Summary
finding that plaintiff, an African-American woman, established a prima facie case of race discrimination by showing that she was replaced by a Latina woman
Summary of this case from Bamba v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec. (Dhs-Fps)Opinion
No. 02 CIV. 7942 (CBM)
December 9, 2003
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Defendant Planned Parenthood of New York City, Inc. ("Planned Parenthood") has moved, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for summary judgment to dismiss the complaint of plaintiff Barbara J. Finney ("Finney"), which alleges a discriminatory termination on the basis of age, race and/or ethnicity in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. ("ADEA"), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000(e), et seq. ("Title VII"), Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ("Section 1981"), the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. L. § 290, et seq. ("NYSHRL"), and the New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-101, et seq. ("TSTTCHRL"). For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted, and the complaint dismissed with prejudice.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a 62-year-old African American woman, born on March 6, 1941. Defendant is a not-for-profit provider of reproductive health care, which operates three medical centers, in Manhattan, the Bronx, and Brooklyn, and has a special focus on serving teenage patients. Plaintiff was hired by defendant on August 9, 1977, to work as a Registered Nurse at the organization's Bronx Center. In June 1979, she was promoted to the position of Nurse Practitioner. Her responsibilities in this position included counseling, providing medical care and treatment, making clinical diagnoses and devising treatment plans. She remained in that position until her termination on July 26, 2001.
Defendant alleges that plaintiff's termination was precipitated by three episodes that occurred in 2001. First, on January 11, 2001, a teenage patient made an anonymous complaint that she found an examination conducted by plaintiff to be "rough and rude," and that when she expressed pain upon insertion of the speculum, plaintiff stated that "you wouldn't be screaming if it were something else going on in there." At a meeting held on February 2, 2001, and attended by plaintiff, Robin Fins, Planned Parenthood's Vice President of Human Resources, and Jan St. Hill, the Bronx Center Director, plaintiff denied that she had made these comments. Fins Aff. at 108. Plaintiff claims that she was "told that the investigation was concluded and that the alleged complaint against me was unfounded." Finney Aff. ¶ 10.
Second, on February 10, 2001, an anonymous memo from "The Bronx Center" was sent to T.C. Westcott, Planned Parenthood's Senior Vice President for Clinical Services and Chief Financial Officer. The memo stated that the center was having a "very big problem" with plaintiff, and listed a number of complaints, including alleged "mistreatment" of patients, "speak[ing] to counselors as if she is the boss around here," talking to patients "like they are not worth anything," and "tell[ing] some of the prenatal teens that she think [sic] they should have an AB [abortion] done because they are to [sic] young and can not afford to take care of babies when they are babes themselves." The memo ended "The staff would like a one on one conference with you. We want to stop the abuse that Barbara is given [sic] to the patient [sic] and to the staff at the Bronx center. T.C please help us and help us save the center." On March 9, 2003, plaintiff met with T.C. Westcott, Robin Fins, and Jan St. Hill, and complied with a request that she supply names of staff members whom they could ask about the allegations. Finney denied any wrongdoing, and stated that she had "followed proper protocol in advising patients as to their options." Compl. ¶ 23. On March 23, 2001, the same group held a further meeting, at which Jan St. Hill and Robin Fins told plaintiff that no disciplinary measures were warranted, but that staff sometimes had a concern about plaintiff's tone of voice. Plaintiff claims that "after an investigation conducted by Ms. St. Hill, the allegations were found to be false" and she was "cleared of all charges allegations [sic] therein." Pl.'s Rule 56.1 Statement ¶ 13.
Third, defendant alleges that in or about July 2001, the mother of a teenage patient complained that plaintiff had knowingly left the patient waiting for an examination, undressed and unattended, while she went to have lunch, and that during the examination she was physically and verbally harsh with the patient, with the result that the patient refused to return to the Bronx Center. The patient is alleged to have confirmed this account. Plaintiff claims that the patient waited no longer than was necessary. Finney Aff. ¶ 11.
After plaintiff's discharge, many of her responsibilities were taken on by Sandra Maldonado, a Latina woman who was at that time over the age of fifty. Westcott Aff. ¶ 17, Westcott Dep. at 103. However, Ms. Westcott has denied that Ms. Maldonado was "the person" who replaced Finney, stating that the family planning services in the Bronx, such as plaintiff used to provide, are now provided by Marquita Wright and Ms. Maldonado. Westcott Dep. at 104. Ms. Wright is an African American woman in her early thirties. Westcott Aff. Ex. A.
