Opinion
Civil Action No. 99-3396, Section "R"(3).
October 16, 2000.
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is the second motion of defendant, the St. Bernard Parish School Board, for summary judgment. For the following reasons, defendant's motion is GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
This is an employment discrimination case. Plaintiff, Brenda Fields, alleges that the St. Bernard Parish School Board failed to reasonably accommodate her disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. Fields began working for the School Board in 1991 as a substitute teacher. In 1994, it hired her as a full-time teacher's aide. On August 14, 1997, the School Board hired Fields as a full-time teacher to work at P.G.T. Beauregard Middle School, beginning with the 1997-98 school year.
During her tenure at P.G.T. Beauregard, Fields alleges that she was assaulted and threatened by students on four separate occasions between September 1998 and January 1999. These assaults allegedly involved the following: a student ramming his shoulder into her chest; a student threatening her with a pair of scissors; a student grabbing, twisting and pulling her finger; and a student with a criminal record and allegedly a member of a street gang threatening her. These incidents led to the expulsion of three students, and the suspension of another student. On January 11, 1999, the day before the final assault, Fields claims that she asked to have a teacher's aide assigned to her classroom after explaining to the Principal, Stephen Cowen, that she felt very shaky and nervous. Plaintiff claims the school did not accommodate this request.
Fields did not report to work after January 12, 1999. The following week she provided the School Board with a "Certificate to return to work" bearing the stamp of Dr. Matthew Horsefield, dated January 18, 1999. ( See Def.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J., Ex. C.) The Certificate stated that Fields had been under his care from January 13 to 29, 1999, and she would be unable to return to work "depending on referral." ( See id.) The School Board understood this statement to mean that Fields would be absent through January 29, 1999. ( See Def.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 4.) On February 8, 1999, Fields provided the School Board with a second medical certification. On the School Board's "Notice of Temporary Disability Form," Dr. James Denny, plaintiff's psychiatrist, indicated that Fields suffered from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder as a result of a student attack. Dr. Denny stated that Fields disability began January 13, 1999 and described her anticipated date of return to work as "undetermined." Not knowing when Fields would return to work, the School Board asked her to return her student roll book, which is an official record of student absences, performance and grades. After a number of requests to return the roll book, the School Board's Supervisor of Personnel, Paul Granberry, Jr., wrote Fields advising her that her failure to return the roll book might result in disciplinary action and possibly termination for neglect of duty and insubordination. Fields did not return the roll book until March 24, 1999. ( See Def.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J., Exs. E, F.)
On that day, Fields attests that she met with Granberry and, in the presence of her husband, requested an accommodation so that she could resume her duties. ( See Pl.'s Mem. Opp. Summ. J., Ex. 3, Aff. of Brenda Fields; Ex. 4, Aff. of Dr. Michael Fields). In addition, Fields states that she requested a reassignment to another school or grade level within the St. Bernard Parish school system. ( See id.) However, in her own deposition, Fields admits that the accommodation she sought was a leave of absence to recover, followed by a change in grade level and schools. ( See Def.'s Mem. Supp. Second Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 39, Dep. of Brenda Fields at 36-39). Under Louisiana law, the teachers' union agreement, and the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), Fields was not eligible for additional leave because she had already used all of her vacation and sick leave, as well as the twelve weeks afforded to her by the FMLA. Fields claims that Granberry refused any accommodation and "became loud, belligerent, and verbally abusive" toward her. ( See Pl.'s Mem. Opp. Summ. J., Ex. 3, Aff. of Brenda Fields; Ex. 4, Aff. of Dr. Michael Fields). When Fields returned the roll book, she included a note to Granberry, in which she attributed her failure to return the roll book to her disability and to her attorney's advice. ( See id. Ex. F.) In this note, she again requested a leave of absence.
On April 11, 1999, Fields wrote to Granberry again, requesting a form for the Family Leave Act. ( See Pl.'s Mem. Opp. Summ. J., Ex. 6). Fields advised him that she suffered from PTSD, a disability recognized by the ADA and stated: "Due to my disability, I will be unable to work or report for duty, for an undetermined or extended period of time. Upon my being able to return to my position, I will need accommodation under the Rehabilitation Act." ( Id.)
