Opinion
13-22-00523-CR
08-31-2023
CURTIS LYNN FIELDS, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
Do not publish. Tex.R.App.P. 47.2(b).
On appeal from the 66th District Court of Hill County, Texas.
Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Benavides and Longoria
MEMORANDUM OPINION
GINA M. BENAVIDES JUSTICE
Appellant Curtis Lynn Fields appeals his conviction for injury to an elderly person, a third-degree felony for which punishment was enhanced because of Fields's status as a habitual felony offender. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 22.04(f), 12.42(d). The trial court sentenced Fields to forty years' imprisonment. See id. § 12.42(d). By a single issue, Fields contends the trial court abused its discretion by admitting extraneous-offense evidence. We affirm.
This appeal was transferred to this Court from the Tenth Court of Appeals in Waco by order of the Texas Supreme Court. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 73.001 (granting the supreme court the authority to transfer cases from one court of appeals to another at any time that there is "good cause" for the transfer).
The indictment alleged that "on or about the 24th day of June, 2021, . . . [Fields] did then and there intentionally or knowingly cause bodily injury to Jesse Horn, an individual 65 years of age or older, by striking him in the torso with a closed fist." Trial commenced on September 27, 2022.
According to Investigator Robert White of the Hill County Sheriff's Office, on June 24, 2021, at approximately 11:00 p.m., he met with Horn in the lobby of the Sheriff's Office. Investigator White "[i]mmediately" observed injuries on Horn. Pictures of Horn's injuries were admitted into evidence. During cross-examination, defense counsel asked Investigator White, "Hypothetically, if this man right here, Mr. Horn, had been punched in the chest by a grown man hard enough to knock him on the ground twice, would you have expected to see a mark on his chest?" Investigator White responded, "[Y]es, it's possible, very possible."
The State called Horn, the complainant, to testify. Partway through Horn's testimony, the trial court conducted a hearing outside the jury's presence on the admissibility of testimony about certain extraneous bad acts committed by Fields. Defense counsel objected to the admission of the evidence on the grounds that it violated rules of evidence 401, 403, 404, and 405. See Tex. R. Evid. 401, 403, 404, 405. The trial court ultimately concluded that most of the evidence was admissible under article 38.371 of the code of criminal procedure. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.371. However, the trial court disallowed the admission of other extraneous-offense evidence, including evidence that pertained to a "civil warrant issue" and "what third parties had to say or had to do about . . . any of it." The trial court granted Fields's request for a running objection to the admitted extraneous-offense evidence.
Following the hearing, the trial court instructed the jury as follows:
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I'm going to give you what we call a limiting instruction, and I want you to listen very carefully to what I tell you. There may be some testimony in a few minutes about some other prior acts. This is the instruction that you are given. You are instructed that if there is any testimony before you in this case regarding other crimes, wrongs or acts committed by Mr. Fields, the Defendant over here, against Jesse Horn, the gentleman testifying, you cannot consider that testimony for any purpose, unless you find . . . beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant, Mr. Fields, committed such crimes, wrongs or acts against Jesse Horn, and then you may only consider that testimony for the purpose of its bearing, if any, on the state of mind of the Defendant, Mr. Fields, and of Jesse Horn and their previous and subsequent relationship, but not as evidence or inference of guilt in this case.
Horn testified that he owned a working ranch and hired Fields to work for him. Horn explained that Fields had various duties, including "tak[ing] care of the cattle." At some point during their working relationship, Fields moved in with Horn and the two developed a romantic relationship.
But things eventually soured between the men. Horn testified that Fields's quality of work decreased. When Horn would talk to Fields about his diminished work quality, "it caused a major conflict." Horn testified that, beginning in 2020, he became worried about his personal safety around Fields, "[b]ecause if [they] tried to talk or anything, he'd knock [Horn] down." Horn explained that on June 24, 2020, he asked Fields to bring his car back from Waco. According to Horn,
[W]hen I went out there to meet him, I don't even remember if I said something, and he knocked me down. And anyway, it was-it was a pretty hard lick, and I-I was able to-I think he was high on something, and I was able to get my-get in my car and lock the door. Then I went over . . . to my neighbor's house . . . and called 911.Two days later, Jacob Brunner, Horn's friend "and also the builder expanding [Horn's] house" was visiting when Fields "started saying lots of things." Brunner texted law enforcement. Horn explained that when law enforcement officers arrived, Fields "exposed his butt" to them "and said, 'Are you going to use the rape kit?'"
