Opinion
No. 36798-0-II.
March 3, 2009.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Clark County, No. 05-2-00923-7, Diane M. Woolard, J., entered August 10, 2007.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Quinn-Brintnall, J., concurred in by Van Deren, C.J., and Penoyar, J.
Walter D. Fields is an attorney licensed to practice law in Washington State who is representing himself in this appeal from an administrative decision to register an Idaho child support order in this state. Fields contends that registration of the child support order was improper, arguing that the State of Idaho fraudulently obtained the order obligating him to pay $1,010 per month for the support of his two minor children and had interfered with a business opportunity he anticipated in California. In addition, Fields argues that the Washington State Department of Health and Social Services — Division of Child Support (DCS) should have modified his child support to reflect a support obligation commensurate with his current income. Because registration of a foreign state's child support order is a purely ministerial process and the receiving state generally lacks the authority to modify the foreign state's order, we affirm.
Fields also raises many additional issues with the registration that we are unable to address because his brief fails to present a cogent argument and lacks proper citations to authority or the record. RAP 10.3(a)(6).
FACTS
On February 25, 1999, Fields and Jeanine Rishel dissolved their marriage in the State of Idaho. The Idaho court approved the parties' child custody and property settlement agreement which provided that Fields would pay Rishel $1,500 a month in child support for their three children based on Fields's annual gross income of $83,000. The agreement also required that Fields continue to provide health, dental, and medical insurance for the three children.
On May 4, 2004, an Idaho court modified Fields's child support obligation to account for his oldest child reaching the age of 18 and graduating from high school. The modified order reduced Fields's base monthly child support obligation to $1,010 calculated on Fields's potential annual income of $60,000. The Idaho court also ordered a future reduction in Fields's base monthly child support obligation to $672 when his second child graduates from high school. This obligation continues until the youngest child turns 18 or when he graduates from high school, whichever occurs later. Fields did not appeal the Idaho order modifying his support obligation.
Fields relocated to Washington State and, on July 15, 2004, DCS received a request from the State of Idaho to enforce Fields's child support obligation. On November 3, 2004, DCS personally served Fields with a notice of support debt and registration. The notice informed Fields that, under former RCW 26.21.530-.540 (1997), he could request a hearing to contest the validity of the registration or enforcement. Fields requested a hearing to contest the registration.
On January 12, 2005, an administrative hearing was held with Fields, Rishel, and a DCS attorney appearing by telephone. At the hearing, the administrative law judge (ALJ) admitted 14 exhibits without objection. The sole issue considered by the ALJ was "[w]hether the Order and Judgment from the State of Idaho entered on May 04, 2004 can be registered for enforcement" in Washington. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 2. The ALJ found that Fields failed to establish any of the statutory defenses to registration listed in former RCW 26.21.540(1). The ALJ also concluded that Fields's inability to pay was not an available defense to the registration of the order. Fields requested judicial review of the ALJ's ruling by the Clark County Superior Court which affirmed the ALJ's ruling.
Fields contends that his level of annual income has not reached $60,000 since the Idaho court entered the order modifying his support obligation.
ANALYSIS
Standard of Review
In reviewing an administrative action, we sit in the same position as the superior court and apply Administrative Procedure Act standards directly to the record before the agency. Regan v. Dep't of Licensing, 130 Wn. App. 39, 49, 121 P.3d 731 (2005), review denied, 157 Wn.2d 1013 (2006). Like the superior court, we review questions of law de novo, but we accord substantial weight to an agency's interpretation of the statutes it administers. Everett Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Dep't of Labor Indus., 109 Wn.2d 819, 823, 748 P.2d 1112 (1988).
The party challenging an agency's action bears the burden of demonstrating the invalidity of the decision. RCW 34.05.570(1)(a). We will grant relief only if we determine that the agency action complained of substantially prejudices the person seeking judicial relief. RCW 34.05.570(1)(d). Registration of the Idaho Child Support Order
The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), 42 U.S.C. § 666, has been adopted by every state and governs the procedure for establishing, enforcing, and modifying child support orders. Former ch. 26.21 RCW; In re Marriage of Owen and Phillips, 126 Wn. App. 487, 494 n. 4, 108 P.3d 824 (quoting Kurtis A. Kemper, Annotation, Construction and Application of Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, 90 A.L.R. 5th 1 (2001)), review denied, 155 Wn.2d 1022 (2005).
Effective January 1, 2007, chapter 26.21 RCW was repealed and recodified at chapter 26.21A RCW. Chapter 26.21 RCW applies here because this version was in effect at the time the support order was registered in Washington State on July 15, 2004. The remainder of this opinion refers to the version in effect on July 15, 2004.