Fields wrote to Granberry again on April 19, 1999, stating that her union representative had advised her to request a one-year sabbatical to accommodate her PTSD. ( See id. Mem. Opp. Summ. J., Ex. 7.) Granberry wrote Fields on April 30, 1999, advising her that she was not eligible for a sabbatical. ( See Def.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J., Ex. I.)
Fields made a final request for a one-year sabbatical on May 3, 1999. ( See id. Ex. J.) She advised Granberry that neither she, nor her doctor, could determine when she would be able to return to work. ( See id.) Granberry responded on May 26, 1999, reiterating that Fields did not qualify for a sabbatical under state law and the union contract because sabbaticals are available only to "certificated personnel," who must teach for six semesters in order to qualify for a one-semester sabbatical and for twelve semesters to qualify for a one-year sabbatical. ( See id. Ex. K.)
Fields filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on June 14, 1999, asserting that she had been denied a reasonable accommodation because of her disability in violation of the ADA. The School Board terminated Fields' employment on July 27, 1999, six months after she had stopped working. She had been on disability leave from January 13, 1999 through the end of the 1998-99 school year and compensated with what is known in Louisiana as "Gayle Pay." She was not eligible for full pay because she had already exhausted all ten days of her accumulated sick leave. Fields filed suit in this Court on November 10, 1999, alleging that the School Board violated the ADA.
The term "Gayle Pay" derives from the case of Gayle v. Porter, 239 So.2d 739, 74 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1970), in which the court held that a school board must fully compensate a teacher absent due to illness during her authorized sick leave but thereafter may deduct the cost of a substitute teacher, if one was hired.
The School Board now moves a second time for summary judgment on the grounds that Fields is not a "qualified individual with a disability" within the meaning of the ADA because she could not perform the "essential functions of her employment position," with or without a reasonable accommodation. Fields opposes the motion, arguing that a genuine issue of fact exists as to whether Fields is capable of performing her job with a reasonable accommodation; whether the School Board failed to engage in an adequate interactive process to determine a reasonable accommodation; and whether the School Board could have accommodated her disability.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues as to any material facts, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986). A court must be satisfied that no reasonable trier of fact could find for the nonmoving party or, in other words, "that the evidence favoring the nonmoving party is insufficient to enable a reasonable jury to return a verdict in her favor." Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 178 (5th Cir. 1990) ( citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511 (1986)). The moving party bears the burden of establishing that there are no genuine issues of material fact.
If the dispositive issue is one for which the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden by merely pointing out that the evidence in the record contains insufficient proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2554; see also Lavespere, 910 F.2d at 178. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who must, by submitting or referring to evidence, set out specific facts showing that a genuine issue exists. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. Summary judgment is mandated if the nonmovant fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential of her case on which she bears the burden of proof at trial. See id. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552. The nonmovant may not rest upon the pleadings but must identify specific facts that establish a genuine issue exists for trial. See id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2553-54; Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1996).
This case is set for a bench trial on December 13, 2000. The Fifth Circuit has "arguably articulated an even more lenient standard for summary judgment in certain nonjury cases." Phillips Oil Co. v. OKC Corp., 812 F.2d 265, 273 n. 15 (5th Cir. 1987). In Nunez v. Superior Oil Co., 572 F.2d 1119, 1123 (5th Cir. 1978), the Fifth Circuit explained:
There is no litmus test that infallibly distinguishes those issues that are "factual" from those that are "legal" or "mixed." . . . as we approach the point where facts and the application of legal rule to them blend, appraising evidentiary facts in terms of their legal consequences and "applying" law to fact become inseparable processes.
Therefore, in a nonjury case the court is encouraged to draw inferences, even when they appear to be factual, if a "trial on the merits would reveal no additional data." Id. at 1124.
B. ADA
1. Disability
The ADA prohibits discrimination "against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). As a threshold requirement, an ADA plaintiff must establish that she has a disability. See de la Torres v. Bolger, 781 F.2d 1134, 1136 (5th Cir. 1986).
