Summary
applying New York's mere department analysis when confronted with arguments that personal jurisdiction exists on the basis of a defendant's role in "a highly integrated enterprise"
Summary of this case from Henao v. Parts Auth., LLCOpinion
2013-03-26
FIMBANK P.L.C., Plaintiff–Appellant, v. WOORI FINANCE HOLDINGS CO. LTD., et al., Defendants–Respondents.
Sullivan & Worcester LLP, New York (Michael T. Sullivan of counsel), for appellant. Burke & Parsons, New York (Stephen P. Kyne of counsel), for Woori Finance Holdings co., LTD., and Woori Bank, respondents.
Sullivan & Worcester LLP, New York (Michael T. Sullivan of counsel), for appellant. Burke & Parsons, New York (Stephen P. Kyne of counsel), for Woori Finance Holdings co., LTD., and Woori Bank, respondents.
Choi & Park, LLC, New York (Chull S. Park of counsel), for Kwangju Bank LTD., respondent.
FRIEDMAN, J.P., MOSKOWITZ, DeGRASSE, RICHTER, GISCHE, JJ.
Orders, Supreme Court, New York County (Barbara R. Kapnick, J.), entered September 14, 2012, which granted defendants' motions to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(8) and CPLR 327, unanimously affirmed, without costs.
In this action arising from two letters of credit issued in Korea to plaintiff, a Maltese corporation, defendants, commercial banks, are headquartered in Korea, and are wholly owned subsidiaries of defendant Woori Finance Holdings (WFH), a Korean holding company. The letters of credit were made for the benefit of plaintiff's customer, a company located in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, in connection with the purchase of scrap steel which was to be shipped from Japan to South Korea. Defendant banks made the decision to dishonor the letters of credit in Korea.
The motion court properly granted the motions by defendants WFH and Kwangju Bank LTD. to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction (CPLR 3211[a][8] ). Defendants are not “engaged in such a continuous and systematic course of ‘doing business' here as to warrant a finding of [their] ‘presence’ in this jurisdiction” ( McGowan v. Smith, 52 N.Y.2d 268, 272, 437 N.Y.S.2d 643, 419 N.E.2d 321 [1981],quoting Simonson v. International Bank, 14 N.Y.2d 281, 251 N.Y.S.2d 433, 200 N.E.2d 427 [1964] ). Nor are there contacts with New York “so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities” ( Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 2846, 2853, 180 L.Ed.2d 796 [2011],quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 310, 318, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 [1945];see also Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 95 [2d Cir.2000], cert. denied532 U.S. 941, 121 S.Ct. 1402, 149 L.Ed.2d 345 [2001] ).
Plaintiff contends that all three defendants are part of a highly integrated enterprise, led and dominated by WFH. However, even assuming Woori Bank is subject to personal jurisdiction here, WFH is not subject to personal jurisdiction based on its ownership of Woori Bank ( see Moreau v. RPM, Inc., 20 A.D.3d 456, 457, 799 N.Y.S.2d 113 [2nd Dept. 2005] ). Plaintiff has not established that WFH's control over Woori Bank's activities is so complete that Woori Bank is in fact “merely a department” of WFH ( Delagi v. Volkswagenwerk AG of Wolfsburg, Germany, 29 N.Y.2d 426, 432, 328 N.Y.S.2d 653, 278 N.E.2d 895 [1972] ). It has shown only common ownership, demonstrating that WFH is simply a holding company. WFH does not control defendants finances, interfere with the selection and assignment of executive personnel or fail to observe the corporate formalities ( Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 751 F.2d 117 [2d Cir.1984] ). Nor does the SEC Form 20–F, relied on by plaintiff, establish pervasive control by WFH. The form's language describes an appropriate parental role of WFH in supervising its subsidiaries.
Plaintiff's alternate request for jurisdictional discovery was properly denied. Plaintiff failed to show that the requested discovery could adduce facts establishing personal jurisdiction in New York ( see Peterson v. Spartan Indus., 33 N.Y.2d 463, 467, 354 N.Y.S.2d 905, 310 N.E.2d 513 [1974] ).
The motion court providently exercised its discretion in dismissing the complaint as to Woori Bank on the ground of forum non conveniens ( seeCPLR 327; Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 62 N.Y.2d 474, 478–80, 478 N.Y.S.2d 597, 467 N.E.2d 245 [1984],cert. denied469 U.S. 1108, 105 S.Ct. 783, 83 L.Ed.2d 778 [1985];Shin–Etsu Chem. Co., Ltd. v. ICICI Bank Ltd., 9 A.D.3d 171, 178, 777 N.Y.S.2d 69 [1st Dept. 2004] ). This dispute has no substantial nexus with New York and the resolution of this case may require consideration of Korean law. Contrary to plaintiff's contention, even though the letters of credit are subject to the terms and conditions of the UCP, “the UCP does not cover every contingency and the meaning of the letter's terms will have to be determined by reference to the law governing the transaction” ( Shin–Etsu, 9 A.D.3d at 176, 777 N.Y.S.2d 69).
Korea is an adequate alternative forum for this dispute. There is no evidence to support plaintiff's allegations and speculation about bias in the Korean courts in favor of defendants. Meager and conclusory allegations are insufficient to support a finding of bias by a foreign court ( see In re Arbitration between Monegasque De Reassurances S.A.M. v. Nak, 311 F.3d 488, 499 [2nd Cir.2002] ).