Felton v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.

Full title: LAQUINTA FELTON, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.

Court: United States District Court, S.D. New York

Date published: Aug 5, 2022

Civil Action 20 Civ. 9076 (LTS) (SLC) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2022)

Opinion

Civil Action 20 Civ. 9076 (LTS) (SLC)

08-05-2022

LAQUINTA FELTON, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.

SARAH L. CAVE, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

THE HONORABLE LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

SARAH L. CAVE, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Laquinta Felton (“Ms. Felton”) commenced this action pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act (the “Act”), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (ECF No. 1). Ms. Felton seeks review of the decision by the Commissioner (the “Commissioner”) of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”), denying her application for Social Security Income (“SSI”) under the Act. (Id.) Ms. Felton contends that the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) dated September 27, 2019 (the “ALJ Decision”) is erroneous because the ALJ's determination is not supported by substantial evidence and is “tainted by errors of law and fact.” (Id. ¶¶ 27-28).

The parties have cross-moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). On September 30, 2021, Ms. Felton filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings (ECF No. 21 (“Ms. Felton's Motion”), on February 23, 2022, the Commissioner cross-moved (ECF No. 27 (the “Commissioner's Motion”)), and on April 15, 2022, Ms. Felton filed a reply. (ECF No. 32) (Ms. Felton's Motion and the Commissioner's Motion together, the “Motions”). For the reasons set forth below, I respectfully recommend that Ms. Felton's Motion be DENIED, the Commissioner's Motion be GRANTED, and the case be DISMISSED.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural Background

On May 25, 2017, Ms. Felton filed an application for SSI, initially alleging a disability onset date of August 31, 2012. (Administrative Record (“R.”) 69, 85 (ECF Nos. 18 - 18-9)). She alleged that her disabilities were major depression, type two diabetes, asthma, obesity, and a knee injury. (R. 69-70). On August 21, 2017, the SSA denied her application. (R. 81-87).

After Ms. Felton requested a hearing before an ALJ, on May 3, 2019, ALJ David J. Begley conducted a hearing, which was “continued . . . in order to allow [Ms. Felton] the opportunity to secure representation.” (R. 10). On August 9, 2019, ALJ Begley held a second hearing (the “Hearing”), at which at which Ms. Felton appeared represented by counsel. (R. 28-63). On September 19, 2019, the ALJ issued his Decision finding that Ms. Felton was not disabled under the Act. (R. 10-23). On August 27, 2020, the ALJ Decision became the final decision of the Commissioner when the Appeals Council denied review. (R. 1-6).

B. Factual Background

1. Non-medical evidence

Ms. Felton was born in November 1978 and was 38 years old when she applied for SSI. (R. 69). She attained an associates' degree in “liberal arts” in 2005, and has had no other vocational training. (R. 36-37, 311). Ms. Felton worked most recently as a poll worker from 1996 to 2003 or 2004. (R. 79). She also worked as an usher at a movie theater from 1999 to 2000. (R. 79, 188). Ms. Felton stopped working in 2003 or 2004 when she became pregnant. (R. 187). During the relevant period, Ms. Felton lived in an apartment in New York City with her mother, her four children (who, at the time of the Hearing, were aged 13, 17, 18, and 23 years old), her grandson (who was eight months old at the time of the Hearing), and two dogs. (R. 34-36, 40, 186, 197-98). Ms. Felton is married, but does not live with her husband. (R. 34-35).

In an undated function report (the “Function Report”) submitted with her SSI application, Ms. Felton indicated that she can dress and bathe herself and prepare her own meals, and that she does not need any help or reminders to take care of her personal needs. (R. 198-99). She stated that she does not go outside often, but that she can use public transportation and travel alone. (R. 200). She shops in stores three times a month and handles her own money. (R. 200-01). Her hobbies and interests include bike riding, jumping rope, dancing, taking care of her family and friends, and volunteering at her children's school, but she indicated that she could no longer “do these thing's [sic] often anymore because of [her] knee” and that she was limited in her ability to lift objects and to use stairs. (R. 201). She stated that she spends time with others “once or twice a month.” (R. 201). Ms. Felton also indicated that she goes “to [her] brother-in-law's house in Brooklyn or on the West Side” on a regular basis, and she is in Brooklyn “all the time.” (R. 201). She also indicated, however, that she “really do[es]n't like some people” and that she tries “to stay away from some of [her] family.” (R. 202).

2. Medical evidence

The parties have provided detailed and largely consistent summaries of the medical evidence concerning Ms. Felton's physical and mental impairments. (ECF Nos. 22 at 9-17; 28 at 8-15). Accordingly, the Court adopts the parties' summaries of the medical evidence as accurate and complete, and summarizes below the pertinent evidence for purposes of analyzing the Motions. Additionally, because Ms. Felton limits her challenge to the ALJ's findings concerning her knee impairment and major depressive disorder, the Court limits its discussion to those impairments.

a. Knee Impairment

i. Mount Sinai Hospital

During the relevant period, Ms. Felton received her non-mental medical treatment at Mount Sinai Hospital (“Mount Sinai”). (R. 37). On September 20, 2011, Ms. Felton underwent a left knee x-ray at Mount Sinai after a fall. (R. 306). The x-ray showed “moderate medial compartment degenerative joint disease[.]” (R. 306-07).