Plaintiff also draws the court's attention to the employment history of three older black former employees of defendant. Plaintiff alleges that their employment histories indicate a "plan, practice and pattern" of defendant to terminate black and older employees, of which her termination was also a part. Compl. ¶¶ 21, 28. Dr. Fritz Charles had his position as a provider of family planning services eliminated in or after 1999, when he was in his sixties, on the ground that such services could be performed in a more cost-effective way by Advanced Practice Clinicians than by physicians. He was replaced by Marquita Wright, an African American woman in her early thirties. Westcott Aff., Ex. A. Dr. Irving Rust (now deceased) resigned in the late 1990s, when he was in his sixties, despite having allegedly stated many times that he wished to serve Planned Parenthood until his death. Finney Aff. ¶ 12; Finney Dep. at 44. Plaintiff claims that, since 1997, he had often told her that the new administration of Planned Parenthood was trying to get rid of him. Finney Aff. ¶ 12. Dr. Rust was replaced by Dr. Greenidge, who is black, and at that time in her late thirties. Finney Dep. at 272. Like Finney, both Dr. Rust and Dr. Charles had been employed by defendant for at least 15 years. Finney Dep. at 35. In addition, Morton Maddox (now deceased), a black male in his sixties, retired from his position as Director of Human Resources in late 2001. While he was not replaced at that time, his position has subsequently been filled by a Latina woman in her late thirties.
II. STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Summary judgment is proper where "[t]he pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact is present if the fact "[w]ill affect the outcome of the suit under governing law" and the supporting evidence is "[s]uch that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In evaluating a summary judgment motion, "[t]he judge's function is not . . . to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. "In making its determination, a court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party." Sorlucco v. New York City Police Department, 888 F.2d 4, 5 (2d Cir. 1989). That is to say, the deposition testimony, affidavits, and documentary evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Roge v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 257 F.3d 164, 165 (2d Cir. 2001). The burden is on the movant to demonstrate that no genuine issue exists respecting any material fact. See Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Lt'd P'ship, 22 F.3d 1219, 1223 (2d Cir. 1994). "[I]n moving for summary judgment against a party who will bear the ultimate burden of proof at trial, the movant's burden will be satisfied if he can point to an absence of evidence to support an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim." Goenaga v. March of Dimes Birth Defects Found., 51 F.3d 14, 18 (2d Cir. 1995). Where the nonmoving party bears the ultimate burden of proof at trial, the motion may not be rebutted by restating allegations in the pleadings or statements in the party's own affidavit; rather, the nonmoving party must "[d]esignate Specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct, at 2553 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). Summary judgment is appropriate when the party opposing the motion relies exclusively on "conclusory allegations or denials." R.G. Group, Inc. v. Horn Hardart Co., 751 F.2d 69, 77 (2d Cir. 1984).
The Second Circuit has directed that trial courts "[b]e especially cautious in deciding whether to grant this drastic provisional remedy in a discrimination case, because the employer's intent is often at issue and careful scrutiny may reveal circumstantial evidence supporting an inference of discrimination." Belfi v. Prendergast, 191 F.3d 129, 135 (2d Cir. 1999). It has noted that "in a Title VII action, where a defendant's intent and state of mind are placed in issue, summary judgment is ordinarily inappropriate." Rosen v. Thornburgh, 928 F.2d 528, 533 (2d Cir. 1991). However, it has also made clear that:
"The summary judgment rule would be rendered sterile . . . if the mere incantation of intent or state of mind would operate as a talisman to defeat an otherwise valid motion. Indeed, the salutary purposes of summary judgment — avoiding protracted, expensive and harassing trials — apply no less to discrimination cases than to commercial or other areas of litigation." Afeiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 998 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 829, 106 S.Ct. 91 (1985).
III. ANALYSIS OF PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS
A. Plaintiff's Federal Claims
Title VII provides, in pertinent part, that "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
The language of the ADEA mirrors that of Title VII:
It shall be unlawful for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual [of at least 40 years of age] or otherwise discriminate against any [such] individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1).