The ADA defines a disability as follows:
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or being regarded as having such an impairment.42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). The pertinent inquiries are therefore whether Fields had a physical or mental impairment, and, if so, whether it substantially limited one or more of her major life activities. See, e.g., Rogers v. Int'l Marine Terminals, 87 F.3d 755, 758 (5th Cir. 1996); Dutcher v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 53 F.3d 723, 725-26 n. 4 (5th Cir. 1995) (noting that ADA and Rehabilitation Act definitions of "disability" are substantially equivalent). The parties agree that Field's PTSD constituted an impairment.
The dispute is whether Field's PTSD substantially limited her major life activities. She claims that she was impaired in her ability to sleep, to concentrate and to work. Under the ADA, not all limitations are substantial; Fields' difficulties with PTDS do not substantially limit her unless (i) they render her unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform; or (ii) they significantly restricted her as to the condition, manner or duration under which she can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the average person in the general population.
The Fifth Circuit has recognized that PTSD, while not a per se ADA disability, may constitute such a protected disability when the plaintiff can also show that the disorder impaired one of her major life activities. See Hamilton v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 136 F.3d 1047, 1050 (5th Cir. 1998). Throughout the spring of 1999, Fields wrote several letters and her doctor confirmed that she was unable to return to work due to her PTSD. Although defendant argues half-heartedly that Fields' PTSD did not impair a major life activity since her litigation position is that she could have returned to work in March of 1999, the Court finds that there is a disputed issue of fact as to whether plaintiff was impaired in her ability to work based on the evaluation of her doctor. (See Pl.'s Mem. Opp'n Summ. J. Ex. 2 3).
2. Qualified Individual
The essential issue in this motion is whether plaintiff is a "qualified individual with a disability." The ADA defines a "qualified individual with a disability" as "an individual who, with or without accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). Hence, this court considers whether Fields could "perform the essential functions of the job, i.e., functions that bear more than a marginal relationship to the job at issue," and, if not, whether "any reasonable accommodation by the employer would enable [her] to perform those functions." Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385, 1393-94 (5th Cir. 1993). Plaintiff therefore bears the burden of proving (1) that she could perform the essential functions of her job, and (2) if not, that she could perform those functions with a reasonable accommodation by her employer. See Tyndall v. Nat'l Educ. Ctr. Inc. of California, 31 F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Chandler, 2 F.3d at 1393-94); Foremanye v. Bd. of Cmty. Coll. Trustees for Baltimore County, 956 F. Supp. 574, 578 (D. Md. 1996) (citations omitted). See also Salmon v. Dade County School Bd., 4 F. Supp.2d 1157, 1160 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (determination of whether disabled individual is otherwise qualified involves a two-step approach).
Because the undisputed evidence supports that Fields could not come to work, she was not a "qualified individual with a disability" under the ADA. As several courts have recognized, "[a]n essential element of any . . . job is an ability to appear for work . . . and to complete assigned tasks within a reasonable period of time." Carr v. Reno, 23 F.3d 525, 530 (D.C. Cir. 1994). See also, Tyndall, 31 F.3d at 213 (an employee "who does not come to work cannot perform any of his job functions, essential or otherwise").
On March 24, 1999, Fields met with Paul Granberry to return her roll book and to discuss her work situation. Although plaintiff gave an account of this meeting in an affidavit opposing defendant's first motion for summary judgment, she has since been deposed and has clarified what happened at the meeting. It is clear from her testimony that what she asked for was not to return to work in any immediate sense, but a one-year leave of absence. (See Def.'s Mem Supp. Summ. J. Ex 39 at 36-37) Although plaintiff mentioned a transfer, she wanted a transfer after she completed the leave of absence. ( See id.) Further, several times after this date, Fields wrote letters to the school requesting a year-long sabbatical to recover. (See Def.'s Mem Supp. Second Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 17; Pl.'s Mem. Opp. Second Mot. Summ. J.; Exs. 9, 10, 11, letter from Brenda Fields). In each of these instances, Fields claimed that due to her disability, she was unable to return to the classroom. See id. She simply requested leave, followed by a transfer. Fields now claims that she would have been able to return to work on March 24, 1999; however, at no time during the spring of 1999 did she inform defendant that this was the case. In fact, until her termination in July of 1999, Fields never requested the requisite release to return to work from her physician. ( See Def.'s Mem Supp. Second Mot. Summ. J., Ex 39 at 32-33.)