On April 20, 2016, Ms. Felton attended a follow-up appointment at Mount Sinai for various conditions, including knee pain. (R. 1506). On exam, Ms. Felton appeared well-developed and in no acute distress, and demonstrated a full range of motion in her joints and a normal gait. (R. 1508).

On August 14, 2017, Ms. Felton attended another follow-up appointment for, inter alia, her knee pain. (R. 1625). She reported that she could “walk but then [would] get pain and knee swelling[,]” and that she would take ibuprofen for “flares” about once a week. (R. 1625). On exam, Ms. Felton again appeared well-developed and in no acute distress, and demonstrated a full range of motion in her joints and a normal gait. (R. 1627).

On November 15, 2017, Ms. Felton had an initial visit with nurse practitioner Nia R. Medder, D.N.P. (“Dr. Medder”), who became her primary care physician at Mount Sinai. (R. 1015). Ms. Felton reported, inter alia, that “she exercises all the time” and “does Zumba” at home. (R. 1015).

On December 22, 2017, Ms. Felton visited Mount Sanai's orthopedics clinic. (R. 1651). She complained of chronic left knee pain. (R. 1652). An exam of her left knee showed tenderness but no swelling, and 5/5 motor strength with discomfort. (R. 1652). An x-ray of Ms. Felton's knee showed “significant narrowing of the medial joint compartment, as well as bony productive change and subchondral remodeling” and “[t]ricompartment osteoarthrosis, most significant in the medial compartment.” (R. 583). Ms. Felton received a cortisone injection (R. 589), and experienced immediate pain relief. (R. 1652).

During visits on December 27, 2017, April 26, 2018, and May 2, 2018, Ms. Felton continued to report to Dr. Medder that she would exercise and do Zumba. (R. 975, 989, 1002). On examination at each visit, Dr. Medder noted a “normal gait.” (R. 977, 991, 1005).

On August 23, 2018, Ms. Felton returned to Mount Sinai's orthopedics clinic. (R. 1715). Ms. Felton reported that the December 2017 cortisone injection “was very affective [sic] till early [that] month.” (R. 1716). An exam of her left knee again showed tenderness but no swelling, and 5/5 motor strength with discomfort. (R. 1716). Ms. Felton was given another cortisone injection, and experienced immediate pain relief. (R. 1716-17).

On November 13, 2018, Ms. Felton had a follow-up visit at Mount Sinai. (R. 1728). An exam of her left knee again showed no swelling, and 5/5 motor strength with discomfort. (R. 1729). The treatment notes describe her knee impairment as “end stage” degenerative joint disease. (R. 1729).

On March 6, 2019, Ms. Felton again reported to Dr. Medder that “she exercises all the time” and “does Zumba” at home. (R. 863). On examination, Dr. Medder noted a “normal gait.” (R. 865).

On April 17, 2019, Ms. Felton reported to Dr. Medder that “her energy ha[d] increased” following bariatric surgery and that “now she walks faster then [sic] her husband.” (R. 847). Ms. Felton also reported that she would “be trying out free trial passes for local gyms” and that she continued to do Zumba at home. (R. 847). On exam, Ms. Felton was well appearing and in no acute distress, and had a normal gait. (R. 849).

On July 31, 2019, Dr. Medder opined that, “[d]ue to some of [Ms. Felton's] conditions, she has experienced some functional limitations” and, specifically, that she was unable to lift more than ten pounds and that “she had had limitations with being able to perform [activities of daily living].” (R. 2123).

ii. Ram Ravi, M.D. - SSA Consultative Examiner

On July 31, 2017, consultative examiner (“CE”) Ram Ravi, M.D. (“Dr. Ravi”) conducted an internal medicine examination of Ms. Felton. (R. 374-77)). Dr. Ravi noted that Ms. Felton complained of left knee pain, which she described as “10/10, sharp and constant” and “worse with walking and lifting.” (R. 374). Dr. Ravi noted that Ms. Felton “appeared to be in no acute distress” and that she exhibited a “moderately antalgic” gait. (R. 375). Ms. Felton was unable to walk on her heels and toes, and could squat only to “10% of maximum.” (R. 375). On examination, Dr. Ravi found Ms. Felton had “full [range of motion] of [her] knees and ankles bilaterally[,]” and showed “[n]o muscle atrophy” in her extremities. (R. 376). Dr. Ravi diagnosed Ms. Felton with, inter alia, left knee pain, and opined that she had (i) “[n]o limitations sitting or standing” (ii) “[m]oderate limitations to walking, bending, pushing, pulling, lifting, and carrying” and (iii) that she should “[a]void squatting due to left knee pain.” (R. 377).

b. Mental Impairments

i. Northside Center for Child Development

During the relevant period, Ms. Felton treated for anxiety and depression with Charita Hoyle, M.D. (“Dr. Hoyle”) and Nonda Volpe, Psy.D. (“Dr. Volpe”) at the Northside Center for Child Development (“Northside”). (R. 309-67, 388-411, 1077-1100, 1221-1317). The Court summaries the relevant treatment records.