On December 29, 2020, Fields drove Horn's car to "the very west side" of Horn's property. When it started raining, Horn thought, "I've got to go and bring it back, because it'll get stuck over there, and it'll be expensive to have somebody tow it out." When Horn explained to Fields "what was going on," Fields "started hollering and screaming at" Horn. Fields then "knocked [Horn] down twice, . . . but he did bring the car back." A video from this incident was admitted into evidence and depicts Fields yelling at Horn.
Horn testified that the video was recorded by Fields's friend, "Louis."
Horn testified that on May 20, 2021, he was in his bedroom "eating supper," and Fields entered his room and "wanted to discuss [Horn] giving him more money." Horn explained that he had just paid Fields, that Fields "wasn't really working," and Horn "wasn't going to give him any more money." Fields knocked Horn out of his chair, "he broke two lamps, and threw food all over [Horn]."
Horn explained that sometime after these events, he attempted to evict Fields. However, Horn found the experience to be "very difficult," and he was not able to complete the process. By this point, Horn "had fired [Fields] several times and wanted him to leave [but] he wouldn't leave." This unpleasantness eventually led to the events of June 24, 2021. On that day, Fields told Horn that he had given some gravel, which Horn was planning to use for their own driveway, to their neighbor. Horn told Fields, "[Y]ou're always making decisions that I need to make. We wanted this gravel and now you're giving it away."
Horn testified that as they were exiting the front door onto the front porch, Fields "knocked [Horn] down" by hitting him in the chest. Horn explained that when he fell, "[t]here were lots of planks there, and some of them had nails in them, and I fell on my right side . . . and it was bleeding." Horn got up, and Fields "knocked [him] down again. Every time he knocked [Horn] down, it was always twice." Horn "decided to go to the Sheriff's" because he was worried "this was going to continue and [Fields] could kill [Horn]." Horn did not believe Fields actually "wanted to kill [him], it's just [Fields] gets high and he gets on drugs and he goes crazy."
Brunner testified about his recollection of the events of June 26, 2020, stating, "I went to pick up a check, and I was at the table giving [Horn] my invoice, and he was getting ready to write the check, and then [Fields] came down from the attic and started talking kind of crazy." Specifically, Brunner observed Fields tell Horn, "[Y]our life is precious, I could have killed you at any time, and I'm proud that you fought back when you were on the ground kicking . . . ." Brunner explained that Fields was "kind of irate, you know, just really like angry" when he was speaking. Brunner texted law enforcement, because he was afraid that Fields "could have killed [Horn] or something, and then I-it would be on my conscience." When law enforcement arrived, Fields "was yelling at the [s]heriffs and . . . pulled down his pants in front of the Sheriff."
Julie Freeman, a chiropractor, testified that she administered treatment to both Horn and Fields. Freeman testified that neither Horn nor Fields ever discussed any abuse with her. She did note that Horn confided in her that on June 25, 2021, "he fell to the right but he was able to get up and drove to Hillsboro that same day, and he stated he did not have any other issues or pain at that time."
At the conclusion of trial, the trial court included the following limiting instruction in its jury charge:
In this particular case, you are instructed that if there is any testimony before you regarding other crimes, wrongs, or acts committed by . . . Fields against . . . Horn, you cannot consider that testimony for any purpose unless you so find and believe, beyond a reasonable doubt, that . . . Fields committed such crimes, wrongs, or acts against . . . Horn, and then you may only consider that testimony for the purpose of its bearing, if any, on the state of mind of . . . Fields and of . . . Horn and their previous and subsequent relationship, but you may not consider such as any evidence or inference of guilt of . . . Fields in this case.The jury found Fields guilty, and the trial court sentenced him to forty years' imprisonment. This appeal followed.
II. Extraneous-Offense Evidence
By his sole issue on appeal, Fields contends the trial court erred by admitting evidence of extraneous offenses.
