Opinion
No. 2-16-0360
08-29-2017
In re MARRIAGE OF STEPHEN B. FIELD, Petitioner-Appellee, v. JENNIFER J. FIELD, Respondent-Appellant.
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). Appeal from the Circuit Court of Lake County. No. 14-D-737 Honorable Joseph V. Salvi, Judge, Presiding. JUSTICE HUTCHINSON delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Burke and Spence concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: The trial court's classifications of marital property were not against the manifest weight of the evidence, and its order directing respondent to share tax refunds and liabilities with respondent for tax years 2013, 2014, and 2015 was not an abuse of discretion. ¶ 2 Respondent, Jennifer Field, appeals from the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County dissolving her marriage to petitioner, Stephen Field. Respondent argues: (1) the trial court erred in classifying the Hoffman Estates townhouse as marital property; (2) the trial court's classification of petitioner's credit card debt as marital debt was against the manifest weight of the evidence; (3) the trial court abused its discretion in ordering respondent to pay half of petitioner's credit card debt; (4) the trial court erred in its classification of certain retirement plans belonging to the parties; and (5) the trial court abused its discretion in ordering respondent to share income tax refunds with petitioner and pay half of petitioner's income tax penalties for 2013, 2014, and 2015 tax years. We affirm.
¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 The parties were married on October 7, 2006, in Fairfield County, Connecticut. Approximately ten years prior to their marriage, respondent acquired 657 Partridge Hill Drive, Hoffman Estates, Illinois ("the townhouse"). The property was purchased solely by respondent, secured by a mortgage in her name only, and was titled in her name only. The parties and their two children resided in the townhouse after they were married until sometime near the end of 2013. In 2009, the parties refinanced the townhouse and jointly secured an interest only home equity line of credit (HELOC) to make improvements to the property. During the course of the marriage, the parties made payments on the HELOC through a joint checking account. ¶ 5 In June 2012 the parties jointly acquired 1441 Woodland Drive, Deerfield, Illinois ("Deerfield home"). The property was purchased for $430,000. The parties then took out a second interest only HELOC to make improvements to the Deerfield home and pay off debts owed on the parties' automobiles. In late 2013 the parties and their two children moved into the Deerfield home. ¶ 6 Sometime in January of 2014 the marriage broke down, and petitioner moved back into the townhouse by himself. On April 22, 2014, petitioner filed his petition for dissolution of marriage. The parties entered into a custody agreement regarding their two children, which remains in effect. Following a lengthy discovery process, the trial court held a hearing regarding the division of the parties' property on March 14, 2016. ¶ 7 At the hearing on March 14, 2016, the trial court heard testimony from both petitioner and respondent. Petitioner testified that $60,000 remained on the mortgage for the townhouse when the parties were married. Marital funds paid from a joint checking account were used to pay off that mortgage. The parties then jointly borrowed $75,000 via a HELOC loan to improve the townhouse, followed by an additional $35,000 HELOC loan to improve the Deerfield home. Petitioner stated that based on conversations with respondent expressing her intent that the townhouse be held jointly by the parties, half the value of the townhouse belonged to him. ¶ 8 Regarding credit card debt, petitioner testified that he has three credit cards through Bank of America in which a total of approximately $52,000 was owed. He also has credit card debt with Chase for approximately $4,000 which he used to pay guardian ad litem fees. ¶ 9 Petitioner testified to his possession of retirement and IRA accounts. Prior to the parties' marriage, petitioner established a retirement account that was eventually transferred from his previous employer to Merrill Lynch. Petitioner continued to contribute money to this account during the marriage. The Merrill Lynch account had a value of $103,801.13 as of January 29, 2016. Petitioner also has a retirement account held by Voya Financial. All contributions to this account were made during the marriage. The Voya Financial account's value as of January 15, 2015, was $7,689.28. The parties stipulated to the value of petitioner's Charles Schwab IRA and Roth IRA as $6,126.16 and 8,436.21 respectively. ¶ 10 Petitioner testified that prior to the parties' separation, they had always filed joint tax returns. Petitioner requested to file jointly with respondent for the 2013 tax year but she did not respond to his request. Eventually, petitioner filed as married filing separately for the 2013 tax year. He was unable to take deductions for either of his children, the Deerfield home or the townhouse as