solely on an underlying constitutional violation that is time-barred.
Second, and perhaps more important, Mr. Fisher's opposition to summary judgment on municipal liability for "denial of medical treatment" makes no mention of a claim against Officer Peterson. (Doc. # 25, at 10-12.) Mr. Fisher included a "Statement of Facts" in his opposition to summary judgment, but otherwise left it to this court and Defendants to discern the scope of his claims, the evidence in support of such claims, and the law governing those claims. (Doc. # 25, at 1-4, 10-12; Mem. Op. 10 n. 12.) In his argument in opposition to summary judgment, Mr. Fisher stated that "the facts supporting Plaintiff's Section 1983 constitutional claims of excessive force and denial of medical care are well plead [sic], specific, and are anything but `vague and conclusory.'" (Mem. Op. 10 (emphasis added).) The source of these argued facts was a pasted and underlined version of the pleadings in his Complaint. (Doc. # 25, at 10-11.) This citation was followed by argument concerning federal pleading standards, standards hardly pertinent to a motion for summary judgment. (Doc. # 25, at 11-12.)
The court notes two serious deficiencies in Mr. Fisher's opposition to summary judgment on municipal liability for "denial of medical treatment." First, the underlined pleadings made no mention of any Defendant, much less Officer Peterson, "turn[ing] away the Fire Medics" as a stated factual basis for his "denial of medical treatment" claim. (Doc. # 25, at 10-11.) In fact, the cited pleadings make no mention of a "denial of medical treatment" claim at all.
Second, in his opposition, Mr. Fisher failed to cite to any evidentiary support for his argument that there were "facts supporting [Mr. Fisher's] Section 1983 constitutional claim[] of . . . denial of medical care." The City met its burden of showing that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to the underlying "denial of medical treatment" claim; thus, the burden shifted to Mr. Fisher to establish, with evidence beyond the pleadings, that a genuine issue of fact material to each of his claims for relief existed. Shiver v. Chertoff, 549 F.3d 1342, 1343 (11th Cir. 2008); Ryan v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 675, 794 F.2d 641, 643 (11th Cir. 1986) ("A party may not rely on his pleadings to avoid judgment against him."); (Mem. Op. 16-22; Doc. # 26, at 6-7.). Mr. Fisher failed to meet his burden, neither citing the elements of a claim for deliberate indifference to medical needs, nor citing to evidence, beyond the pleadings, in support of such elements. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (Applicable substantive law identifies those facts that are material.); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th Cir. 1995) ("There is no burden upon the district court to distill every potential argument that could be made based upon the materials before it on summary judgment. Rather, the onus is upon the parties to formulate arguments.") (internal citations omitted); ( Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1) ("A party asserting that a fact . . . is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by . . . citing to particular parts of materials in the record . . . or other materials."); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(3) ("The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record."); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(3) ("If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact . . ., the court may . . . grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials — including the facts considered undisputed — show that the movant is entitled to it.").
Mr. Fisher included a Statement of Facts at the opening of his opposition to summary judgment, but did nothing to argue how those stated facts were material to the elements of a municipal liability claim for deliberate indifference to medical needs. If any error was made concerning Mr. Fisher's "denial of medical treatment" claim against the City, that error was reaching the merits of his claim at all. Mr. Fisher fails to demonstrate manifest error in part V.B of the Memorandum Opinion and Order, and his Rule 59(e) motion is due to be denied on this claim.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Mr. Fisher's motion to alter or amend the final judgment (Doc. # 34), and motion to supplement record (Doc. # 36) are DENIED. It is further ORDERED that Defendants' motion to strike (Doc. # 41) is DENIED as moot.