Fields attempts to blame her failure to request an immediate return to work on supervisor Granberry's statement that he would not allow a transfer. However, in defendant's request for admissions, Fields admits knowing that she did not need Granberry's permission or the permission of any other school administrator to apply for a transfer. ( See Def.'s Mem. Supp. Second Mot. Summ J., Ex. 41 at 13.) Furthermore, plaintiff admits that at no time did she fill out a transfer request form for any vacancy despite the fact that there were several openings available in the school district. ( See id. Ex. 41 at 14; Ex. 19).
Moreover, Fields' financial transactions have been consistent with her inability to work. In addition, to her numerous statements to the school that she could not work, Fields also represented to third parties that she was unable to work. First, Fields owed monthly loan payments to the Federal Education Loan Program in the amount of $248.90. Under the program, a person with a "temporary total disability" can defer the loan payments while the disability lasts. On February 18, 1999, Fields' psychiatrist certified that Fields "became unable to work and earn money" and that the length of her disability was undetermined. Defendant asserts, and Fields does not deny, that the loan payments continue to be deferred on the basis that plaintiff is totally disabled.
Second, Fields also filed a worker's compensation claim on March 11, 1999. This claim was settled in April of 2000. Throughout the year following her claim, plaintiff never indicated that she was willing and able to return to teaching. She took the position with the Central Claims Service, the party responsible for handling the worker's compensation claim, that she could not teach anywhere.
Third, Fields also has a private insurance policy from American Fidelity that covers disability. In August of 1999, five months after the date Fields claims she could have returned to teaching, Fields' psychiatrist certified that Fields was "totally disabled" and would be for a period of six to twelve months. (See Def.'s Mem. Supp. Second Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 34.) In February of 2000, Fields' psychiatrist provided a supplemental report regarding Fields' condition. In this report, the psychiatrist stated that Fields was "totally disabled as related to working in her former school system and with behaviorally disordered students" and that her prognosis was "marginal to poor if she would return to the same school system and a behaviorally disordered classroom." (See Def.'s Mem. Supp. Second Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 37.) Thus, in February of 2000, a year after Fields left the school, her doctor continued to claim that she could not return to that school system. St. Bernard school administrators can only control and offer plaintiff a position in the St. Bernard system; thus, plaintiff's psychiatrist identified a disability that precluded Fields from working for St. Bernard Parish as a teacher. As of her July 19, 2000 deposition, Fields continued to receive disability payments from American Fidelity.
Last year, the Supreme Court considered the ramifications of claiming social security disability benefits on a plaintiff's status as a qualified individual under the ADA. See Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp., 526 U.S. 759, 119 S.Ct. 1597 (1999). In Policy Management Systems, the Court found that the two claims do not inherently conflict such that a plaintiff's application for social security benefits should preclude her from asserting a claim for disability discrimination under the ADA. See id. at 803, 119 S.Ct. at 1602. The Court explained that there are several situations where a social security claim and an ADA claim exists side by side. See id. For example, social security, unlike the ADA, does not take into account whether a person can work with reasonable accommodation. See id. The Court went on to explain that an ADA plaintiff bears the burden of proving that she is a "qualified individual with a disability" — that is, a person "who with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions" of her job. See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)). A plaintiff's sworn assertion in an application for disability benefits that she is, for example, "unable to work" will appear to negate an essential element of her ADA case — at least if she does not offer a sufficient explanation. For that reason, the Court held that an ADA plaintiff cannot simply ignore the apparent contradiction that arises out of the earlier SSDI total disability claim. Rather, she must proffer a sufficient explanation. See Policy Management Systems, 526 U.S. 795 at 805, 119 S.Ct. at 1603. Thus, in order to defeat summary judgment, the explanation must be sufficient to warrant a reasonable juror's conclusion that, assuming the plaintiff's good faith belief in her earlier statement that she was disabled, she could nonetheless perform the essential functions of her job, with or without reasonable accommodation. See id. at 807, 119 S.Ct. at 1604.