In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination, courts analyze claims brought under Title VII and the ADEA under the burden-shifting framework first articulated by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). See, e.g., Zimmermann v. Assocs. First Capital Corp., 251 F.3d 376 (2d Cir. 2001) (Title VII); Schnabel v. Abramson, 232 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2000) (ADEA). Under the McDonnell Douglas analysis, plaintiff "has the initial burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination.'" Carlton, 202 F.3d 129, 134 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981)). To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under either Title VII or the ADEA, a plaintiff must show (1) that he or she was a member of a protected group, (2) that he or she was qualified for the position in question, (3) that he or she was discharged from that position, and (4) that the discharge occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. See Windham v. Time Warner. Inc., 275 F.3d 179, 187 (2d Cir. 2001) (Title VII); Schnabel, 232 F.3d at 87 (ADEA). The evidence necessary to satisfy this initial burden is de minimis. See, e.g., Zimmermann, 251 F.3d at 381 (2d Cir. 2001). The mere fact that a plaintiff was replaced by someone outside the protected class will suffice for the required inference of discrimination at the prima facie stage of Title VII analysis. Id.
Under either statute, once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant, which is required to offer a legitimate, non-discriminatory rationale for its actions. Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 138 (2d Cir. 2003). This burden is merely "one of production, not persuasion; it can involve no credibility assessment." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 US. 133, 142, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2106, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). The employer's explanation of its reasons must, however, be "clear and specific." Meiri, 759 F.2d at 997.
Once the employer has articulated non-discriminatory reasons for the challenged employment actions, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to come forward with evidence that the employer's proffered explanations were merely pretextual and that the actual motivations more likely than not were discriminatory. Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 239 F.3d 456, 469 (2d Cir. 2001)."[A] plaintiff's prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer's asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated." Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148, 120 S.Ct, at 2109. "[I]n other circumstances," however, "a prima facie case, combined with falsity of the employer's explanation, will not be sufficient" to carry plaintiff's burden. McGuinness v. Lincoln Hall, 263 F.3d 49, 55 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting James v. New York Racing Ass'n, 233 F.3d 149, 156 (2d Cir. 2000)). Accordingly, the question at this stage of an employment discrimination case, "is simply whether the evidence, taken as a whole, is sufficient to support a reasonable inference that prohibited discrimination occurred." Id. (quoting James, 233 F.3d at 156).
1. The Age Discrimination Claim
Defendant does not contest that plaintiff has satisfied the first three prongs of the prima facie standard for her age discrimination claims, as for her race/ethnicity claims. We find that she has satisfied those three prongs, as an African American over the age of forty at the time of her discharge from a job for which she was qualified. Defendants claim, however, that plaintiff has failed to produce evidence that supports a finding that the discharge occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. As regards the age discrimination claim, we agree. The Second Circuit has offered a non-exclusive list of means by which this prong may be satisfied. Plaintiff has failed to satisfy this prong by those means or by any other. Plaintiff is unable to show that her duties were taken over exclusively by someone outside of her protected class, since while there is evidence that some of plaintiff's duties were taken on by Marquita Wright, See Pl.'s Ex. C at 104-05, who, since she is in her thirties, is outside the protected class, it appears that plaintiffs primary successor was a woman within the protected class, Ms. Maldonaldo, who was over the age of fifty at the time of plaintiff's discharge. In addition, plaintiff has submitted no evidence of colleagues outside her protected class being treated more favorably, or differently in any respect. See, e.g., Meiri, 759 F.2d at 998. None of defendant's staff made any discriminatory remarks or otherwise exhibited signs that they were motivated by plaintiff's age. See Holtz v. Rockefeller Co. Inc., 258 F.3d 62, 82 (2d Cir. 2001). Indeed, plaintiff has failed to submit evidence of any occasions on which references to her age were made by any member of defendant's staff. See Tarshis v. The Riese Org., 195 F. Supp.2d 518, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff'd 66 Fed. Appx. 238 (2d Cir. 2003). She has produced no specific details to support her allegations that defendant departed from its general policies in discharging her. See Meiri, 759 F.2d at 998. The evidence that plaintiff does offer consists largely of allegations, by herself and others, that discrimination was apparent, or must have been present. Without more, such allegations are insufficient, since "To satisfy Rule 56(e), affidavits must be based upon `concrete particulars,' not conclusory allegations." Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 111 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Meiri, 759 F.2d at 998). While plaintiff attempts to use the employment histories of three individuals as evidence of this alleged discrimination, it is undisputed that two of them, Dr. Rust and Mr. Maddox, resigned. Even if it, as alleged by Dr. Elahi, a former employee of defendant, Planned Parenthood "succe[eded] in getting Dr. Rust to involuntary sic. leave," Elahi Aff. ¶ 13, plaintiff has submitted no admissible evidence that defendant's actions resulted from discrimination. Statements that Dr. Rust "used to say that he would die in the operating room in Planned Parenthood," Finney Dep. at 224, and that plaintiff believes she read a letter from Dr. Rust to Planned Parenthood's management, indicating that "something was going on that made him feel that he was going to be let go," Id., do not constitute a showing that the circumstances of plaintiff's discharge give rise to an inference of discrimination. As for the third employee, Dr. Charles, whose position was eliminated, plaintiff has failed to submit any evidence countering defendant's claim that this action stemmed from a non-discriminatory decision to assign family planning services to Advanced Practice Clinicians, rather than physicians such as Dr. Charles.