CIVIL APPEALS JURISDICTION CHECKLIST
1. Appealable Orders: Appeals from final orders pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291: 28 U.S.C. § 158Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre 701 F.2d 1 365 1 28 U.S.C. § 636 In cases involving multiple parties or multiple claims, 54Williams v. Bishop 732 F.2d 885 885-86 Budinich v. Becton Dickinson Co. 108 S.Ct. 1717 1721-22 100 L.Ed.2d 178LaChance v. Duffy's Draft House, Inc. 146 F.3d 832 837 Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a): Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and Fed.R.App.P. 5: 28 U.S.C. § 1292 Appeals pursuant to judicially created exceptions to the finality rule: Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. 337 U.S. 541 546 93 L.Ed. 1528Atlantic Fed. Sav. Loan Ass'n v. Blythe Eastman Paine Webber, Inc. Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp. 379 U.S. 148 157 85 S.Ct. 308 312 13 L.Ed.2d 199 2. Time for Filing: Rinaldo v. Corbett 256 F.3d 1276 1278 4 Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1): 3 THE NOTICE MUST BE RECEIVED AND FILED IN THE DISTRICT COURT NO LATER THAN THE LAST DAY OF THE APPEAL PERIOD — no additional days are provided for mailing. Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(3): Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4): Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(5) and 4(a)(6): Fed.R.App.P. 4(c): 28 U.S.C. § 1746 3. Format of the notice of appeal: See also 3pro se 4. Effect of a notice of appeal: 4
Courts of Appeals have jurisdiction conferred and strictly limited by statute: (a) Only final orders and judgments of district courts, or final orders of bankruptcy courts which have been appealed to and fully resolved by a district court under , generally are appealable. A final decision is one that "ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." , , 368 (11th Ci r. 1 983). A magistrate judge's report and recommendation is not final and appealable until judgment thereon is entered by a district court judge. (c). (b) a judgment as to fewer than all parties or all claims is not a final, appealable decision unless the district court has certified the judgment for immediate review under Fed.R.Civ.P. (b). , , (11th Cir. 1984). A judg ment which resolves all issues except matters, such as attorneys' fees and costs, that are collateral to the merits, is immediately appealable. , 486 U.S. 196, 201, , , (1988); , , (11th Cir. 1998). (c) Appeals are permitted from orders "granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions . . ." and from "[i]nterlocutory decrees . . . determining the rights and liabilities of parties to admiralty cases in which appeals from final decrees are allowed." Interlocutory appeals from orders denying temporary restraining orders are not permitted. (d) The certification specified in (b) must be obtained before a petition for permission to appeal is filed in the Court of Appeals. The district court's denial of a motion for certification is not itself appealable. (e) Limited exceptions are discussed in cases including, but not limited to: , , , 69S.Ct. 1221, 1225-26, (1949); , 890 F.2d 371, 376 (11th Cir. 1989); , , , , , (1964). The timely filing of a notice of appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional. , , (11th Cir. 2001). In civil cases, Fed.R.App.P. (a) and (c) set the following time limits: (a) A notice of appeal in compliance with the requirements set forth in Fed.R.App.P. must be filed in the district court within 30 days after the entry of the order or judgment appealed from. However, if the United States or an officer or agency thereof is a party, the notice of appeal must be filed in the district court within 60 days after such entry. Special filing provisions for inmates are discussed below. (b) "If one party timely files a notice of appeal, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date when the first notice was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by this Rule 4(a), whichever period ends later." (c) If any party makes a timely motion in the district court under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of a type specified in this rule, the time for appeal for all parties runs from the date of entry of the order disposing of the last such timely filed motion. (d) Under certain limited circumstances, the district court may extend the time to file a notice of appeal. Under Rule 4(a)(5), the time may be extended if a motion for an extension is filed within 30 days after expiration of the time otherwise provided to file a notice of appeal, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause. Under Rule 4(a)(6), the time may be extended if the district court finds upon motion that a party did not timely receive notice of the entry of the judgment or order, and that no party would be prejudiced by an extension. (e) If an inmate confined to an institution files a notice of appeal in either a civil case or a criminal case, the notice of appeal is timely if it is deposited in the institution's internal mail system on or before the last day for filing. Timely filing may be shown by a declaration in compliance with or a notarized statement, either of which must set forth the date of deposit and state that first-class postage has been prepaid. Form 1, Appendix of Forms to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, is a suitable format. Fed.R.App.P. (c). A notice of appeal must be signed by the appellant. A district court loses jurisdiction (authority) to act after the filing of a timely notice of appeal, except for actions in aid of appellate jurisdiction or to rule on a timely motion of the type specified in Fed.R.App.P. (a)(4).