Summary
In Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Co. v. Hester, 115 Ga. App. 39 (153 S.E.2d 622) it is stated: "The Georgia Workmen's Compensation Act (Code § 114-707) requires that an award of the Board of Workmen's Compensation shall be accompanied by a statement of findings of fact upon which it is made in order that the losing party may intelligently prepare his appeal and that the cause may thereupon be intelligently reviewed.
Summary of this case from Cincinnati Insurance Company v. RobertsOpinion
42297.
SUBMITTED SEPTEMBER 9, 1966.
DECIDED JANUARY 16, 1967.
Workmen's compensation. Berrien Superior Court. Before Judge Lott.
Young, Young Ellerbee, F. Thomas Young, for appellants.
W. D. Knight, E. R. Smith, Sr., for appellee.
The Georgia Workmen's Compensation Act ( Code § 114-707) requires that an award of the Board of Workmen's Compensation shall be accompanied by a statement of findings of fact upon which it is made in order that the losing party may intelligently prepare his appeal and that the cause may thereupon be intelligently reviewed. To fulfill this requirement, the findings of fact must consist of a concise but comprehensive statement of the cause and circumstances of the accident as found to be true by the Board of Workmen's Compensation and similar findings of fact upon any material issue in the case. See Atlanta Transit System v. Harcourt, 94 Ga. App. 503 ( 95 S.E.2d 41); Southeastern Exp. Co. v. Edmondson, 30 Ga. App. 697 (1) ( 119 S.E. 39); American Mutual Liab. Ins. Co. v. Hardy, 36 Ga. App. 387, 390 ( 137 S.E. 113); Noles v. Aragon Mills, 110 Ga. App. 374 ( 138 S.E.2d 598); Dudley v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 111 Ga. App. 214 ( 141 S.E.2d 179); Grier v. Travelers Ins. Co., 112 Ga. App. 159 (2) ( 144 S.E.2d 196); Lee v. General Accident Group, 112 Ga. App. 197 (1a) ( 144 S.E.2d 457). The findings of fact by the director and approved by the board made no decision or findings on the issues. The judge of the superior court, therefore, pursuant to the above authorities, should have remanded the case to the Board of Workmen's Compensation with direction that findings of fact be made on the issues involved. The order of the trial judge reversing the Board of Workmen's Compensation is affirmed with direction that he vacate the present order of reversal and enter a new order of reversal in accordance with this opinion remanding the case to the Board of Workmen's Compensation.
Judgment affirmed with direction. Felton, C. J., and Frankum, J., concur.
SUBMITTED SEPTEMBER 9, 1966 — DECIDED JANUARY 16, 1967.
J. C. Hester filed a claim for compensation against Modern Homes Construction Company and Fireman's Fund American Insurance Company, the insurer, for disability allegedly occasioned by a heart attack claimed to have been suffered by him as an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment.
At the hearing there was testimony of a physician on behalf of the claimant who gave his opinion that the claimant had suffered a heart attack when he had a "seizure" while working on a house being built for Modern Homes Construction Company, that this work was being done, under an agreement whereby claimant was to build houses for a fixed sum per square foot with claimant paying his own labor, that payments to claimant by Modern Homes Construction Company had deducted therefrom workmen's compensation insurance, that a co-worker of the claimant described the "seizure" had by the claimant at the time. There was other evidence in the case as shown by some of the findings of fact.
The issues were (a) whether the claimant was an employee or independent contractor and (b) if an employee, whether he suffered a heart attack, and if so (c) whether the attack was caused by, or accelerated by, exertion while at his work, or was caused solely by a pre-existing physical condition. The amount of weekly payment to the claimant was stipulated but the defendants specifically deny "employment of claimant by them and that claimant was injured on the job for defendants." The director made the following findings of fact and award:
"Findings of Fact. I find from the testimony of J. C. Hester, claimant here, in that he was working for Modern Homes Construction Company, defendant herein, on April 8, 1963, constructing houses from plans and specifications supplied to him by defendant; that defendant furnished the necessary building materials, and claimant furnished the necessary labor; that his immediate supervisor was Jack Seago; that witness was moving bundles of roofing on the roof of the house, weight about eighty pounds each, and 'I had a seizure' causing pain in the arms and a 'crushing pain in the left chest'; that following the 'seizure' the pain subsided and witness returned to his work and helped finish the roofing job; that on April 18, 1963, witness saw a doctor who hospitalized him after having the same type seizure, 'laid ahold of me again' while working at a house for Modern Homes removing a set of steps therefrom for the purpose of making repairs to the porch; that witness returned to his job within about three days from hospitalization and light duty, or no work at all, and as a supervisor for about six weeks to the month of December, 1963, when witness took a job as building supervisor at $100.00 per week; that witness did not exert himself at the time of the seizure to a greater degree than he normally had in the past; that on this particular job 'I lost lots of time. I was paid by the job, and the longer I stayed, the more expenses I incurred and the less profits I made'; that witness was paid $320.00 for building an eight hundred foot house, and he paid his helpers from the proceeds.