A. Standard of Review & Applicable Law
"Extraneous-acts evidence is admissible if it is relevant to a fact of consequence in the case, and the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice." Fox v. State, 283 S.W.3d 85, 91 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. ref'd); see Tex. R. Evid. 401, 403, 404(b). "[A] trial court's ruling on the admissibility of extraneous offenses is reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard." De La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336, 343 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Under this standard, we do not reverse a trial court's decision unless it lies outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. Dabney v. State, 492 S.W.3d 309, 318 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). "Furthermore, if the trial court's evidentiary ruling is correct on any theory of law applicable to that ruling, it will not be disturbed even if the trial judge gave the wrong reason for his right ruling." De La Paz, 279 S.W.3d at 344.
In a prosecution for a family violence-related offense, "each party may offer testimony or other evidence of all relevant facts and circumstances that would assist the trier of fact in determining whether the actor committed the offense . . ., including testimony or evidence regarding the nature of the relationship between the actor and the alleged victim." Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.371(b); see Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 71.004 (defining family violence). However, this rule "does not permit the presentation of character evidence that would otherwise be inadmissible under the Texas Rules of Evidence or other applicable law." Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.371(c).
B. Analysis
Below, Fields objected on the grounds that the extraneous offense evidence violated rules of evidence 401, 403, 404, and 405.
1. Rules 401, 404, & 405
Evidence of prior bad acts is not admissible if the sole reason for its relevancy is to show that the defendant has a propensity to commit bad acts. Tex. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). However, such evidence may "be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident." Id. R. 404(b)(2). "This list is illustrative, rather than exhaustive, and extraneous-offense evidence may be admissible when a defendant raises a defensive issue that negates one of the elements of the offense." Martin v. State, 173 S.W.3d 463, 466 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Further, evidence concerning a person's character may only be proven by certain means. Tex. R. Evid. 405.
In this case, the extraneous-offense evidence was offered to establish the nature of the relationship between Fields and Horn and to rebut the defensive theory that Horn fabricated the assault. This is a permitted, non-propensity purpose. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.371(b); James v. State, 623 S.W.3d 533, 548 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2021, no pet.) ("[T]he extraneous-offense evidence was also probative to rebut the defensive theory of fabrication."); see also Hammond v. State, No. 10-17-00178-CR, 2018 WL 1866053, at *2 (Tex. App.-Waco Apr. 18, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) ("The trial court further could have concluded that Heather's testimony was not for the purpose of establishing Hammond's bad character, but was admissible to show the nature of the relationship between Heather and Hammond in how they interacted with each other on previous occasions."). The trial court did not err in concluding that the evidence was relevant under rule 401, not inadmissible under rule 404(b), and not for the purpose of establishing Fields's character under rule 405.
2. Rule 403
Nonetheless, "[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence." Tex. R. Evid. 403.
In considering a Rule 403 objection, the trial court must engage in a balancing test that considers: (1) how compellingly the extraneous offense evidence serves to make a fact of consequence more or less probable; (2) the potential of the evidence to impress the jury in some irrational, but nevertheless indelible way; (3) the time the proponent needs to develop the evidence, during which the jury will be distracted from consideration of the indicted offense; and (4) the proponent's need for the evidence.Perkins v. State, 664 S.W.3d 209, 216 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022). This balancing test "is always slanted toward admission, not exclusion, of otherwise relevant evidence." De La Paz, 279 S.W.3d at 343.
We first consider "how compellingly the extraneous offense evidence serves to make a fact of consequence more or less probable." Perkins, 664 S.W.3d at 216. Here, the extraneous-offense evidence was used to explain the dynamics of the relationship between the men. The defense's theory of the case was that the relationship between Fields and Horn contained solely verbal rather than physical abuse.
For instance, in closing, defense counsel argued,
You know, Mr. Brunner testified that he was scared and it was escalating and [Fields] was a violent person, but he didn't hit . . . Horn. Although Mr. Horn testified on more than one occasion up there on the witness stand, "Oh, it wasn't ever any talking, he just hit and he always hit me twice[."] Well, there's the one person who showed up to talk about another event like that, Mr. Brunner. [Fields] didn't hit [Horn] then. It was all talk. It was yelling. That's what we saw in the video was all talk. It was yelling but it wasn't hitting.
