Opinion
No. 2-824 / 02-0183
Filed January 15, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Carroll County, William C. Ostlund, Judge.
A school district appeals from a decision reversing its termination of a teacher for just cause under Iowa Code section 279.18 (1999). AFFIRMED.
Brian Gruhn of Gruhn Blades, Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
Gerald Hammond, Des Moines, for appellee.
Heard by Hecht, P.J., Vaitheswaran, J., and Brown, S.J.
Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2001).
We must decide whether there is sufficient evidence to support a teacher termination decision. Like the district court, we conclude there is not. Accordingly, we affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
The essential facts are undisputed. Yvonne Fielder is a veteran English and Speech teacher at Carroll High School. She has two adult sons she raised alone after her husband died in a car accident. One of her sons, Jason, began using illegal drugs in high school. After he graduated, he moved to Des Moines and continued his drug habit.
Jason began to suspect that his Des Moines apartment was being watched by law enforcement authorities. In the summer of 2000, he moved his drug paraphernalia to his mother's house in Glidden. Less than forty-eight hours later, law enforcement authorities executed a search warrant on the Glidden home. They discovered drug paraphernalia and marijuana in five locations. Three items were seized from Yvonne Fielder's bedroom: a roach clip, a pipe, and a rolled marijuana cigarette.
The school superintendent served Fielder with a notice of termination of her teaching contract based on the following six reasons:
1) possession of drug paraphernalia, 2) possession of marijuana, 3) poor role model, 4) unprofessional conduct, 5) poor leadership as a professional educator, and 6) failure to maintain a good reputation and also to be a person who maintains high integrity and/or moral character which is detrimental to your ability to be an effective teacher.[sic]
Following a hearing, the Carroll Community School District Board of Directors found just cause to immediately terminate her teaching contract. The board's decision contained several findings of fact concerning the items seized from the home. With respect to items found in Jason's bedroom, the board stated "it was possible that Fielder had not seen or was unaware of these items." The board "did not give significant weight" to this evidence. The board made the same finding and accorded the same weight to items found on the third floor of the home. As for items in a first floor bathroom, the board noted Fielder's testimony that she would have had no reason to enter that bathroom in the few hours after the items were placed there. Although expressing concern over the evidence, the board stated "it was possible that Fielder had not seen or was unaware of these items." The board also expressed concern over a pipe found in a lamp stand in the living room and the items in Fielder's bedroom. The board found evidence to support each of the superintendent's reasons for termination.
Fielder sought adjudicator review. See Iowa Code § 279.17 (1999). The adjudicator examined the evidence supporting the six reasons cited by the superintendent and board. With respect to the first two, possession of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia, the adjudicator found Fielder technically possessed the roach clip, pipe and marijuana cigarette, as they were discovered in her bedroom. The adjudicator acknowledged Fielder's testimony that the roach clip and pipe were mementos of her deceased husband that she had neglected to discard and the marijuana cigarette was discovered following Jason's graduation party two years earlier. The adjudicator found, however, that she was not empowered to consider this mitigating testimony. She upheld the first two reasons for termination, concluding, "the Board had competent evidence to support its factual finding and it weighed credibility as to the teacher's explanation."
Fielder testified she kept it to confront her sons about drug use, but an appropriate occasion never arose.
With respect to the final four reasons, the adjudicator noted there had to be evidentiary support for at least one of these reasons to establish the nexus between Fielder's personal conduct and her teaching performance. She found that support lacking, stating, "if `burden of proof' is to have any force under this Iowa statute, I must conclude that the administration witness testimony did not provide the Board a preponderance of competent evidence on the final four reasons." The adjudicator concluded the board's finding of just cause for termination was not supported by a preponderance of competent evidence.
The board then sought judicial review. See Iowa Code § 279.18. The district court agreed with the adjudicator. After examining case precedent, the court concluded, "the superintendent did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent's possession of a marijuana cigarette would impair her ability to be an effective role model and teacher."
On further judicial review, the board's primary contention is that, contrary to the determination of the district court, its decision is supported by a preponderance of competent evidence. The board also argues its fact findings were entitled to deference.
II. Evidentiary Support for Board's Decision
Iowa Code section 279.18, governing judicial review of school board and adjudicator decisions, authorizes a court to:
reverse, modify, or grant any other appropriate relief from the board's decision or the adjudicator's decision equitable or legal and including declaratory relief if substantial rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because the action is. . . .
6. Unsupported by a preponderance of the competent evidence in the record made before the board and the adjudicator when that record is viewed as a whole. . . .