"I find from the testimony of Dr. Morris Davis of Tifton, Georgia, taken by deposition by the respective parties at his office March 21, 1964, and now admitted to this record, that he has professionally treated the claimant herein on several occasions prior to April 18, 1963, when he visited witness' office complaining of pain in his chest radiating down his right arm; that subsequently on April 22, 1963, the claimant was admitted to hospital by witness where he remained about three days, and no abnormalities were found, including the routine examination witness conducted on claimant March 2, 1964; that witness limited claimant to light work because 'I think he had some heart damage while he was doing this particular work.' Q. And you are basing that opinion on what he told you rather than objective findings?' 'A. Right. That's all I have to go by.'
"I find from the testimony of Howard Davis, taken by the parties hereto in deposition form at Valdosta, Georgia, April 18, 1964, and now admitted to this record that he knows J. C. Hester, claimant herein; that on April 8, 1964, witness was driving a truck for his employer making a delivery of building materials on the job site where claimant was at work; that while assisting claimant in loading bundles of roofing onto a housetop, claimant came down from the roof complaining of being sick, and after the roofing was unloaded, witness 'went on into Gainesville' and 'that's all I know about it.'
"I further find that no evidence appears from the record in this matter that the mandatory provisions of the Georgia Code Section 114-303 was complied with in this matter, and nothing appears herein to authorize a finding that an exception or excuse for not notifying defendant should be entertained. Therefore, it is presumed that defendants waived the required notice to employer under the Act, which otherwise would have authorized a dismissal on proper motion.
"I further find that no evidence appears in this matter that claimant suffered a compensable accident and injury arising out of, in the course of, or because of his employment, as contemplated by the Workmen's compensation Act of Georgia, nor was it a contributing proximate cause. 'Personal injury shall mean only injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment and shall not . . . include a disease in any form except where it results naturally and unavoidably from the accident, nor shall injury and personal injury include . . . heart disease, heart attack, the failure or occlusion of any of the coronary blood vessels or thrombosis unless it is shown by preponderance of competent and creditable evidence that it was attributable to the performance of the usual work of employment.' See the Georgia Code Section 114-102, Acts 1963. 106 Ga. App. 441.
"I therefore find as a matter of fact from all the evidence adduced in this matter and conclude as a matter of law that the burden in a workmen's compensation claim is on the claimant in the first instant to establish claim under the Act with competent evidence that a compensable, disabling injury occurred to him arising out of and in the course of his employment. I find that the burden was not carried by claimant herein, which was a necessary prerequisite to entitle him to an award for compensation benefits. Accordingly, I find that the within claim of J. C. Hester against Modern Homes Construction Company and/or Fireman's Fund Insurance Company should be hereby denied for the above stated reasons.
"Award. Wherefore, based upon the above and foregoing Findings of Fact and conclusions of law applicable thereto, the claim of J. C. Hester, claimant, against Modern Homes Construction Company, employer, and/or Fireman's Fund Insurance Company, insurer, must be denied hereby because claimant failed to carry the burden of proof with competent evidence that he sustained a compensable, disabling injury to himself arising out of, in the course of and because of his alleged employment with Modern Homes Construction Company, defendant, as contended by claimant, and it is so ordered."
Upon review, the full board adopted the findings of fact of the director and made the award of the director the award of the full board. The claimant appealed to the superior court and the superior court entered the following order from which the alleged employer and insurer appealed to this court: "It is the opinion of this court, upon a proper legal construction and consideration thereof as a whole, that the claimant made out such a case as entitled him to compensation, as follows:
"The sum of $37.00 per week for 6 weeks, which is based upon a stipulated average weekly wage of $173.81, less 30% deducted for labor assistance, less 5% workmen's compensation insurance.
"The further sum of $25.79 per week beginning December 27, 1963, at which time he began working for the same employer at a reduced salary of $100.00 per week, less his expenses at McRae, Georgia, of $30.00 per week, or a net of $70.00 per week, representing a difference of $42.98 between what he was receiving under his original employment, for a period of 350 weeks, until changed or modified.
"Also, the further sum of $41.00 medical bills, and $70.00 for his hospital expenses while sick.
"Upon the question raised by the claimant as to the constitutionality of the Act of the Legislature, Georgia Laws 1963, page 142, approved March 15, 1963, Park's Annotated Code of Georgia, section 114-102, it is the opinion of this court that this amendment to the Workmen's Compensation laws of Georgia, and especially that portion of said amendment pertaining to heart injury and the rule of evidence sought to be applied thereto is discriminatory and in contravention of the general laws and rules of evidence in civil actions as laid down and provided for in sections 38-105 and 38-106 of the Civil Code of Georgia, of 1933 (Park's Annotated Code of Georgia), providing that: 'In all civil cases, the preponderance of evidence is considered sufficient to produce mental conviction.' And said amendment seeks to place upon a claimant in a civil proceeding for damages for heart injury a greater burden than the general rules of evidence provide, and is, therefore, unconstitutional, and since the award indicated that it was based upon this erroneous provision of the said amendment, it is held to be error.
"Therefore, the award of the State Board of Workmen's Compensation is hereby respectfully reversed in accordance with this order.
"It is so ordered, this the 8th day of June, 1966."