respondent had already claimed these deductions. As a result, petitioner testified that he was required to make additional payment for taxes owed in the 2013 tax year. Respondent filed separately and as head of household for the 2014 and 2015 tax years and took the deductions for the Deerfield home, the townhouse, and the parties' children. Petitioner incurred tax liabilities for those years when he filed as married filing separately. At the time of petitioner's testimony, he stated that he owed the IRS approximately $8,000 for liabilities incurred in the 2013 and 2014 tax years. He was paying $250 per month from his own bank account towards this debt. He had not filed his 2015 tax return as of March 14, 2016, but expected to incur additional tax liability. ¶ 11 Respondent was then called to testify. She testified similarly to petitioner in regard to her tax filings for the 2013, 2014, and 2015 tax years. Respondent then recounted that she and petitioner used marital funds to pay off the townhouse between 2006 and 2009. She admitted that the parties took out a HELOC loan of $75,000 in 2009 to renovate the townhouse and pay off amounts owed on automobiles. The couple then took out the additional $35,000 HELOC loan to fix the home they just purchased in Deerfield. ¶ 12 Respondent then testified as to the various retirement and IRA accounts she owns. Respondent owned a Takeda Pharmaceuticals savings and retirement plan that had a balance of $15,147.88 at the time of the parties' marriage. Following respondent's termination of employment with Takeda in 2014, she withdrew the balance of $274,534.67. Respondent then established a Fidelity Roth IRA with a value of $69,000 and a Fidelity roll over account with a value of $165,000. ¶ 13 Following respondent's testimony the trial court adjourned. On April 20, 2016, the trial court issued a judgment of dissolution of marriage. As to the classification of the townhouse, the trial court found the following:
"V. *** The court heard testimony concerning the contribution made by the marital estate to maintain [the townhouse], but considering the credibility of the witnesses, exhibit presented by the Petitioner, ***; the lack of any financial records in the Respondent's testimony concerning the value of [the townhouse] ***; the lack of credibility of the Respondent ***; that in 2009 the subject property was refinanced and that both the Petitioner and the Respondent are jointly responsible for the [HELOC] on [the townhouse]; that the parties during the course of the marriage used marital funds to maintain said property and to pay the [HELOC]; the Court finds that it was the intent of the parties that the [townhouse] is a marital asset. ***."As to the classification of the parties' credit card debt, the trial court found the following:
"MM. The Court finds that the Petitioner ***, as of March 14, 2016, has outstanding credit card debt ***. The Court finds said credit card debt totaling [$49,339.13] to be marital debt."As to the classification of the parties' respective tax refunds and liabilities, the trial court found the following:
"II. The Court finds that the Respondent *** has filed tax returns for the years 2013, 2014, and 2015 as married filing separately, and as head of household, and for those years has claimed the minor children as exemptions and has claimed the interest payments and real estate tax payments on the residences located in Deerfield and Hoffman Estates to the exclusion of the Petitioner ***.
JJ. The court finds that the Respondent *** received a tax refund for the year 2013 of [$9,017.00], a tax refund for the year 2014 of [$9,587.00], and a tax refund for the year
2015 of [$6,595.00]. *** The Court finds that said tax refunds for the years 2013, 2014 and 2015 totaling [$25,199.00] are a marital asset.As to petitioner's retirement account relevant to this appeal, the trial court found the following:
KK. The Court finds that the Petitioner ***, as a result of the Respondent's refusal to file joint tax returns for the years 2013, 2014 and 2015 has incurred a tax liability in the amount of $6,654.00, $4,000 and $10,000 and that the Petitioner is currently paying [$250.00] per month *** at the direction of the IRS. The Court finds that the debt to the IRS in the amount of $20,654.00 is a marital debt. Furthermore, upon the filing of his 2015 tax return[,] any additional amount owed is marital debt."
"W. *** [T]he Court finds that the Petitioner *** has a retirement account with Merrill Lynch *** that was established prior to the marriage; that the value of said account as of January 29, 2016, is [$103,801.13]. That during the marriage the Petitioner *** contributed the sum of [$9,086.74] to said retirement account. The Court finds that the Merrill Lynch [account] is the non-marital asset of the Petitioner ** and that the marital estate is entitled to a credit of [$9,086.74]."As to respondent's retirement plan relevant to this appeal, the trial court found the following:
"12. *** Petitioner *** is awarded the non-marital portion of his retirement account with Merrill Lynch *** with a non-marital value of $94,714,39.