The defense further theorized that the breakdown in the relationship was a motivator for Horn to fabricate the assault. During voir dire, defense counsel discussed with the venire the potential for witnesses to lie and what their motivations may be for lying, saying, "So a lot of people would-they'll tell a lie if it would benefit them. Right?" See James, 623 S.W.3d t 548 ("Defense counsel built the groundwork for the theory [of fabrication] during voir dire, when he talked about judging witness credibility and assessing motivation."). During opening, prior to any testimony, defense counsel touched on this defensive theory again, stating, "Watch for lies from the witness stand. Watch for motivation for people to lie." Finally, during closing, counsel summarized the perceived motivation Horn had to lie:
You heard testimony that I think could give you an idea of what's going on out there. They were at one point in a romantic relationship, but then the romantic relationship was over. . . . [A]nd then the work started suffering, and then he wanted to run off, that he had started the eviction pro[c]ess, but it was complicated or something. He couldn't go through with it. But on that night on June 24th, he had a real good chance to evict [Fields] and it worked. You go tell the cops, "Hey, this is what happened to me[,"] go out there and get put in jail. So there's an eviction right there, an eviction with the police.
"[E]vidence of prior assaults and abuse makes it less likely that a complainant has fabricated the charged offenses." Id. Not only did the extraneous-offense evidence contextualize the relationship between Horn and Fields, but it also served to rebut the defensive theory that Horn fabricated the incident. See id.; Gonzalez v. State, 541 S.W.3d 306, 312 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.) ("The complaint on which appellant's prior assault conviction was based is relevant, and within the scope of evidence permitted by article 38.371, because it goes directly to appellant's defensive theory that the offense never occurred."). Because of this, we conclude that the probative value of the extraneous-offense evidence was strong. See id.
Next, we analyze the potential for the extraneous-offense evidence to mislead the jury. See Perkins, 664 S.W.3d at 216. Here, the extraneous offenses were similar to the indicted offense. "Whenever the extraneous offense is similar to the charged offense, there is always a potential that the jury may be unfairly prejudiced by the defendant's character conformity." Beam v. State, 447 S.W.3d 401, 405 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). However, we can consider the jury charge when determining whether the extraneous-offense evidence had a misleading effect. Blackwell v. State, 193 S.W.3d 1, 15 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. ref'd).
The trial court instructed the jury both verbally and in its written charge. Both limiting instructions expressly forbade the jurors from considering the extraneous-offense evidence as evidence of guilt in this matter and properly limited the consideration of the extraneous-offense evidence to issues other than character conformity, such as Fields's state of mind and the nature of his relationship with Horn. Therefore, the potential misleading effect of the evidence was minimal. See id.; Tex. R. Evid. 403; Beam, 447 S.W.3d at 405; see also Thrift v. State, 176 S.W.3d 221, 224 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) ("[W]e generally presume the jury follows the trial court's instructions in the manner presented.").
Fields argues that "[t]he entire trial was about these other acts." It is true that the testimony and evidence concerning the extraneous offenses accounted for nearly half of the trial. However, evidence concerning the nature of the relationship between Horn and Fields was intrinsically linked to the credibility of the allegations in this case. Therefore, "a jury could not be distracted away from the charged offense regardless of the required time to present the" evidence. See State v. Mechler, 153 S.W.3d 435, 441 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Further, whether Horn fabricated the events of June 24, 2021, was a hotly contested issue at trial. When an issue at trial is "hotly contested," the extraneous-offense evidence is "of critical importance to the State." Lane v. State, 933 S.W.2d 504, 521 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
Based on our review of the relevant factors, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the probative value of the extraneous-offense evidence was not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. See Perkins, 664 S.W.3d at 216; see also Bass v. State, 270 S.W.3d 557, 563 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) ("[I]t is at least subject to reasonable disagreement whether the extraneous-offense evidence was admissible for the noncharacter-conformity purpose of rebutting appellant's defensive theory that the complainant fabricated h[is] allegations against [the appellant] . . . ."). Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Fields's rule 403 objection. Because none of the objections raised by Fields were meritorious, we overrule Fields's sole issue.
III. Conclusion
We affirm the trial court's judgment.