Filtration Development Co., LLC v. U.S.

12 Citing cases

  1. Impresa Construzioni Geom. Domenico Garufi v. U.S.

    No. 99-400C, c/w 01-708C (Fed. Cl. Oct. 21, 2011)

    "A government-contract case does not require the kind of specialized knowledge or skill that would justify an enhanced award." Id. (citing Prowest Diversified, Inc. v. United States, 40 Fed. Cl. 879, 889 (1998); Filtration Dev. Co. v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 612, 624 (2005); Cal. Marine Cleaning, Inc. v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 724, 732 (1999)). Plaintiff does not argue that its attorneys had some distinctive knowledge or specialized skill needed for the litigation.

  2. Garufi v. United States

    No. 99-400C (Fed. Cl. Oct. 21, 2011)

    "A government-contract case does not require the kind of specialized knowledge or skill that would justify an enhanced award." Id. (citing Prowest Diversified, Inc. v. United States, 40 Fed. Cl. 879, 889 (1998); Filtration Dev. Co. v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 612, 624 (2005); Cal. Marine Cleaning, Inc. v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 724, 732 (1999)). Plaintiff does not argue that its attorneys had some distinctive knowledge or specialized skill needed for the litigation.

  3. Greenhill v. U.S.

    No. 07-854 C (Fed. Cl. Jan. 21, 2011)   Cited 6 times

    The fees attributable to preparing the EAJA application will also be reduced by 60%. See Filtration Dev. Co. v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 612, 627 (2005) (reducing the total fees including those attributable to the EAJA application by 40%); Baldi Bros. Constructors v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 78, 84-85 (reducing plaintiff's total fee request including fees attributable to the EAJA application by 33.3%); KMS Fusion, 39 Fed. Cl. at 603 (reducing fees attributable to the EAJA application by same percentage, 60%, that pre-judgment fees were reduced). The Government argues that the Federal Circuit held in Hubbard that any award of attorneys' fees cannot be grossly disproportionate to the actual damages obtained.

  4. Fernandez de Iglesias v. United States

    No. 08-464C (Fed. Cl. Dec. 22, 2010)

    The general "American Rule" for attorney's fees requires each party to bear its own fees, unless a statute, such as the EAJA, provides otherwise. SeeHensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983); Filtration Dev. Co. v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 612, 615 (2005). The EAJA partially waives sovereign immunity for fees in order to ease the burden of challenging unreasonable government action.

  5. United Partition Systems, Inc. v. U.S.

    No. 03-1242C (Fed. Cl. Oct. 12, 2010)   Cited 4 times
    In United Partition, the Court's review of Federal Circuit precedent led it to conclude that expenses that are also taxable costs may be awarded either pursuant to EAJA or pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920 "so long as there is statutory authorization for costs or expenses."

    This court has concluded that a plaintiff experiences "partial or limited success" typically where the plaintiff fails on the majority of its claims or recovers significantly less damages than the amount it originally sought. See, e.g., Dalles Irrigation Dist., 91 Fed. Cl. at 703-04 (reducing attorneys' fees where plaintiff succeeded on three of its seven claims and recovered only 18% of the damages sought); CEMS, Inc v. United States, 65 Fed. Cl. 473, 483-84 (2005) (reducing award where plaintiff prevailed on only nine of its thirty claims and received slightly less than 24% of the damages it sought); Filtration Dev. Co., LLC v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 612, 627 (2005) (reducing plaintiff's award where court enjoined only one-quarter of the procurement at issue); Baldi Bros. Constructors v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 78, 82-84 (2002) (reducing attorneys' fees incurred in damages trial where plaintiff recovered 55% of the damages sought and the court found that "many of plaintiff's claimed costs" were "subsumed" in its other claims or were "otherwise unsubstantiated"). At an early procedural stage of this case, United Partition successfully resisted a claim by the government that the action should be dismissed on jurisdictional grounds.

  6. Infiniti Information Solutions, LLC v. U.S.

    No. 09-750C (Fed. Cl. Sep. 17, 2010)

    Where "explicit, unambiguous regulations directly contradict" the government's position, that position "will not be found to be reasonable or substantially justified." Geo-Seis, 79 Fed. Cl. at 78 (citing Hillensbeck v. United States, 74 Fed. Cl. 477, 481 (2006)); see also Filtration Dev. Co. v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 612, 621 (2005) ("There is no justification for the government's position when clear, unambiguous regulations directly contradict that position."). SBA's regulations at issue are explicit and unambiguous when applied to the facts at hand, and therefore, regardless of GAO's opinion, the government's position before GAO and this court was not substantially justified.

  7. Turner Construction Co., Inc. v. U.S.

    No. 10-195C, BID PROTEST (Fed. Cl. Jul. 16, 2010)

    Furthermore, precedent from this court and the GAO has never discussed any such requirement but has always referred to waiver as merely one of several options that an agency may pursue. See, e.g., Filtration Dev. Co., LLC v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 418, 422 (2005) ("In appropriate circumstances, the head of the contracting agency is empowered to waive an OCI. . . ."); Nortel Gov'tSolutions, Inc., B-299522.5 (Comp. Gen., Dec. 30, 2008), at 7 n. 5 (noting that there are "situations" in which the FAR allows the head of contracting activity to waive an OCI); Government Bus.Servs. Group, B-287052 (Comp. Gen., Mar. 27, 2001), at 12 (noting that waiver is merely one of several courses that an agency could take, if an OCI were found). The only requirement contained in the text of the FAR is that, if a waiver is requested in writing, the "request and decision shall be included in the contract file."

  8. Savantage Financial Services, Inc. v. U.S.

    No. 08-21C BID PROTEST (Fed. Cl. Sep. 29, 2008)

    Typically, "plaintiffs may be considered `prevailing parties' for attorney's fees purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit." Filtration Dev. Co. v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 612, 618 (2005) (quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (1st Cir. 1978)). Plaintiff here succeeded on all claims in the underlying litigation.

  9. Precision Pine Timber, Inc. v. U.S.

    No. 02-131 C (Fed. Cl. Sep. 9, 2008)   Cited 7 times
    Observing that courts "include within the category of 'prevailing party' applicants that prevail on an issue or issues and achieve some of the benefits sought by the litigation"

    The determining factor is not "the degree of success," but instead "whether there has been an alteration to the legal relationship between the parties." Filtration Dev. Co., LLC v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 612, 618 (2005). While judgments on the merits and court-ordered consent decrees are two means by which a court might alter the parties' legal relationship, they are not exclusive. Rice Servs. v. United States, 405 F.3d 1017, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (prevailing party status "requires a plaintiff to have obtained a court order carrying sufficient `judicial imprimatur' to materially change the legal relationship of the parties.

  10. Geo-Seis Helicopters, Inc. v. U.S.

    No. 07-155C (Fed. Cl. Oct. 31, 2007)

    In short, "there is no justification for the government's position when clear, unambiguous regulations directly contradict that position." Filtration Dev. Co. v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 612, 621 (2005). Accordingly, the government has not met its burden of proving that its position was substantially justified.