The UIFSA authorizes DCS to register a child support order issued in another state and to enforce the order in the same manner that DCS enforces orders issued by a Washington tribunal. Former RCW 26.21.500 (1993). Former RCW 26.21.490 (1997) specifies the necessary procedures for registering an out-of-state child support order for enforcement in Washington. A party may contest registration of the order administratively under former RCW 26.21.530 but is limited to the defenses set forth in former RCW 26.21.540. Former RCW 26.21.540 states:
(1) A party contesting the validity or enforcement of a registered order or seeking to vacate the registration has the burden of proving one or more of the following defenses:
(a) The issuing tribunal lacked personal jurisdiction over the contesting party;
(b) The order was obtained by fraud;
(c) The order has been vacated, suspended, or modified by a later order;
(d) The issuing tribunal has stayed the order pending appeal;
(e) There is a defense under the law of this state to the remedy sought;
(f) Full or partial payment has been made; or
(g) The statute of limitation under [former] RCW 26.21.510 precludes enforcement of some or all of the arrearages.
(2) If a party presents evidence establishing a full or partial defense under subsection (1) of this section, a tribunal may stay enforcement of the registered order, continue the proceeding to permit production of additional relevant evidence, and issue other appropriate orders. An uncontested portion of the registered order may be enforced by all remedies available under the law of this state.
(3) If the contesting party does not establish a defense under subsection (1) of this section to the validity or enforcement of the order, the registering tribunal shall issue an order confirming the order.
Evidence of Fraud
Fields first argues that the ALJ improperly refused to admit evidence that the Idaho child support order was obtained by fraud. Fields specifically argues that the ALJ refused to admit alleged evidence of damaging letters and communications made by the State of Idaho to Fields's potential business partner in California. DCS contends that Fields has waived this contention on appeal by failing to offer this evidence at the administrative hearing and by failing to request that the record remain open. It argues, in the alternative, that these alleged letters and communications do not provide evidence of fraud under former RCW 26.21.540 as a matter of law. Our review of the record establishes that Fields did not waive his right to challenge the ALJ's refusal to admit evidence of fraud and the ALJ's decision not to admit additional evidence or hold the record open was proper and did not substantially prejudice Fields.
At the administrative hearing, Fields requested that the record remain open to allow him to admit evidence not then before the ALJ:
MR. FIELDS: Um, would I be able to produce documentary evidence that I'm going to discuss today after the fact?
THE COURT: If you wish to make a request that the record be held open to submit additional documents, you may make that request, and I will rule on that at that time.
MR. FIELDS: I would like to make that request.
THE COURT: Okay. Well, why don't we get into the evidence and find out what it is that you want to offer and why you haven't offered it before? So why don't we kind of go a little bit further into the hearing and find out what it is that you want to offer.
CP at 70.
Later in the hearing, Fields testified that the Idaho court based his child support order on his potential annual income of $60,000 but alleged that the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare interfered with his ability to achieve that level of income through damaging communications with a prospective business partner in California. The DCS representative objected to Fields's testimony, arguing that any alleged interference with the partnership was not relevant to the issue of whether the underlying order was obtained by fraud. The ALJ sustained the objection.
As revealed above, the record does not support DCS's argument that Fields waived his right to challenge the ALJ's refusal to admit evidence of fraud. Fields formally requested that the record remain open and that he be allowed to submit additional evidence. But the ALJ denied Fields's request when it sustained DCS's objection to Fields's offer of proof regarding the evidence he wished to present. The ALJ's decision not to hold the record open was proper because the evidence Fields offered addressed matters alleged to have occurred after entry of the order that could not have demonstrated that the Idaho order was obtained by fraud.
Moreover, Fields's claim that the Idaho order was obtained by fraud cannot be supported by an allegation that an Idaho agency interfered with a business partnership. Fields conceded at the administrative hearing that the only statement or representation of fact underlying his claim of fraud is his ability to achieve an annual income of $60,000, which proved to be false.
THE COURT: . . . It is my understanding you don't think the May 4th order should be registered and enforced in the State of Washington, because you think it was obtained by fraud primarily on the basis that it was based on $60,000, a potential $60,000 a year income. Is that correct? MR. FIELDS: Yeah.
CP at 81.
