VOGEL, Justice. This is the latest in a long series of appeals in matters relating to First American Bank Trust Company. Prior opinions are found at State ex rel. Holloway v. First American Bank Trust Co., 186 N.W.2d 573 (N.D. 1971), and 197 N.W.2d 14 (N.D. 1972); First American Bank Trust Co. v. Ellwein, 198 N.W.2d 84 (N.D. 1972), 474 F.2d 933 (CA8 1973); Securities Exchange Commission v. First American Bank Trust Co., 481 F.2d 673 (CA8 1973), and First American Bank Trust Co. v. Ellwein, 221 N.W.2d 509 (N.D. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1026, 95 S.Ct. 505, 42 L.Ed.2d 301, rehearing denied, 419 U.S. 1117, 95 S.Ct. 798, 42 L.Ed.2d 816 (CA8 1975). The present appeal is from an order of the Honorable Benny A. Graff, the district judge who was designated by us to act in the case.

The burden borne by Tharaldson is great. To overcome the presumption against an implied repeal, it must be shown that "* * * the conflict between the two provisions is irreconcilable * * *" Section 1-02-07, N.D.C.C., supra. As stated in the case of First American Bank Trust Company v. Ellwein, 198 N.W.2d 84 (N.D. 1972): "There must be a clear repugnancy between the provisions of the new law and the old statute to such an extent that a necessary implication arises that the legislature by enactment of the latter Act intended to repeal the former, and then only to the extent of its repugnancy."

This appeal is from a final judgment of the district court of Burleigh County entered on January 26, 1972, wherein it adjudged two orders issued by the State Examiner on January 17, 1972, null and void ab initio. The parties and issues of this case are identical with the parties and issues in the case entitled First American Bank Trust Company v. Ellwein, 198 N.W.2d 84, which this court decided on this date. Our decision in that case governs this case.

As a "trust company" and "banking institution", First American is subject to the extensive regulatory authority of the State Banking Board. See State ex rel. Holloway v. First American Bank Trust Co., supra, 186 N.W.2d at 578-79. See also First American Bank Trust Co. v. Ellwein, supra; First American Bank Trust Co. v. Ellwein, 198 N.W.2d 84 (N.D. 1972). Moreover, North Dakota specifically provides for liquidation of the type of business engaged in by First American under Chapter 6-07 of the North Dakota Century Code. While this alone does not require that First American be considered within the Section 4 exception, see Sims v. Fidelity Assur. Ass'n, supra, 129 F.2d at 451; In re Prudence Co., supra, 79 F.2d at 79, it is indicative of the state's intent to provide, in the interest of depositors and other members of the public dealing with such an enterprise, the supervisory and administrative safeguards accorded the liquidation of other "banking institutions".

The State Supreme Court held that the Examiner could only issue orders to preserve the status quo during the pendency of a hearing before the State Banking Board (although he could make a finding of insolvency) and could not require compliance by First American with his orders or require First American to show cause why a receiver should not be appointed. Only the Board had this power. First American Bank Trust Co. v. Ellwein, 198 N.W.2d 84 (N.D. 1972). Subsequently, on May 26, 1972, the State Banking Board authorized the Examiner to commence a proceeding before the Board.

A dispute concerning the Examiner's authority and the application of the state's statutes governing administrative procedure, has been previously litigated in the state supreme court in an action related to the present controversy. First American Bank Trust Company v. Ellwein, 198 N.W.2d 84 (N.D. 1972). First American asserts that due to the alleged prejudice and prejudgment of the Board, it has been denied the opportunity to present its case to a "fair and unbiased" tribunal.

The Commissioner is not an administrative agency and he has no authority to act separately from the State Banking Board in an individual capacity. First American State Bank Trust Company v. Ellwein, 198 N.W.2d 84 (N.D. 1972). The letter from the Commissioner does not show that the Comptroller was aware of a determination by the State Banking Board that in the latter's opinion the proposed South University branch would constitute the operation of two branches.

We have previously stated that “[i]f an alternate construction of a statute would involve serious constitutional difficulties, then that interpretation should be rejected in favor of one which avoids such constitutional infirmities.” State v. Heisinger, 252 N.W.2d 899, 903 (S.D.1977) (citing First Am. Bank & Trust Co. v. Ellwein, 198 N.W.2d 84, 95 (N.D.1972)). [¶ 18.] Notably, the effect of a pardon and an expungement are the same.

It does not mean some or a part, but rather means the whole or its entirety. See First American Bank Trust Co. v. Ellwein, 198 N.W.2d 84, 104 (N.D. 1972) (on petition for rehearing). The statute directs payment of the whole amount of taxes (to the extent funds are available). It does not qualify the category of taxes to be paid by limiting it to some taxes, to current taxes, to taxes accruing only in the period of redemption. We hold therefore that NDCC § 32-19.

This Court has stated that "where the performance of a legal duty involves the exercise of judgment and discretion the exercise of such judgment and discretion cannot be controlled by mandamus nor can the courts direct the manner in which such discretion should be exercised; . . ." First American Bank Trust Company v. Ellwein, 198 N.W.2d 84, 106 (N.D. 1972). It is important at this point to note that the present posture of this case does not present a situation in which § 29-09-07, N.D.C.C., becomes applicable.