Although § 25–5–11(b), Ala.Code 1975, allows for co-employee suits in certain limited circumstances involving willful conduct, this Court has held that such suits are barred by the exclusivity provisions of the LHWCA where the accident falls within the twilight zone of concurrent jurisdiction and the scope of the LHWCA. Fillinger v. Foster, 448 So.2d 321 (Ala.1984). Some courts have recognized an exception to the exclusivity provision of the LHWCA where the employer has committed an intentional tort. Fisher v. Halliburton, 667 F.3d 602 (5th Cir.2012).
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 541, 121 S.Ct. 2404, 2414, 150 L.Ed.2d 532 (2001); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 869-74, 120 S.Ct. 1913, 1919-22, 146 L.Ed.2d 914 (2000). Alabama considered this issue and reached the same conclusion as we reach today.Fillinger v. Foster, 448 So.2d 321 (Ala. 1984). In Fillinger, the longshoreman sued his co-employee for injuries allegedly sustained while working on the job.
§ 933(i). The Alabama Supreme Court, in Fillinger v. Foster, 448 So.2d 321 (Ala. 1984) addressed the reach of this provision, and held that an employee who sued his co-employee for injuries he suffered while working as a ship fitter at a land-based operation was prohibited from suing his co-employee for injuries sustained on the job under the LHWCA. In reaching this conclusion, the Court found that because the LHWCA and Alabama's worker's compensation law was in conflict with respect to the maintenance of co-employee suits, the LHWCA preempted Alabama's worker's compensation law.
This Court has previously decided that the exclusivity provisions of 33 U.S.C. § 933 (i) pre-empt negligence suits by land-based maritime workers against co-employees. Fillinger v. Foster, 448 So.2d 321 (Ala.), cert. denied, Foster v. Fillinger, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 223, 83 L.Ed.2d 153 (1984); Bailey v. Collier, 465 So.2d 381 (Ala. 1985). Therefore, we find that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment.
We can perceive no greater conflict than that which would be presented if we allowed this employee to sue his co-employee because he was a land-based maritime worker, and a maritime worker injured on a navigable water would be precluded from maintaining such a suit; therefore we are persuaded to hold that the exclusivity provisions of [LHWCA] apply and that the state action is barred.Fillinger v. Foster, 448 So.2d 321, 326 (Ala.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 872, 105 S.Ct. 223, 83 L.Ed.2d 153 (1984). Peter's argument against preemption rests primarily on Sun Ship and Hahn and this has occasioned our extended review of the case law necessary to put those cases in proper perspective.
administration of a federal program, the federal law must take precedence. Fillinger v. Foster, 448 So.2d 321 (Ala. 1984). Preemption may occur from explicit preemptive language in a statute, from implied congressional intent, or where state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.
According to the preemption doctrine, any time the law of Alabama is in conflict with federal law, or with the administration of a federal program, the federal law must take precedence. Fillinger v. Foster, 448 So.2d 321 (Ala. 1984). Preemption may occur from explicit preemptive language in a statute, from implied congressional intent, or where state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.
The trial court correctly granted summary judgment against Bailey. As the trial court stated and as this Court recently held in Fillinger v. Foster, 448 So.2d 321 (Ala.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 223, 83 L.Ed.2d 153 (1984), the exclusivity provisions of 33 U.S.C. § 933 (i) pre-empt negligence suits by land-based maritime workers against co-employees. It is undisputed that Bailey is a maritime employee covered by the L.H.W.C.A. and it is further undisputed that Fillinger, supra, is controlling. In fact, rather than arguing the inapplicability of Fillinger, Bailey simply argues that this Court should reconsider and overrule its opinion in that case.
The ground of exclusion was, that the certificate of the tax sale was to Michael Dundon, whereas the deed was to Patrick Michael Dundon, Jr., and these were two different persons and no connection shown between them by assignment. The law only knows one christian name. (Franklin v. Talmadge, 5 Johns. 84; Roosevelt v. Goodwin, 2 Cow. 463.) The law also disregards the word Jr., or junior, as a part of a name.
Tomlin contends the LHWCA is not an exclusive remedy and that his action is not barred by 33 U.S.C. § 933 (i). In Fillinger v. Foster, 448 So.2d 321 (Ala. 1984), the Supreme Court of Alabama held that such an action is barred by 33 U.S.C. § 933 (i) stating: "We are of the opinion that the LHWCA and the law of Alabama [on worker's compensation] are in serious conflict as to the maintenance of co-employee suits, and because that is the case, we hold that the federal law will preempt state law."