13. *** Petitioner *** is awarded the marital portion of his retirement account with Merrill Lynch *** with the marital portion value of $9,086.74."
"AA. The Court finds that the Respondent *** had a Savings and Retirement Plan with Takeda Pharmaceuticals with a value of [$274,534.67] as of July 22, 2014 *** which the Respondent *** withdrew in November 2014, when her employment with Takeda was
terminated. *** [T]he Takeda Savings and Retirement Plan had a value of [$15,147.88] as of the date of the marriage of the parties. The Court finds that the Takeda Savings and Retirement Plan in the amount of [$244,239.00] was a marital asset and $15,147 was [a] non-marital asset."This appeal followed.
¶ 14 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 15 Before examining petitioner's contentions in this appeal we note that respondent did not file a brief with this court. However, as the issues presented are relatively simple, we may decide the merits of those issues. See First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133 (1976). ¶ 16 Each issue respondent raises in this appeal are related to either the trial court's classification or allocation of the parties' property. We will address each in turn, starting with an analysis of the classification of said property.
Respondent filed a motion with this court on June 16, 2017, to bar petitioner from filing a brief and to decide the matter based on appellant's brief. This court issued an order on June 20, 2016, to take the motion with the case. The motion is denied as moot. --------
¶ 17 Classification of Property
¶ 18 Respondent's first contention is that the trial court erred in classifying the townhouse as marital property. Respondent argues that she purchased the townhouse ten years prior to the marriage and never expressed any intent to place the property into joint tenancy with respondent. ¶ 19 The disposition of property in a dissolution of marriage proceeding is governed by section 503 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (the Act) (750 ILCS 5/503 (West 2016)). All property owned by the parties in a dissolution proceeding belongs to one of three estates—the husband's estate, the wife's estate, or the marital estate. In re Marriage of Werries, 247 Ill. App. 3d 639, 641-42 (1993). Before a court may dispose of property upon the dissolution of marriage, it must determine whether the property is marital or non-marital. In re Marriage of Henke, 313 Ill. App. 3d 159, 166 (2000). After the trial court classifies the property, it awards each spouse their non-marital property and divides the marital property into just proportions. 750 ILCS 5/503(d) (West 2016). A trial court's classification of property as marital or non-marital will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Marriage of Romano, 2012 IL App (2d) 091339, ¶ 44. A decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence only when an opposite conclusion is clearly apparent or when the court's findings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence. Id. ¶ 20 There is no dispute that the townhouse purchased in 1996 by respondent came into the marriage as petitioner's non-marital property. See 750 ILCS 5/503(a)(6) (West 2016). However, property designated as non-marital under section 503(a) may still be presumptively transmuted into marital property by an affirmative act of the contributing spouse, such as placing non-marital property into joint tenancy or some other form of co-ownership with the other spouse. In re Marriage of Gattone, 317 Ill. App. 3d 346, 352 (2000). This raises a presumption that the contributing spouse made a gift of the property to the marital estate. Id. The contributing spouse may overcome this presumption by presenting clear and convincing evidence that he or she did not intend to make a gift of the non-marital property. Id. Any doubts as to the nature of the property are resolved in favor of finding that the property is marital. Id. ¶ 21 Some of the significant factors for determining whether a party has successfully rebutted the presumption of a gift include: (1) the size of the gift relative to the entire estate; (2) who paid the purchase price, made improvements, paid taxes on the property with solely acquired funds, and exercised control and management over the property; (3) when the asset was purchased; and (4) how the parties handled their prior financial dealings with each other. In re Marriage of Guerra, 153 Ill.App.3d 550, 556 (1987). With these principles in mind, we conclude that the trial court's determination that the townhouse was marital property was not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. ¶ 22 The trial court heard evidence that the parties paid off respondent's remaining mortgage on the townhouse with marital funds from a joint checking account. The parties then jointly refinanced the townhouse with a $75,000 HELOC loan to improve the property. The parties then jointly took another $35,000 HELOC loan against the townhouse to improve the Deerfield home that they had jointly purchased. They used marital funds to maintain the townhouse and pay back the HELOC loan. The parties lived in the townhouse as a married couple with their two children from 2006 to sometime in late 2013. Additionally, and perhaps most importantly, the trial court