Fields explains the inconsistency of her disability claims and her ADA claim by asserting that at the time she filled out her disability claims, defendant would not cooperate with her as to accommodations. However, Fields did not simply claim a disability on one date and subsequently ask for a reasonable accommodation. Fields claimed that she was totally disabled several times, including February 8, March 11, August 25, 1999 and February 10, 2000. ( See Def.'s Mem. Supp. Second Mot. Summ. J., Exs. 10, 11, 14, 34.) On each of these dates, plaintiff and her doctor claimed that plaintiff was unable to work because of her disability. ( See id.) These assertions belie Fields' claim that in March of 1999 she could have returned to teaching. Furthermore, Fields continues to receive benefits due to her "total disability." Thus, Fields does not present an explanation that warrants a conclusion that she could perform the essential functions of her job.
3. Indefinite Leave Is Not a Reasonable Accommodation
Plaintiff's actions support defendant's claim that plaintiff was not qualified to return to work. The Fifth Circuit in Rogers v. International Marine Terminals, Inc., 87 F.3d 755, 759 (5th Cir. 1996) recognized that:
Nothing in the text of the reasonable accommodation provision requires an employer to wait an indefinite period for an accommodation to achieve its intended effect. Rather, reasonable accommodation is by its terms most logically construed as that which presently, or in the immediate future, enables the employee to perform the essential functions of the job in question. . . . [R] easonable accommodation does not require [an employer] to wait indefinitely for [the employee's] medical conditions to be corrected. . . .See id at 759-60. ( quoting Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 1995)).
The Fifth Circuit recognized that "[a]n essential element of any . . . job is an ability to appear for work . . . and to complete assigned tasks within a reasonable period of time." Rogers, 87 F.3d at 759 ( quoting Carr v. Reno, 23 F.3d 525, 530 (D.C. Cir. 1994)); see also Tyndall, 31 F.3d at 213 ("Except in the unusual case where an employee can effectively perform all work-related duties at home, an employee who does not come to work cannot perform any of his job functions, essential or otherwise.") (internal quotations omitted) ( quoting Wimbley v. Bolger, 642 F. Supp. 481, 485 (W.D. Tenn. 1986), aff'd, 831 F.2d 298 (6th Cir. 1987)); Salmon, 4 F. Supp.2d at 1161 (accepting School Board's unrebutted claim that regular and punctual attendance is essential requirement of elementary school guidance counselor position); Foremayne, 956 F. Supp. at 578-79 (Assessment Coordinator at college who was unable to work the hours per week required of position could not perform essential functions of job). Accordingly, regular and punctual attendance is generally an essential function of any job.
Here, it is undisputed that Fields missed an extended number of teaching days during the 1998-99 school year, including the disability leave she took from January 13, 1999 through the end of the school year. The School Board claims, and the Court agrees, that the classroom is the workplace for a middle school teacher and that a teacher who cannot come to school is unable to perform any of the essential functions of her job. Fields has presented no evidence, or even argued, that regular attendance is not an essential element of a full-time teaching position at P.G.T. Beauregard School. Further, throughout the school year, plaintiff's actions indicated that she was not able to return to teaching, an essential function of her job, without the additional year of leave she requested. Although plaintiff now claims that she may have been able to return to work with an aide in March of 1999, this claim is totally inconsistent with her position during the relevant time period that she could not return, to work for at least another year. Further, the record of plaintiff's condition reflects the unfortunate fact that plaintiff was hospitalized in February of 1999, and she was again hospitalized on June 1, 1999 after an attempted suicide. ( See Def.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J. Ex 30). This undermines her litigation position that she could have returned to work with the help of a teacher's aide in March of 1999. Based on the record, the Court finds that Fields was unable to perform an essential function of her job with or without an accommodation because she could not return to work. Accordingly, she was not a qualified individual under the ADA definition and relevant case law and her ADA claim must be dismissed.