The qualification prong must not be interpreted "in such a way as to shift onto the plaintiff an obligation to anticipate and disprove, in his prima facie case, the employer's proffer of a legitimate, non-discriminatory basis for its decision." Slattery v. Swiss Reinsurance America Corp., 248 F.3d 87, 92 (2d Cir. 2001). The showing necessary at this stage "is minimal; plaintiff must show only that he `possesses the basic skills necessary for performance of [the] job.'" Id. (quoting Owens v. New York City Housing Auth., 934 F.2d 405, 409 (2d Cir. 1999)). "As a result, especially where discharge is at issue and the employer has already hired the employee, the inference of minimal qualification is not difficult to draw." Id. It has easily been satisfied by plaintiff, who held this position for over 22 years, receiving consistently favorable evaluations. Plaintiff's final mid-year review, dated 04/24/01, stated that "Barbara is an experienced and knowledgeable Family Planning provider. Her clinical skills are exceptional. She is a thorough examiner and her medical record documentation is excellent. Barbara adheres to all PPFA medical protocols and procedures and all regulatory requirements."
In Chambers, the Second Circuit found that the inference of discriminatory intent could be drawn in several circumstances, including, but not limited to "the employer's continuing, after discharging the plaintiff, to seek applicants from persons of the plaintiffs qualifications to fill that position; or the employer's criticism of the plaintiff's performance in ethnically degrading terms; or its invidious comments about others in the employee's protected group; or the more favorable treatment of employees not in the protected group; or the sequence of events leading to the plaintiff's discharge. Chambers v. TRM Copy Centers Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 37 (2d Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).
The same is true for the two "other Older Doctors who were over 60 years of age and members of minority groups, namely Dr. Kameh and Dr. Caturani," also described by Dr. Elahi as employees that defendant "was able to get rid of." See Elahi Aff ¶ 14.
2. The Race/ Ethnicity Discrimination Claim
Cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 require the presentation of proof in a three-step evidentiary framework that is identical to that applied in cases brought under Title VII. Lopez v. S.B. Thomas, Inc., 831 F.2d 1184, 1188 (2d Cir. 1987). Again, it is only the fourth prong of the prima facie standard that requires analysis, and here there is a closer question. As stated above, from the record before the court it appears that plaintiff's primary successor was a woman within the protected class, Ms. Maldonaldo, who is Latina, while some of plaintiff's duties were taken on by Ms. Wright, See Pl.'s Ex. C at 104-05, who identified herself as African American on defendant's New Hire Information Form. Westcott Aff., Ex. A. Defendant assumes, for the purposes of this motion, that plaintiff is able to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination by showing that her duties were taken on by Ms. Maldonado, a woman outside the protected class. Since we are required at this stage in the proceedings to view the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, Roge, 257 F.3d at 165, we will make the same assumption, and therefore assume that the prima facie case is satisfied. See Zimmermann, 251 F.3d at 381.
Once the prima facie case is satisfied, the burden shifts to the defendant to offer a legitimate, non-discriminatory rationale for its actions. Terry, 336 F.3d at 138. We find that defendant has satisfied this burden, with reasons that are "clear and specific." Meiri, 759 F.2d at 997. Defendant has detailed three complaints against plaintiff within the space of seven months, each of them alleging deep discomfort at plaintiff's conduct, and each of them concerning plaintiff's treatment of teens, whose care is a particular focus of Planned Parenthood.
Thus, to survive this summary judgment motion, plaintiff must show that a reasonable trier of fact could find that defendant's proffered explanations were merely pretextual and that the actual motivations more likely than not were discriminatory. Abdu-Brisson, 239 F.3d at 469. Plaintiff has failed to meet this burden. First, plaintiff has failed to produce sufficient evidence to support a rational finding that the non-discriminatory reasons proffered by the defendant were pretextual. It is unrebutted that the investigation prompted by the first two 2001 complaints led senior members of defendant's staff to feel concern about plaintiff's job performance that they raised with plaintiff at the March 23, 2001, meeting. It is also unrebutted that a further serious complaint was received in July 2001. While plaintiff objects to the affidavit detailing this third complaint on hearsay grounds, we note that the hearsay rule applies only to statements offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted within. The affidavit is of value for purposes other than proof of the truth of the statement asserted within, however, since it indicates the receipt of a third complaint relating to plaintiff's interactions with teenage patients. It is not our function to second-guess defendant's non-discriminatory decisions, since Title VII "does not provide remedies against poorly thought-out or unwise employment actions, but only against racially discriminatory employment actions." Jordan v. Olsten Corp., 11 F. Supp.2d 227, 236 (W.D.N.Y. 2000), aff'd 25 Fed.Appx. 45, 2002 WL 4539 (2d Cir. 2000).
Even if a rational trier of fact could find that defendant's reasons were pretextual, plaintiff has failed to point to evidence that reasonably supports a finding of prohibited discrimination. While it is possible for evidence of falsity of an explanation, combined with the evidence that comprised plaintiff's prima facie case, to suffice to survive a summary judgment motion, Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148, 120 S.Ct, at 2109, the prima facie showing in this case is insufficiently strong, consisting as it does of no more than the fact that the person taking primary responsibility for the continuation of plaintiff's duties was, as a Latina, outside the protected class. The filling of plaintiff's position by an individual outside of her protected class is not enough, absent evidence suggestive of discrimination, to satisfy plaintiff's burden at this stage. Gumbs v. Hall, 51 F. Supp.2d 275, 280 (W.D.N.Y. 1999), aff'd, 205 F.3d 1323 (2d Cir. 2000). We find that allegations by plaintiff and others that the employment histories of other former employees of defendant indicate a "plan, practice and pattern" of discrimination fail, without more, to create a genuine issue as to whether plaintiff's discharge was the product of discrimination.
After the Supreme Court's recent decision in Reeves, the court must examine each case to "determine whether the plaintiff could satisfy his ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff." Windham v. Time Warner, Inc., 275 F.3d 179, 187-88 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Schnabel, 232 F.3d at 90).
The Supreme Court in Reeves recommended a case-specific approach at this stage of summary judgment proceedings, urging a reviewing court to consider a number of factors, including "the strength of the plaintiff's prima facie case, the probative value of the proof that the employer's explanation is false, and any other evidence that supports the employer's case and that properly may be considered on a motion for judgment as a matter of law." Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148-49, 120 S.Ct. at 2109.
B. Plaintiff's State and City Claims
Plaintiff's claims brought under the New York State Human Rights Law are analyzed under the same burden-shifting scheme as plaintiff's ADEA and Title VII claims. Leopold v. Baccarat, Inc., 174 F.3d 261, 264 n. 1 (2d Cir. 1999); Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1180 (2d Cir. 1992). The same is true of cases brought under the New York City Human Rights Law. Abdu-Brisson, 239 F.3d at 466; Brennan v. Metropolitan Opera Assoc., Inc., No. 95 Civ. 2926, 1998 WL 193204, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), aff'd, 192 F.3d 310 (2d Cir. 1999). For the reasons stated in Part A, defendant is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's state and city claims.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion for summary judgment is hereby granted, and plaintiff's complaint is dismissed with prejudice. The pre-trial conference scheduled for December 12, 2003, is, accordingly, canceled.
SO ORDERED.