First Nat. Bank of Omaha v. State

11 Citing cases

  1. Hamilton v. City of Omaha

    243 Neb. 253 (Neb. 1993)   Cited 25 times
    In Hamilton, we noted that under general tort principles, there was no duty to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him from causing physical harm to another unless (1) a special relationship existed between the actor and the third person which imposed a duty upon the actor to control the third person's conduct or (2) a special relationship existed between the actor and the other person which gave to the other a right of protection.

    The longstanding rule is that to state a cause of action for negligence, one must plead facts from which it can be inferred that the defendant owed a legal duty to protect the plaintiff from injury, that the defendant failed to discharge that duty, and that damage proximately resulted from that failure. See, First Nat. Bank of Omaha v. State, 230 Neb. 259, 430 N.W.2d 893 (1988). . . . Widga v. Sandell, 236 Neb. 798, 801 464 N.W.2d 155, 158 (1991).

  2. First Nat. Bank of Omaha v. State

    241 Neb. 267 (Neb. 1992)   Cited 10 times
    In First Nat. Bank of Omaha v. State, 241 Neb. 267, 488 N.W.2d 343 (1992), First National Bank of Omaha claimed that the State Department of Banking acted negligently with respect to the department's involvement in facilitating First National's acquisition of two state-chartered banking institutions which ultimately failed in the wake of the collapse of Commonwealth Savings Company.

    First National instituted its suit under the provisions of the State Tort Claims Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. ยง 81-8,209 et seq. (Reissue 1987). In First Nat. Bank of Omaha v. State, 230 Neb. 259, 430 N.W.2d 893 (1988) (First Nat. Bank of Omaha I), this court affirmed the sustainment of the State's demurrer, but reversed the order of dismissal, writing that "it is reasonably possible that [First National] may be able to state a cause of action in support of its theory of recovery." Id. at 268, 430 N.W.2d at 900.

  3. Hoiengs v. County of Adams

    245 Neb. 877 (Neb. 1994)   Cited 64 times
    Concluding that the word "person" "is broad enough to include the state or any subdivision thereof"

    However, statutes authorizing suits against the state are to be strictly construed because such statutes are in derogation of the state's sovereign immunity. Riley v. State, 244 Neb. 250, 506 N.W.2d 45 (1993); Concerned Citizens, supra; First Nat. Bank of Omaha v. State, 230 Neb. 259, 430 N.W.2d 893 (1988); Wiseman v. Keller, 218 Neb. 717, 358 N.W.2d 768 (1984); Frye v. Sibbitt, 145 Neb. 600, 17 N.W.2d 617 (1945). Waiver of sovereign immunity will only be found where stated "`"by the most express language or by such overwhelming implications from the text as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction.

  4. Schmidt v. Omaha Pub. Power Dist

    245 Neb. 776 (Neb. 1994)   Cited 24 times
    Applying a four-factor test, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that a "one-call" clearing house had a duty to warn callers that not all electrical lines were marked by the power companies

    We limit our analysis to whether Hotline negligently failed to warn Schmidt that not all electric lines would be located by OPPD. For actionable negligence to exist, there must be a legal duty on the part of the defendant to protect the plaintiff from injury, a failure to discharge that duty, and damage proximately resulting from such undischarged duty. First Nat. Bank of Omaha v. State, 230 Neb. 259, 430 N.W.2d 893 (1988). Therefore, for Hotline to be liable to Schmidt, there first must be a legal duty running from Hotline to Schmidt.

  5. Widga v. Sandell

    464 N.W.2d 155 (Neb. 1991)   Cited 13 times

    The longstanding rule is that to state a cause of action for negligence, one must plead facts from which it can be inferred that the defendant owed a legal duty to protect the plaintiff from injury, that the defendant failed to discharge that duty, and that damage proximately resulted from that failure. See, First Nat. Bank of Omaha v. State, 230 Neb. 259, 430 N.W.2d 893 (1988); Topil v. Hub Hall Co., 230 Neb. 151, 430 N.W.2d 306 (1988); Ring v. Kruse, 158 Neb. 1, 62 N.W.2d 279 (1954). The duty of a possessor of land, insofar as it pertains to children of tender years, does not depend upon whether the child is an invitee, licensee, or trespasser.

  6. Lewis v. Craig

    236 Neb. 602 (Neb. 1990)   Cited 13 times

    Ravenna Bank v. Custom Unlimited, 223 Neb. 540, 544, 391 N.W.2d 557, 560 (1986). Accord First Nat. Bank of Omaha v. State, 230 Neb. 259, 430 N.W.2d 893 (1988). We have also said that in a general sense, a cause of action is the claim or subject matter upon which suit may be maintained.

  7. Millman v. County of Butler

    235 Neb. 915 (Neb. 1990)   Cited 35 times
    In Millman v. County of Butler, 235 Neb. 915, 932, 458 N.W.2d 207, 217 (1990), we held that a general denial included in the answer filed by a political subdivision did not raise the issue of noncompliance with the notice provision of the act which, we said, "must be raised as an affirmative defense specifically expressing the plaintiff's noncompliance with the notice requirement of ยง 13-905."

    "A cause of action is judicial protection of one's recognized right or interest, when another, owing a corresponding duty not to invade or violate such right or interest, has caused a breach of that duty." Sorensen v. Lower Niobrara Nat. Resources Dist., 221 Neb. 180, 193, 376 N.W.2d 539, 548 (1985); First Nat. Bank of Omaha v. State, 230 Neb. 259, 430 N.W.2d 893 (1988); Ravenna Bank v. Custom Unlimited, 223 Neb. 540, 391 N.W.2d 557 (1986); Suhr v. City of Scribner, 207 Neb. 24, 295 N.W.2d 302 (1980). In reference to a petition, a cause of action means a statement of the subject matter on which a plaintiff claims a right to a remedy.

  8. St. Paul Fire Marine Ins. Co. v. Touche Ross Co.

    452 N.W.2d 746 (Neb. 1990)   Cited 18 times
    Holding that trial court abused its discretion in not providing for leave to amend where plaintiffs at no time requested leave to amend

    A general demurrer tests substantive legal rights of parties upon admitted facts, including proper and reasonable inferences of law and fact which may be drawn from facts which are well pleaded. First Nat. Bank of Omaha v. State, 230 Neb. 259, 430 N.W.2d 893 (1988). When ruling on a demurrer, a court is required to accept the truth of facts well pled and factual and legal inferences which may reasonably be deduced from such facts, but the court does not accept the legal or factual conclusions of the pleader.

  9. Schoneweis v. Dando

    231 Neb. 180 (Neb. 1989)   Cited 20 times
    Holding that "the statements related solely to that debtor-creditor relationship," and that the court was "not persuaded that under such circumstances [the bank] owed [plaintiff] any duty of confidentiality."

    Ravenna Bank v. Custom Unlimited, 223 Neb. 540, 544, 391 N.W.2d 557, 560 (1986). Accord First Nat. Bank of Omaha v. State, 230 Neb. 259, 430 N.W.2d 893 (1988). We have also said that in a general sense, a cause of action is the claim or subject matter upon which suit may be maintained.

  10. Nelson v. Cool

    434 N.W.2d 32 (Neb. 1989)   Cited 9 times

    A petition should not leave uncertain the theory on which the plaintiff chooses to proceed, Hutmacher v. City of Mead, ante p. 78, 430 N.W.2d 276 (1988), but should state in logical and legal form the facts which constitute the cause of action, define the issues to which defendant must respond at trial, and inform the court of the real matter in dispute. First Nat. Bank of Omaha v. State, ante p. 259, 430 N.W.2d 893 (1988). Nelson did not allege in his petitions that the truck or title was obtained by fraud, theft, misrepresentation, or breach of contract, and a judgment based on any of those theories would not be supported by the pleadings.