articulated through its findings in the judgment for dissolution of marriage that it did not find respondent's testimony regarding the townhouse to be credible. Conversely, the trial court heard testimony from petitioner that respondent expressed her intent for the townhouse to be held jointly by the parties upon securing the initial HELOC loan and found no issue concerning credibility with that testimony. The trial court is in a better position than a court of review to observe the demeanor of witnesses, judge their credibility, and determine the weight the testimony should receive. Sohaey v. Van Cura, 240 Ill. App. 3d 266, 293 (1992). Therefore, we cannot say that respondent presented clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that the townhouse is marital property following her expressed intent for the property to be held jointly by the parties after securing the HELOC loans to improve the marital home. The trial court's classification of the townhouse as marital property was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. ¶ 23 Respondent next contends that the trial court erred in classifying the credit card debt of the parties as marital debt. Additionally, respondent contends that the trial court's allocation of the debt constituted an abuse of discretion. We will first examine respondent's contention that the trial court erred in its classification of the credit card debt. Again, a trial court's classification of property as marital or non-marital will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Marriage of Romano, 2012 IL App (2d) 091339, ¶ 44. A decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence only when an opposite conclusion is clearly apparent or when the court's findings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence. Id. ¶ 24 Debt is a type of property for the purposes of the Act. 750 ILCS 5/503(a) (West 2016). Section 503(b)(1) of the Act provides: "For purposes of distribution of property, all property acquired by either spouse after the marriage and before a judgment of dissolution of marriage or declaration of invalidity of marriage is presumed marital property." 750 ILCS 5/503(b)(1) (West 2016). This presumption may be overcome by a showing through clear and convincing evidence that the property was acquired by a method listed in section 503(a) of the Act. Id. ¶ 25 Section 503(a) of the act lists the methods for the acquisition of non-marital property to overcome the presumption of marital property acquired as described in section 503(b)(1) as follows:
"(1) property acquired by gift, legacy or descent or property acquire in exchange for such property;
(2) property acquired in exchange for property acquired before the marriage;
(3) property acquired by a spouse after a judgment of legal separation;¶ 26 Respondent in the present case did not present clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that the credit card debt incurred by petitioner was anything but marital debt. Respondent cites In re Samardzija, 365 Ill. App. 3d 702 (2006), for the proposition that petitioner's credit card debt should not be considered a marital debt. In Samardzija, one of the parties had run up $38,000 in credit card debt shortly after the couple had separated. Id. at 707. The record in that case reflected that the items charged included a $1,300 suit of clothes, a $1,900 fur coat, $879 in sportswear, a $939 crystal ball, and over $600 for two wedding gifts. The court said that the credit card bills incurred by the wife were "sort of a frolic on her own," and "I think she is going to assume those bills herself." The facts in Samardzija are quite distinct from the record in this case. Id. ¶ 27 The trial court heard testimony from petitioner that he incurred credit debt by paying guardian ad litem fees, attorney fees, living expenses and medical expenses. All of this debt was incurred between the time petitioner moved out of the Deerfield home and the judgment for dissolution of marriage. The language of section 503(b)(1) of the Act clearly classifies this credit card debt as marital debt and no clear and convincing evidence was introduced by petitioner to rebut that presumption. The only evidence that respondent highlighted regarding the use of petitioner's credit cards involved two charges; one at a Hooters restaurant and another at Miller's Pub. These two charges alone do not constitute the type of folic contemplated in Samardzija, and they do not amount to clear and convincing evidence that the credit card debt was non-marital. Therefore, the trial court's classification of $49,339.13 of credit card debt incurred via petitioner's various accounts as marital was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. ¶ 28 We now move on to respondent's contention that the trial court misclassified the retirement plans of the parties and miscalculated each party's share. Respondent argues that the trial court's classification of $94,714.39 of petitioner's Merrill Lynch retirement account as a non-marital asset was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Additionally, respondent argues that the trial court's classification of $15,147.00 of her Takeda savings and retirement plan as a non-marital asset was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Respondent's argument rests on her interpretation of section 503(a)(6) of the act which states that non-marital property is property acquired before the marriage "except as it relates to retirement plans that may have both marital and non-marital characteristics." We disagree based on the trial court's findings in this case. ¶ 29 The trial court shall make specific factual findings as to its classification of assets as marital or non-marital property, values, and other factual findings supporting its property award. 