Opinion
No. 27344.
October 22, 1928.
1. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS. Assessment of property of consolidated school district for school purposes need not be made on separate roll or separate part thereof; assessment of school property is sufficient, though general assessment appears on same page ( Laws 1924, chapter 283, section 104).
Under section 104, chapter 283, of the Laws of 1924, providing for a separate assessment of the property of the consolidated school district for school purposes, it is not necessary that a separate assessment roll be made, or that the assessment of the school property be assessed upon a separate part of the roll. Where the roll contains a column indicating the school district and the lands in such district in an appropriate place on the roll, it is sufficient, although the same page and line also shows an assessment of the property for general state and county purposes.
2. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS. Assessment of personal property for school purposes is sufficient, if it is assessed to owner on sufficient roll at election precinct.
Where the personal property of a taxpayer is situated in a school district and is assessed at an election precinct to the owner of the property, it is a sufficient assessment of the personal property for school purposes that it be assessed on the roll to the owner of the property at the precinct, where the roll is sufficient to show that the property was located within the district, where the owner's residence or place of business is situated.
APPEAL from chancery court of Stone county; HON. V.A. GRIFFITH, Chancellor.
V.B. Parker, for appellant.
The only question before the court is whether or not there was a separate assessment of the property in said district sufficient to support a levy of special school tax as required by section 104, chapter 283, Laws 1924, which statute was expressly construed in Morgan et al. v. Wood, Tax Collector, et al., 140 Miss. 137, 106 So. 435, which case we consider directly in point.
Appellee in the court below contended that the real and personal property in said district was separately assessed and both in the answer and in argument before the court contended that the assessment was made in strict compliance with instructions of the state tax commission in that opposite each description of land a word appeared which might indicate in what district that particular piece of property lay and that it was not necessary to make any separate total of any kind of the valuation of the property in said district or to list the property separately as is done in separate school districts, while appellant contended that the blanks furnished by the state tax commission and filed herewith as exhibits in this record had special columns prepared thereon for the extension of the property in each respective district but that this extension would not satisfy the law as to having the property separately assessed for the reason that such would not be a separate assessment of said property and it was and is the contention of appellant, that an assessment of the property of Magnolia consolidated school district should have been and was required by law to be made separate and distinct from the property in other districts in the county, just as was and is the property in Wiggins separate school district, separately assessed; in other words, the statute expressly provides that "The tax assessor shall make a separate assessment of the property of such district, and the county tax collector shall collect the taxes required each year of such district as other taxes are collected, and deposit the same with the county treasurer to the credit of the district for which it was levied;" the defendant himself, testified that he made the assessment roll as assessor, previous to taking office as tax collector and that there was nothing in the entire assessment rolls including the recapitulation thereof to indicate the separate total value of the property in said district or in any other consolidated school district in said county.
Appellant, therefore, says that the assessment was not made as required by the law and was not such a valid assessment as will support the thirty-five mill levy made by the board of supervisors and that the levy of said tax by the board of supervisors was and is void and that the tax collector had no authority to enforce collection of said tax and that complainant was entitled decree declaring the assessment and levy to be void and to writ of injunction prayed for.
The word "separate" assessment has a well-defined meaning and is almost too common to permit a discussion of its definition, however, the definition in Black's Law Dictionary on page 1072, is as follows:
SEPARATE. Individual; distinct; particular, disconnected. Generally used in law as opposed to "joint," though the more usual antithesis of the latter term is "several." Either of these words implies division, distribution, disconnection, or aloofness. See Merrill v. Pepperdine, 9 Ind. App. 416, 36 N.E. 921; Larzelere v. Starkweather, 38 Mich. 104.
Broadus Broadus, for appellee.
The sole question in the court below and the sole question before this court, as admitted by the appellant in its brief, is whether or not the property in the Magnolia consolidated school district was separately assessed as the law requires. The appellee admits that the law required that the property in consolidated school districts be separately assessed, but the appellee contends that the property in Magnolia consolidated school district was and is separately assessed, and the appellant contends that it is not separately assessed. The question at issue therefore before the chancellor was one of fact and he found as a fact that the property, both real and personal in said school district was separately assessed as the law required.
The appellant in relying on the case of Morgan et al. v. Wood, Tax Collector, et al., 140 Miss. 137, 106 So. 435, and we concede that case to be good authority, but the only trouble with appellant's position is that the state of facts in the case at bar does not coincide with the case of Morgan v. Wood. Let us see how entirely dissimilar the case at bar is from the case above referred to. In that case the bill alleged that there has been no separate assessment of the property in the school district and to this bill there was filed a demurrer which demurrer was by the court sustained. The demurrer was an admission that there was no separate assessment of the property in the school district. It was further shown that no separate assessment of the property had been made in that case by the order of the board of supervisors, which order directed that no separate assessment be made but that the tax collector collect the said special levy from the previous assessments, but failing to state the assessment roll or rolls which they referred to, many previous assessments having been made. It is further stated in the opinion in this case that the boundary lines of the said school district did not follow the government surveys, but that said boundary lines cut across forties and followed in many instances, creeks, roads and other devious trails, and under the circumstances it would be impossible for the tax collector to determine just what lands were included in said school district unless the said lands were separately assessed by the assessor. See section 8213 of Hemingway's Code 1927; sec. 6917 of the Code of 1917.
The law gives the state tax commission the authority to prescribe the form of the assessment rolls (see section 9397 of Hemingway's Code of 1927, section 7769, Code of 1917), and accordingly the state tax commission prepared the rolls on which the lands of Stone county were assessed and on each roll, both real and personal, there are columns made in which the assessor is to show what school district or road district the land is located in or the personal property is in as, the case may be, and in the case at bar the assessor used the rolls as required by the state tax commission and just as all rolls in the state are made up.
