Resulting trust are intent enforcing devices that arise by operation of law and the presumed intent of the parties distilled from their conduct. Fender v. Yagemann, 29 Ill.2d 205, 193 N.E.2d 794, 796 (1963); Judgment Services Corp. v. Sullivan, 321 Ill. App.3d 151, 254 Ill.Dec. 70, 746 N.E.2d 827, 831 (2001). What distinguishes resulting trust from constructive trust is that the former is focused solely on the intent of the parties while the latter is imposed irrespective of the parties intent.
The presumed intent of the parties is inferred from their conduct, relationship, and surrounding circumstances. Carlson v. Carlson, 393 N.E.2d 643, 645 (Ill.App.Ct. 1979); Davenport v. S.I. Sec., 268 B.R. 159, 162-63 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2001) ( citing Fender v. Yagemann, 193 N.E.2d 794, 796 (Ill. 1963) and Judgment Servs. Corp. v. Sullivan, 746 N.E.2d 827, 831 (Ill.App.Ct. 2001)). In the most common situation involving real property, the general rule is that where a transfer of property is made to one person and the purchase price is paid by another, a resulting trust arises in favor of the person who paid the purchase price.
In the absence of a showing of a fiduciary relationship between Weil and Rudd, and fraud in its breach, there can be no constructive trust. (Fender v. Yagemann, 29 Ill.2d 205, 210, 193 N.E.2d 794 (1963).) As there is no evidence in this record of fraud on behalf of Rudd or that he abused any confidential relationship, the proof here does not show that a constructive trust arose.
The interline railroads mention but do not seriously pursue this possibility. A constructive trust usually depends on a fraudulent act to obtain control of the assets, see In re General Coffee Corp., 828 F.2d 699 (11th Cir. 1987) (Florida law); Fender v. Yagemann, 29 Ill.2d 205, 210, 193 N.E.2d 794 (1963); and the Iowa put its hands on this money legitimately. There could be a decent claim of unjust enrichment if we had to decide whether the Iowa's stockholders or the interline railroads should get the money remaining in the Iowa's coffers; it would unjustly enrich the stockholders to receive this money.
Under Illinois law, resulting trusts are “intent enforcing devices that arise by operation of law and the presumed intent of the parties distilled from their conduct.” Davenport v. S.I. Secs. (In re Davenport), 268 B.R. 159, 162 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.2001) (citing Fender v. Yagemann, 29 Ill.2d 205, 193 N.E.2d 794, 796 (Ill.1963)); Judgment Servs. Corp. v. Sullivan, 321 Ill.App.3d 151, 254 Ill.Dec. 70, 746 N.E.2d 827, 831 (Ill.App.Ct.2001). “A resulting trust arises by operation of law where one person furnishes the consideration for property and the title is taken in another.”
Reviewing courts in this State refuse to consider complaints raised by an appellee in his brief concerning action taken by the circuit court when he has failed to file a cross-appeal from the circuit court's decision. (See Fender v. Yagemann (1963), 29 Ill.2d 205, 210; Bryant v. Lakeside Galleries, Inc. (1949), 402 Ill. 466, 471; De Phillips v. Mortgage Associates, Inc. (1972), 8 Ill. App.3d 759, 762.) The appellate court, therefore, properly dismissed the defendant's challenge to the circuit court's denial of fees.
If a reasonable explanation of the evidence adduced may be made upon any theory other than the existence of a resulting trust, that evidence is insufficient to establish a resulting trust. Fender v. Yagemann, 29 Ill.2d 205, 193 N.E.2d 794 (1963). The evidence here is capable of a reasonable explanation.
In the case at bar, there is no evidence that the parties intended to set up such a trust. (See Fender v. Yagemann (1963), 29 Ill.2d 205, 193 N.E.2d 794 (refusing to find a resulting trust when the record did not show that the conveyor of property intended to retain a beneficial interest in the property).) Moreover, Chillicothe has cited no case law on resulting trusts nor has it presented any argument supporting this contention; therefore, it has waived this argument on appeal. 134 Ill.2d R. 341(e)(7).
Further, despite the fact that there was evidence that the reconveyance was for tax purposes, there was no evidence that it was intended that a beneficial interest would remain in Mrs. Taylor. See Fender v. Yagemann, 29 Ill.2d 205, 109 (1963). Nor was there a constructive trust established as defendants argue.
The determination of intent is based upon the acts of the parties at the time title vests, or not at all. ( Suwalski v. Suwalski (1968), 40 Ill.2d 492, 240 N.E.2d 677; Fender v. Yagemann (1963), 29 Ill.2d 205, 193 N.E.2d 794; Hanley v. Hanley (1958), 14 Ill.2d 566, 152 N.E.2d 879.) Acts subsequent to the taking of title have no bearing upon the question of whether a resulting trust was created. ( Hanley v. Hanley; Hille v. Barnes (1948), 399 Ill. 252, 77 N.E.2d 809.) With respect to the burden of proof, the court in Suwalski v. Suwalski stated: