First Ind. Fed. Sav. Bank v. Md. Dev. Co.

2 Citing cases

  1. Phipps v. First Federal Sav. Loan

    438 N.W.2d 814 (S.D. 1989)   Cited 16 times

    First Federal's refusal to accept further payments, combined with Phipps' understanding of the telephone conversation, indicate that First Federal gave effective notice to Phipps. While mere refusal to consent to assumption of a mortgage is insufficient, as a matter of law, to establish clear and unequivocal intention to accelerate, see First Indiana Fed. Sav. Bank v. Maryland Dev. Co., Inc., 509 N.E.2d 253, 259 (Ind. App. 1987), First Federal backed its refusal with an oral declaration of acceleration. These actions, without reference to First Federal's refusal to accept further payments, are clear and unambiguous.

  2. Coca-Cola Bottling v. Citizens Bank

    583 N.E.2d 184 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992)

    A nonexclusivity of remedy provision is limited when the non-defaulting party chooses acceleration as a method of recovering the amount owed to it, because "acceleration, by definition, advances the maturity date of the debt, and, as a result, payment is not a prepayment but rather a payment made at or after maturity." First Indiana Federal Savings Bank v. Maryland Development Co. (1987), Ind. App., 509 N.E.2d 253, 257; Baybank Middlesex v. 1200 Beacon Properties, Inc. (1991), D.Mass., 760 F. Supp. 957, 966. Because the defaulting party is forced to pay the debt upon acceleration, the non-defaulting party's election to accelerate that debt waives its opportunity to earn interest payable over a number of years in exchange for immediate payment of the outstanding principal and accrued interest. "[W]hen lenders accelerate the maturity of the debt, they waive their opportunity to earn, and their claim to interest payable over a period of years in exchange for the immediate payment of the outstanding principal and accrued interest.