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Ferguson v. Temco

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.
Nov 14, 2012
100 A.D.3d 686 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012)

Opinion

2012-11-14

Selma FERGUSON, respondent, v. TEMCO, appellant.

Lester Schwab Katz & Dwyer, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Steven B. Prystowsky and David H. Motola of counsel), for appellant. Dinkes & Schwitzer (Pollack, Pollack, Isaac & De Cicco, New York, N.Y. [Brian J. Isaac and Kenneth J. Gorman], of counsel), for respondent.


Lester Schwab Katz & Dwyer, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Steven B. Prystowsky and David H. Motola of counsel), for appellant. Dinkes & Schwitzer (Pollack, Pollack, Isaac & De Cicco, New York, N.Y. [Brian J. Isaac and Kenneth J. Gorman], of counsel), for respondent.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Saitta, J.), dated May 19, 2011, which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

“Because a finding of negligence must be based on the breach of a duty, a threshold question in tort cases is whether the alleged tortfeasor owed a duty of care to the injured party” ( Espinal v. Melville Snow Contrs., 98 N.Y.2d 136, 138, 746 N.Y.S.2d 120, 773 N.E.2d 485;see Benavides v. 30 Brooklyn, LLC, 96 A.D.3d 889, 946 N.Y.S.2d 513). A contractual obligation, standing alone, will generally not give rise to tort liability in favor of a third party ( see Espinal v. Melville Snow Contrs., 98 N.Y.2d at 138, 746 N.Y.S.2d 120, 773 N.E.2d 485;Benavides v. 30 Brooklyn, LLC, 96 A.D.3d at 889, 946 N.Y.S.2d 513). An exception to the general rule exists where the contractor “launches an instrument of harm or creates or exacerbates a hazardous condition” ( Benavides v. 30 Brooklyn, LLC, 96 A.D.3d at 890, 946 N.Y.S.2d 513;see Wheaton v. East End Commons Assoc., LLC, 50 A.D.3d 675, 677, 854 N.Y.S.2d 528;see also Espinal v. Melville Snow Contrs., 98 N.Y.2d at 140, 746 N.Y.S.2d 120, 773 N.E.2d 485).

Here, in support of its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, the defendant was required to establish, prima facie, that it did not create or exacerbate the alleged dangerous condition ( see Benavides v. 30 Brooklyn, LLC, 96 A.D.3d 889, 946 N.Y.S.2d 513). The defendant failed to meet this burden.

Since the defendant failed to meet its initial burden, the sufficiency of the plaintiff's opposition papers need not be considered ( see Winegrad v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 N.Y.2d 851, 487 N.Y.S.2d 316, 476 N.E.2d 642).

The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ANGIOLILLO, J.P., AUSTIN, SGROI and MILLER, JJ., concur.


Summaries of

Ferguson v. Temco

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.
Nov 14, 2012
100 A.D.3d 686 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012)
Case details for

Ferguson v. Temco

Case Details

Full title:Selma FERGUSON, respondent, v. TEMCO, appellant.

Court:Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Date published: Nov 14, 2012

Citations

100 A.D.3d 686 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012)
2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 7622
953 N.Y.S.2d 879

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