750 ILCS 5/503(a) (West 2016). In the present case, the trial court did exactly that in regard to the division of all the parties' property, including the various retirement accounts. Pertaining to petitioner's Merrill Lynch retirement account, the trial court found the account "was established prior to the marriage," and had a value "as of January 29, 2016 [of] [$103,801.13]." The trial court went on to find that during the marriage, petitioner "contributed the sum of [$9,086.74] to said retirement account." The trial court found that the account "is the non-marital asset of the petitioner," and that "the marital estate is entitled to a credit of [$9,086.74]." The court made similar articulations in its classification of respondent's Takeda savings and retirement plan. The court found that the plan had a value of $274,534.67 as of July 22, 2014. There was a finding that the plan had a value of $15,147.00 as of the date of the parties' marriage. The court then classified that $15,147.00 as respondent's non-marital asset. These findings and classifications illustrate an exercise of judicial consideration that section 503(a) of the Act requires of the trial court. According to respondent, it does not appear that the retirement plans were given any look by the trial court. Based on the trial court's findings in the judgment for dissolution of marriage, this assertion is baseless. The trial court's classification of the parties' retirement accounts and the calculation of each party's share was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. ¶ 30 Having analyzed respondent's contention in regard to the trial court's classification of the parties' property at issue in this appeal, we will now move on to respondent's contentions concerning the trial court's allocation of property.
(4) property excluded by valid agreement of the parties, including a premarital agreement or postnuptial agreement;
(5) any judgment or property obtained by judgment awarded to a spouse from the other spouse except, however, when a spouse is required to sue the other spouse in order to obtain insurance coverage or otherwise recover from a third party and the recovery is directly related to amounts advanced by the marital estate, the judgment shall be considered marital property;
(6) property acquired before the marriage, except as it relates to retirement plans that may have both marital and non-marital characteristics;
(6.5) all property acquired by a spouse by the sole use of non-marital property as collateral for a loan that then is used to acquire property during the marriage; to the extent that the marital estate repays any portion of the loan, it shall be considered a contribution from the marital estate to the non-marital estate subject to reimbursement;
(7) the increase in value of non-marital property, irrespective of whether the increase results from a contribution of marital property, non-marital property, the personal effort of a spouse, or otherwise, subject to the right of reimbursement provided in subsection (c) of this Section; and
(8) income from property acquired by a method listed in paragraphs (1) through (7) of this subsection if the income is not attributable to the personal effort of a spouse." 750 ILCS 5/503(a) (West 2016).
¶ 31 Allocation of Property
¶ 32 Respondent contends that the trial court erred in its allocation of the credit card debt. Respondent argues that the trial court's order meant that debt load was inequitable because it increased her debt load by 73%, or $14,428.89. ¶ 33 Once the trial court classifies the property, section 503(d) of the Act requires the trial court to divide the parties' marital property "in just proportions considering all the relevant factors." 750 ILCS 5/503(d) (West 2016). Section 503(d) of the Act (750 ILCS 5/503(d) (West 2016)) requires the trial court to distribute marital property in "just proportions considering all relevant factors[.]" Section 503(d) specifies factors to consider including: (1) the contribution of each party to the acquisition or value of marital or nonmarital property, including the contribution of a spouse as a homemaker to the family unit; (2) the value of the property assigned to each spouse; (3) the duration of the marriage; (4) the relevant economic circumstances of each spouse; (5) the age, health, station, and occupation of each spouse; (6) the custodial provisions for any children; (7) the reasonable opportunity of each spouse for future acquisition of capital assets and income; and (8) the tax consequences of the property division upon the respective economic circumstances of the parties. Id. "Just proportions" does not mean mathematical equality but a division according to equity (In re Marriage of Joynt, 375 Ill. App. 3d 817, 821 (2007)), and the circumstances may warrant that one spouse receive a greater