But it was Fields who stated that he could earn $60,000 a year when he was negotiating the terms of a modified Idaho child support order. At the administrative hearing, Rishel testified:
MS. RISHEL: His attorney provided that amount. My attorney was actually going for the original amount of $83,000, and we were actually battling this. It went back and forth and it went to court. He actually won on that point. He did win on $60,000, which is what his attorney was arguing for. So I understand he is upset about what is happening since then, but the $60,000 was his figure.
. . . .
MR. FIELDS: . . . During the testimony in the trial the judge asked if there was anything that I wanted, and my reply was relief, and although I would like to have the belief that I have the potential of making $60,000 — as far as I can recall, I have not reviewed the record and I'm not sure if that hearing has been transcribed — although I would like to have the belief that I could make $60,000 I'm only making whatever. I'm not sure that that number was provided by my attorney.
CP at 101-02.
Under former RCW 26.21.540(1)(b), it was Fields's burden to prove that the Idaho order was obtained by fraud. And even if Fields's attorney made an erroneous representation concerning Fields's ability to make $60,000 to Fields's detriment, under both Idaho and Washington law, "'[a]n action for fraud or misrepresentation will not lie for statements of future events.'" Maroun v. Wyreless Sys., Inc., 141 Idaho 604, 615, 114 P.3d 974 (2005) (quoting Thomas v. Med. Ctr. Physicians, P.A., 138 Idaho 200, 207, 61 P.3d 557 (2002)); see also Baertschi v. Jordan, 68 Wn.2d 478, 483, 413 P.2d 657 (1966) ("Generally fraud cannot be predicated upon a representation as to a future event, or a promise to do something in the future.") (citing Shook v. Scott, 56 Wn.2d 351, 353 P.2d 431 (1960)). Thus, the ALJ properly denied Fields's request to hold the record open for evidence of the allegedly damaging communications that occurred after entry of the order. Fields cannot challenge Washington's registration of his Idaho child support order by claiming tortious interference with a business expectancy. If Fields wishes to pursue this claim, his proper course is to file a separate cause of action in Idaho.
Modification of the Idaho Child Support Order
Fields's primary contention with the registration of his Idaho child support order is that he cannot afford to make payments under his current income. But inability to pay is not a defense to registration of a foreign state's child support order. Former RCW 26.21.540. And under the circumstances here, registration of the Idaho child support order was a purely ministerial process without authority to modify the child support order registered. Moreover, Fields cannot currently seek modification in Washington because he is a resident of this State, Rishel and the child live in Idaho, and the parties have not filed written consents in Idaho to allow Washington to assume jurisdiction over the order. Former RCW 26.21.580(1) (1997), If Fields cannot meet his obligation under his current income, his proper remedy is to seek a modification from the State of Idaho.
Former RCW 26.21.595(1) (1997) allows a tribunal of this state registering a foreign child support order to modify the underlying obligation only if "all of the parties who are individuals reside in this state and the child does not reside in the issuing state." Because Rishel and the child continued to live in Idaho, former RCW 26.21.595 did not apply and the registering tribunal had no authority to modify the Idaho order. Cf. In re Custody of A.C., No. 79938-5, 2009 WL 281053, at *2-4 (Wash. February 5, 2009) (addressing the limited circumstances where a Washington tribunal may modify a foreign state's child custody order under an analogous interstate compact, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act).
Former RCW 26.21.580(1) states in pertinent part that before a Washington tribunal may modify a foreign state's child support order, it must find that "[t]he child, the individual obligee, and the obligor do not reside in the issuing state" and that the "petitioner [seeking modification] is a nonresident of this state" or "all of the parties who are individuals have filed written consents in the issuing tribunal for a tribunal of this state to modify the support order and assume continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the order."
We do not address Fields's remaining arguments because his brief lacks proper citations to authority or the record and fails to present a cogent argument. RAP 10.3(a)(6); Am. Legion Post No. 32 v. City of Walla Walla, 116 Wn.2d 1, 7, 802 P.2d 784 (1991) ("In the absence of argument and citation to authority, an issue raised on appeal will not be considered."); Holland v. City of Tacoma, 90 Wn. App. 533, 538, 954 P.2d 290 ("Passing treatment of an issue or lack of reasoned arguments is insufficient to merit judicial consideration."), review denied, 136 Wn.2d 1015 (1998). See also In re Marriage of Olson, 69 Wn. App. 621, 626, 850 P.2d 527 (1993) (a pro se litigant is bound by the same rules of procedure and substantive law as is an attorney). In summary, Fields has failed to demonstrate a valid defense to the registration of Idaho's child support order. Accordingly, the order was properly registered. We affirm.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.
VAN DEREN, C.J. and PENOYAR, J., concur: