Opinion
No. 4114.
Decided October 7, 1952.
A policy of liability insurance affording coverage to the insured for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the insured's premises for jalopy races but excluding coverage "to any person while practicing for or participating in any contest" permits recovery by a member of the jalopy repair crew who sustained injuries when struck by a car which went out of control during a race and entered the repair pit where the plaintiff rightfully stood.
PETITION, for a declaratory judgment to determine coverage under a policy of insurance issued to Hudson Associates, Inc. By this policy, Fireman's Fund Indemnity Company agreed to pay on behalf of the insured, within the limits of the coverage, all sums which the insured might become obligated to pay by reason of the liability imposed upon it by law for damages of certain kinds caused by accident and arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the premises known as the Hudson Speedway. The policy contained the following endorsement. "It is hereby agreed that this policy does not cover bodily injury claims on account of accident to any person while practicing for or participating in any contest." Fred G. Knight claims to have received bodily injuries on October 2, 1949, while lawfully on the premises known as the Hudson Speedway and has brought action against the defendant Hudson Associates, Inc. to recover damages for those injuries.
The Hudson Speedway was operated in 1949 by the defendant Hudson Associates, Inc. as a business venture for the purpose of conducting so-called jalopy races. The physical plant of the speedway consisted of three principal parts, the circular track for auto racing, the grandstand adjacent to the track but separated from it by a fence, for the accommodation of the patrons and the area, also adjacent to the track but separated from it in part by a fence, known as the pit where the participating jalopies with their crews were segregated from the public. Hudson Associates, Inc. had a contract with National Jalopy Association, Inc. under which the association, for a percentage of the gate receipts, would arrange for its members and their jalopies to attend and participate in the races. Under the rules of the association, each member owner was permitted to bring with him to the pit a driver and a crew of not more than two. The crew took no part in the operation of the jalopy on the track but assisted in preparing the jalopy for the races. The crew were not allowed on the track but did their work in the pit and remained there during the races. The crew paid no admission to the premises. A contribution of a fixed daily fee was required to be made to the association for each owner, driver and crewman in attendance at a race for the maintenance of a fund from which hospital and medical expenses of any injured owner, driver or crewman could be paid. Members of the public were excluded from the pit. The defendant Knight, not a member of the association, was present in the pit on October 2, 1949, as a member of a crew with a jalopy entered in the races. The bodily injury suffered by Mr. Knight occurred when one of the jalopies engaged in a race collided with another on the track, went out of control and while out of control entered the pit through the entrance-way between the track and pit and struck Mr. Knight who was standing with others in the pit watching the race. Further facts appear in the opinion. Trial by the Court whose findings and rulings in full are as follows. "Fred G. Knight is found to have been participating in a contest, within the meaning of the endorsement, and coverage under the policy issued by the plaintiff to Hudson Associates, Inc., does not cover bodily injury claims of Fred G. Knight on account of the accident of October 2nd, 1949."
The defendants excepted to the finding and to the ruling that the defendant Knight was participating in a contest within the meaning of the endorsement provision. All questions of law raised by the exceptions were reserved and transferred by Wescott, J.
Paul E. Nourie, for the plaintiff, filed no brief.
Robert J. Doyle (by brief), for the defendant Fred G. Knight.
George F. Nelson, for the defendant Hudson Associates, Inc., filed no brief.
The sole question raised is whether Mr. Knight suffered injury "while . . . participating in any contest." The plaintiff contends that Knight was so participating although he was merely in attendance at the races as a crewman and watching the race from the pit at the time he received his injuries. The defendants maintain that he was not participating since he was not actively engaged in any part of the race at the time. If he was not participating, he does not come within the provisions of the policy excluding coverage to persons of that class and the plaintiff is obligated to pay any judgment recovered by him in the suit against Hudson Associates, Inc.
The word "participating" has no clear and unmistakable meaning. In its primary sense, it means simply a sharing or taking part with others but when it is applied to a particular situation, it takes on secondary implications that render it ambiguous. Under some circumstances it may denote a mere passive sharing while under other circumstances an implication of active engagement may accompany its use. 67 C.J.S. 879.
The test to be applied in the interpretation of the insurance policy has been stated in Hoyt v. Insurance Co., 92 N.H. 242, 243. The test is what a reasonable person in the position of the insured would have understood the words of the policy to mean, determined in the light of the circumstances surrounding the insured's operation of the Hudson Speedway. The insured was engaged in operating an automobile race track for profit. The contests conducted by it were races between jalopies which were operated on the track. Under its contract with National Jalopy Association, Inc., it was provided as to injured non-members who paid the regular fee to the association that the association would furnish medical care as distinct from the provision as to members of the association who were to be furnished not only medical care but also benefits. The contract also provided that the insured should not be liable for injuries to drivers or pitmen who were members of the association but was silent as to liability to non-members. The insured knew from this contract that it was not relieved from liability as to all persons in attendance in connection with the conduct of the races. The insured also knew that during a practice session or a race the pit area would be occupied by owners, drivers and crewmen not engaged on the track and that except for the drivers and officials there would be no one permitted on the track during a practice session or a race.
So far as the insured was concerned, the persons subject to risk of bodily injury during a practice session or a contest fell into two classes, those on the track including the officials and the drivers operating the jalopies and those off the track including both the public in the grandstand and the drivers, owners and crewmen in the pit. Those in the pit during a race were not in substantially greater danger of bodily injury from the racing contest than those in the grandstand. The risks involved to those on and off the track differed materially. In securing insurance in connection with its operation of the track, Hudson Associates, Inc. accepted an exclusion of injuries occurring while the injured person was practicing for or participating in any contest. The accident in question did not occur during a practice session but the presence of that type of exclusion in the same clause excluding injuries occurring while the injured person was participating in any contest has significance in determining the understanding of the insured as to the meaning of the policy terms.
We are of the opinion that a reasonable person in the position of the insured could not have understood the clause in question to exclude any persons other than those injured while actively engaged in the practice sessions or the contests themselves. Mr. Knight was not participating in the contest within the meaning of the exclusionary clause of the policy at the time he received his injuries. Accordingly, he is entitled to the benefits of the policy.
Judgment for the defendant.
All concurred.