share of the marital estate (In re Marriage of Agazim, 176 Ill. App. 3d 225, 231 (1988)). ¶ 34 The touchstone of proper apportionment is whether it is equitable, and each case rests on its own facts. In re Marriage of Romano, 2012 IL App (2d) 091339, ¶ 121. An equitable division does not necessarily mean an equal division, and one spouse may be awarded a larger share of the assets if the relevant factors warrant such a result. Id. (citing In re Marriage of Henke, 313 Ill. App. 3d 159, 175 (2000)). Determinations of the trial court regarding credibility, as the entity closest to the litigation and as the trier of fact, are given great deference, and there is a strong presumption the trial court made the right decision. In re Marriage of McHenry, 292 Ill. App. 3d 634, 641 (1997). " 'A reviewing court applies the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard to the factual findings of each factor on which a trial court may base its property disposition, but it applies the abuse-of-discretion standard in reviewing the trial court's final property disposition ***.' " Romano, 2012 IL App (2d) 091339, ¶ 121 (quoting In re Marriage of Vancura, 356 Ill. App. 3d 200, 205 (2005)). ¶ 35 Both parties were gainfully employed at the time of the judgment for dissolution of marriage with petitioner earning $120,900.45 in 2015 and respondent earning $99,828.00 in 2015. This is not a wide discrepancy in earnings. Additionally, the trial court awarded respondent and petitioner $291,994.18 and $205,080.41 respectively through allocation of the parties' marital retirement plans. The judgment for dissolution also orders payment of the credit card through the proceeds gained from the stipulated sale of the townhouse. Taken as a whole, we cannot say that the trial court's allocation of the parties' credit card debt is in any way inequitable and certainly not an abuse of discretion. ¶ 36 Respondent's final contention is that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering her to equally share income tax refunds and liabilities with petitioner. She makes two assertions to support this contention: (1) the trial court did not follow the mandatory language of section 503(a) of the Act; and (2) the trial court improperly considered the factors listed in section 503(d) of the Act. Again, these are baseless assertions. ¶ 37 As we stated earlier, the trial court shall make specific factual findings as to its classification of assets as marital or non-marital property, values, and other factual findings supporting its property award. 750 ILCS 5/503(a) (West 2016). Here, the trial court made specific factual findings as to the parties' tax returns for the years 2013, 2014 and 2015. As discussed above, paragraphs II., JJ., and KK of the judgment for dissolution of marriage make specific, detailed findings regarding this issue. There is absolutely no merit to respondent's assertion that the trial court did not follow the language of section 503(a) of the Act. ¶ 38 Section 503(d) of the Act (750 ILCS 5/503(d) (West 2016)) requires the trial court to distribute marital property in "just proportions considering all relevant factors[.]" Section 503(d) specifies factors to consider including: (1) the contribution of each party to the acquisition or value of marital or non-marital property, including the contribution of a spouse as a homemaker to the family unit; (2) the value of the property assigned to each spouse; (3) the duration of the marriage; (4) the relevant economic circumstances of each spouse; (5) the age, health, station, and occupation of each spouse; (6) the custodial provisions for any children; (7) the reasonable opportunity of each spouse for future acquisition of capital assets and income; and (8) the tax consequences of the property division upon the respective economic circumstances of the parties. Id. "Just proportions" does not mean mathematical equality but a division according to equity (In re Marriage of Joynt, 375 Ill. App. 3d 817, 821 (2007)), and the circumstances may warrant that one spouse receive a greater share of the marital estate (In re Marriage of Agazim, 176 Ill. App. 3d 225, 231 (1988)). The trial court's property allocation will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Joynt, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 822. ¶ 39 Here, there is nothing in the record or the judgment for dissolution of marriage to suggest that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering respondent to share her tax refunds from 2013, 2014 and 2015 with petitioner. The trial court had fully considered all the evidence and factors and determined that the refunds respondent received were marital property to be shared equally between the parties. As to petitioner's tax liabilities, the trial court determined them to be marital debt to be shared equally between the parties. Even if this court were to weigh each factor listed in section 503(d) of the Act as it pertains to the facts of the present case, we may well come to the same conclusion that the trial court did when ordering respondent to share the tax refunds and liabilities with petitioner. We can certainly say that the trial court's order was not an abuse of discretion.
¶ 40 III.CONCLUSION
¶ 41 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County. ¶ 42 Affirmed.