This standard requires us to find a higher quantum of evidence supporting the decision than we would have to under the substantial evidence standard contained in the Administrative Procedure Act. See Iowa Code 17A.19(10)(f); Sheldon Community School Dist. Bd. of Dirs. v. Lundblad, 528 N.W.2d 593, 596 (Iowa 1995). We agree with the district court that the board did not satisfy this standard.
A school board must find "just cause" for termination of a teacher. Iowa Code § 279.15(2). "Just cause" is cause which directly or indirectly significantly and adversely affects what must be the ultimate goal of every school system: high quality education for the district's students. It relates to job performance including leadership and role model effectiveness. It must include the concept that a school district is not married to mediocrity but may dismiss personnel who are neither performing high quality work nor improving in performance. Briggs v. Bd. of Dirs, 282 N.W.2d 740, 743 (Iowa 1979).
The board's fact findings fall short of establishing that Fielder's conduct significantly and adversely affected her job performance. There was no evidence Fielder bought, sold, or used marijuana either on the job or off during her fifteen year tenure with the school system. While there was evidence Fielder's home contained drug paraphernalia and some marijuana, the record reflects that all but three items belonged to Jason rather than Yvonne and, of the items belonging to Jason, all but one pipe had been in the home for less than forty-eight hours. As for the three items in Fielder's bedroom, the roach clip and pipe tested negative for the presence of marijuana and the cigarette could have been at least a year old and possibly more, partially corroborating Fielder's story that she discovered it following Jason's graduation party.
Given the absence of evidence Fielder used drugs, the case for termination turns entirely on whether she condoned the use of drugs. The board stated, the fact that these items were spread about the house, and a pipe is in the lamp stand for weeks, or perhaps months, demonstrates Ms. Fielder either condones this activity or at a minimum has a permissive attitude about marijuana and paraphernalia. Keeping her husband's pipe and roach clip demonstrates this same attitude, and more importantly, keeping the marijuana joint in her bedroom also shows this same permissive attitude, as well as not talking to her children about the joint promptly.
The problem with this determination is that it is inconsistent with the board's earlier findings that Fielder likely did not know most of these items were in her home. Additionally, there is no evidence Fielder conveyed a permissive attitude to her students concerning the use of illegal drugs. The record reflects that, as a result of her son's drug problem, which counseling did not resolve, ended each of her Friday classes with an instruction to her students to stay away from drugs.
The board attempts to impugn Fielder's credibility by suggesting her story about what happened changed over time. We find her explanation of events immediately following the search and seizure entirely consistent with her testimony at the hearing. Notably, Fielder contacted the school principal on the morning following the seizure and voluntarily apprised him of the events that transpired the previous afternoon and of the fact that something was discovered in her bedroom. The principal testified, "[s]he was very open with me about the paraphernalia." Cf. Bd. of Dirs of Des Moines Area Community College v. Simons, 493 N.W.2d 879, 883 (Iowa Ct.App. 1992) (noting teacher failed to cooperate with college investigation).
In support of the board's decision, we are left with the opinions of four administrators concerning the probable effect of the seizure on Fielder's teaching abilities. The board contends these opinions alone amount to a preponderance of competent evidence in favor of its decision. We agree with the board that the administrators possessed the credentials to opine on the subject. We also believe they were entitled to opine on possible future adverse effects of the conduct. See Briggs, 282 N.W.2d at 742 (quoting Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., 461 P.2d 375, 386-87 (1969)). However, like the board's decision, the administrators' opinions were largely based on an assumption that Fielder was aware of all the items found in her home, an assumption that the board appeared to reject. Although the superintendent and principal also mentioned several specific instances of negative public reaction to the raid, Fielder amply countered this evidence with more than forty letters and cards attesting to her continued stature in the community, as well as evaluations reflecting a fifteen-year history as an outstanding educator. Cf. Bd. of Dirs v. Sexton, 334 N.W.2d 341, 343-44 (Iowa Ct.App. 1983) (noting existence of "a record showing support for defendant and her teaching ability. . . ."). For these reasons, we conclude the board's decision is unsupported by a preponderance of the competent evidence in the record when that record is viewed as a whole.
The board now maintains the letters and cards are hearsay but the superintendent did not object to the evidence when it was proffered. The board is not bound by rules of evidence. Iowa Code § 279.16; Fay v. Bd. of Directors, 298 N.W.2d 345, 349 (Iowa Ct.App. 1980). The board also points to a prior disciplinary incident in Fielder's record. However, the board "did not give significant weight to this evidence" at the time it rendered its decision.
III. Deference
The board also contends the district court did not afford sufficient deference to the board's fact findings. However, the review provisions of chapter 279 provide that a court is to give weight to the board's fact findings but is not bound by them. Iowa Code § 279.18. We believe the district court provided cogent reasons for refusing to be bound by the administrators' opinions. For the reasons stated above, we affirm the court's ruling.