C. Louisiana Discrimination Claims.
Plaintiff also sues under state discrimination law citing Louisiana Revised Statute 23:323. This statute provides:
A. No otherwise qualified disabled person shall, on the basis of a disability, be subjected to discrimination in employment.
B. An employer, labor organization, or employment agency shall not engage in any of the following practices:
(1) Fail or refuse to hire, promote, or reasonably accommodate an otherwise qualified disabled person on the basis of a disability, when it is unrelated to the individual's ability, with reasonable accommodation, to perform the duties of a particular job or position.
(2) Discharge or otherwise discriminate against an otherwise qualified disabled person with respect to compensation or the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment on the basis of a disability when it is unrelated to the individual's ability to perform the duties of a particular job or position.
The Court has found few cases that cite, much less apply Section 23:323. However, many courts have applied other Louisiana statutes prohibiting employment discrimination in the workplace. See e.g., Hypes v. First Commerce Corp., 3 F. Supp.2d 712, 719 (E.D. La. 1996). In Hypes, the court applied Louisiana Revised Statute, section 46:2251, et seq., which provides that an employer shall not:
Discharge or otherwise discriminate against an otherwise qualified individual with respect to compensation or the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, on the basis of a handicap when it is unrelated to the individual's ability to perform the duties of a particular job or position.
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 46:2254(c)(2). The employee's handicap must not render him incapable of performing the job, given reasonable accommodation. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 46:2254(c)(1); Kelly v. Boeing Petroleum Services, Inc., 61 F.3d 350, 362 (5th Cir. 1995). In this case, the court found that an employee who was frequently absent from work could not perform the essential functions of his job under the ADA. The Hypes court found that its federal analysis dictated the state law result. See Hypes, 3 F. Supp.2d at 719. Although the court stated its caution regarding the application of federal jurisprudence to a state statute, the plain language of La. R.S. 46:2554 mirrors the federal statute. See id. The Court applies the logic in Hypes to this case and finds that plaintiff was not a "qualified disabled person" under La. R.S. 23:323.
D. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
In Louisiana the Supreme Court has recognized the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. In order to recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must establish:
(1) that the conduct of the defendant was extreme and outrageous;
(2) that the emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff was severe; and
(3) that the defendant desired to inflict severe emotional distress or knew that severe emotional distress would be certain or substantially certain to result from his or her conduct.See White v. Monsanto Co., 585 So.2d 1205, 1209 (La. 1991). The Supreme Court described the conduct necessary to prevail as follows:
The conduct must be so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Liability does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities. Persons must necessarily be expected to be hardened to a certain amount of rough language, and to occasional acts that are definitely inconsiderate and unkind. Not every verbal encounter may be converted into a tort. . . .See id. at 1209. Recognition of a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress in a workplace environment has usually been limited to cases involving a pattern of deliberate, repeated harassment over a period of time. Id. "A plaintiff's status as an employee may entitle him to a greater degree of protection from insult and outrage by a supervisor with authority over him than if he were a stranger." Id. at 1210.
Plaintiff bases her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim on two events. First, she claims that Mr. Granberry threatened her with losing her job during the March 24, 1999 meeting. This encounter was neither a deliberate nor repeated act aimed at inflicting emotional distress. Further, it did not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct required to establish an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. Second, plaintiff cites an interaction between her daughter and a coteacher where the coteacher inquired about plaintiff's condition. This interaction was neither extreme nor outrageous; furthermore, plaintiff has offered no evidence that defendant disclosed any information about plaintiff's condition to this coteacher. Thus, none of the actions taken by any of Fields' coworkers or supervisors was so outrageous and extreme as to cause a reasonable person to suffer severe emotional distress. Accordingly, the Court finds Fields' intentional infliction of emotional distress claim to be without merit.
III. CONCLUSION
For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS defendant's second motion for summary judgment.