In conclusion we wish to call the court's attention to the fact that appellant shows in his bill that the lands and property in Stone county were separately assessed as to school districts. In the bill it is alleged as follows: "Complainant respectfully shows that on page 103 of the Stone county assessment roll for 1926-1927 under which this tax is being demanded, is found assessed all of sections 16, 17, 18 and 19, 2-12. Section 16 being in Bond consolidated school district, sections 17 and 18 in Eureka and section 19 in Magnolia." Thus he admits that section 16 is assessed in Bond school district, sections 17 and 18 in Eureka school district, and section 19 in Magnolia. This of course shows that this property has been separately assessed under the meaning of the law, but when appellant was making these allegations in his bill he was laboring under the erroneous idea that section 16 should have been assessed over in the front part of the roll under "Bond consolidated school," and that sections 17 and 18 should have been placed somewhere near the middle of the roll under "Eureka consolidated school district" and that section 19 should have been assessed over near the back of the roll under the heading "Magnolia consolidated school district" and thus the land would have been separately assessed under school districts according to the idea of appellant. We, however, fail to see how the assessor could have so assessed the property in this manner and still complied with the law on the subject.
Argued orally by U.B. Parker, for appellant.
The appellant, Finkbine Lumber Company, filed a bill in the chancery court of Stone county to enjoin the sheriff and tax collector from collecting taxes against the real and personal property of the company in the Magnolia consolidated school district in said county for the years 1926 and 1927, setting forth in the bill the description of the property and the assessment thereof, and alleging:
"All of which land was and is assessed on the assessment rolls of said county, now in the hands of the defendant together, so that the lands in the various consolidated school districts in said county are assessed on one and the same page, and the valuation of said land included in the total valuations on such pages, making the said assessment absolutely void under the law."
And it alleges that the said assessment of its said land and personal property, as well as all the other land and personal property in said district is absolutely void; but, notwithstanding this fact, the assessment rolls for said year have been turned over to the sheriff and tax collector, the defendant herein, and that said defendant has demanded that complainant pay the taxes on said land and personal property, including the thirty-five mills of special levy made for school purposes in said district, and, unless restrained from so doing, the said sheriff and tax collector will advertise and sell complainant's land and personal property for such taxes; that complainant offered to pay such taxes as were found to be due by it on said property, and prayed for a decree declaring the special levy of thirty-five mills on taxable property belonging to the complainant in the said Magnolia consolidated school district to be void and of no force and effect, and declaring the assessment of all the real and personal property of the complainant in said district to be void, and the said special levy to be void in so far as it applied to the special school tax.
The bill was answered, and proof taken on motion to dissolve the injunction so granted in behalf of the complainant. As shown on the assessment roll of the county, the assessment of the school tax in each of the several consolidated school districts was assessed to the owner of the land in the column "Name of Owner," the description of the land by section, township, and range in the column "Description of Land or Division of Section," the value of the property in the column "Grand Total Valuation," and under the heading "School and Road Districts" was written the name of the school district in which the property lay, and, if not in a school district, the column was left blank. On the personal roll, the personal property owned by the appellant was assessed under the heading or title of a precinct, by name.
The contention of the appellant is that this does not constitute a separate assessment of the property; that there should have been an entirely separate book, or a separate portion of the county assessment roll, land or personal, where the assessment of the property for school district purposes would appear entirely separate from the assessment page showing the assessment for state and county purposes. And it is contended that section 104, chapter 283, Laws of 1924, providing for a separate assessment of property for school district purposes, requires it to be placed on a separate roll, or on a separate and distinct part of the assessment roll of the county, physically separated from the part of the roll showing the state and county taxes; and the case of Morgan et al. v. Wood, Tax Collector, 140 Miss. 137, 106 So. 435, is cited as authority for this contention. And it is further contended that the chancellor erred in dissolving the injunction, and granting a judgment in favor of the county.
We do not think the above-cited case is authority for the proposition contended for. In that case there had been no indication or marking of the regular assessment rolls, so as to show that the property was assessed for the purposes of a school district; the levy of taxes for school purposes was not placed on any roll, but was to be applied to a previous assessment.
The words "separate assessment" do not necessarily import a separate book for separate assessment rolls, or a separate part of the county assessment rolls. If the assessment rolls are so marked as to indicate the assessment for school purposes, so that the taxpayer, in passing upon the assessment when he is called upon to appear and raise objection thereto, may be advised by the assessment roll with what he is assessed, we see no particular reason for having lands assessed for taxes in two separate places. We see no reason why the method by which the taxes so assessed is not sufficient to fully advise the taxpayer of what he is called upon to pay, and the liability of the property therefor.
On the rolls before us the taxpayer is distinctly advised that the property is assessed for the general state and county taxes, and for the consolidated school district tax, and the valuation of the land for both purposes is the same. It is not necessary to have different valuations on property. Indeed, it would be improper to value land at one price for one assessment, and at another price for another assessment. The column "Valuation" indicates merely the value of the land. The assessment roll shows a separate assessment, under the heading "Valuation," for state and county purposes, and for school district purposes, and this is all that is required of the assessment roll.
It is complained that the taxpayer is merely assessed at a precinct, named thereon, on the personal roll, and that some of the territory embraced in the said precinct constitutes lands in the consolidated school district. Of course, the assessment on the personal roll "at a precinct" at which the taxpayer is assessable is to be construed as assessing him at his place of residence, or business, or where his property may be situated within the named precinct, and we think the assessment was sufficiently definite to advise each property owner of the nature of the assessment against him, and the levy of the several taxes by the board of supervisors shows what amount of the tax is to be applied by the valuation of the assessment roll.
We are therefore of the opinion that the chancellor was right in dissolving the injunction, and his decree is accordingly affirmed.
Affirmed.