On July 6, 2016, Ms. Felton underwent a psychosocial assessment at Northside. (R. 1287). She “explained that she was encouraged to attend therapy by her fiance and by police after a recent incident.” (R. 1282). She reported “feelings of being overwhelmed by emotions and stress, anger, sadness and mood swings[,]” and indicated that her father died in 2011. (R. 1282). She also reported being a “full time student at Touro College” and expected to graduate in June 2017. (R. 1282). A mental status exam showed that Ms. Felton had good eye contact, a euthymic but tense mood, a guarded but responsive and cooperative attitude, full orientation, normal concentration, attention, memory, speech, affect, and perceptions, good insight and judgment, a logical thought process, and rational thought content. (R. 1302-04). The treatment notes reflect that Ms. Felton was deemed to “meet[] the criteria for Unspecified Depressive Disorder due to symptoms of: feelings of sadness, socially withdrawn, bereavement, anger and often cries alone.” (R. 1282). The clinician recommended therapy and a psychiatric evaluation. (R. 1308).

On September 30, 2016, Dr. Hoyle evaluated Ms. Felton. (R. 311). Ms. Felton complained of feeling “not herself,” isolating behavior, poor energy, fluctuating appetite with weight gain, and lack of interest. (R. 311). On examination, Dr. Hoyle observed a depressed mood, absent thoughts, and decreased psychomotor activity, but that Ms. Felton was cooperative, with articulated and coherent speech, appropriate affect, intact memory, and normal thought content, impulse control, insight, and judgment. (R. 313-16). Dr. Hoyle diagnosed Ms. Felton with major depressive disorder, and recommended weekly therapy and that Ms. Felton “consider mediation if there is no progress in therapy in 6 weeks.” (R. 318).

In or about October 2016, Ms. Felton started therapy with Dr. Volpe. (R. 331). The Record contains a series of “Treatment Plans” that each span several months of treatment. (R. 322-59, 442-567). The Court summaries the relevant Treatment Plans.

In the October 30, 2016 to January 18, 2017 Treatment Plan, Dr. Volpe noted that Ms. Felton showed depressive symptoms following the death of an uncle. (R. 335-36). Ms. Felton reported that she and her fiance were having difficulties getting along. (R. 336). The focus of therapy was to help Ms. Felton cope more effectively with depression and to improve her poor self-esteem. (R. 336). In October 2016, Dr. Hoyle prescribed Wellbutrin XR, an anti-depressant. (R. 412).

In the January 19, 2017 to April 9, 2017 Treatment Plan, Dr. Volpe noted slight improvement in Ms. Felton's depressive symptoms, including sadness, trouble sleeping and mood swings. (R. 345). Ms. Felton reported that she had recently married, but continued to have difficulty getting along with her husband. (R. 345). Ms. Felton's therapy was focused on helping her to improve her poor self-esteem and to cope more effectively with stressors in her life to reduce symptoms of depression. (R. 345)

In the April 10, 2017 to June 29, 2017 Treatment Plan, Dr. Volpe noted that Ms. Felton reported that her sadness, trouble sleeping, and mood swings were stable and that her relationship with her husband had improved, but that she continued to cope with various stressors in her life, such as housing, financial issues and health problems. (R. 435). In the June 30, 2017 to September 18, 2017 Treatment Plan, Dr. Volpe noted that Ms. Felton's depression was stable, but that she often felt tired and lacking energy. (R. 448). In the September 19, 2017 to December 8, 2017 Treatment Plan, Dr. Volpe noted that Ms. Felton continued to experience symptoms of depression, such as irritability, sadness, trouble sleeping and mood swings, but they had been less severe. (R. 463). In the December 9, 2017 to February 2018 Treatment Plan, Dr. Volpe noted that Ms. Felton reported that her depression had slightly improved but that she continued to have difficulty dealing with the stressors in her life. (R. 480).

In the February 28, 2018 to May 19, 2018 Treatment Plan, Dr. Volpe noted that Ms. Felton reported slight improvement in sleep and mood swings, and that she had been trying to use cognitive behavioral therapy techniques to deal with stress. (R. 494). In the May 20, 2018 to August 8, 2018 Treatment Plan, Dr. Volpe noted that Ms. Felton had discontinued her medication due to a side effect of hair loss. (R. 510). She reported that her mood swings were stable, but that she was isolating herself at times. (R. 510). In the August 9, 2018 to October 28, 2018 Treatment Plan, Dr. Volpe noted that Ms. Felton had resumed medication but reported that she had been experiencing fewer mood swings. (R. 523). In the October 29, 2018 to January 17, 2019 Treatment Plan, Dr. Volpe noted that Ms. Felton reported that her mood swings and irritability were less intense. (R. 536).

In the January 18, 2019 to April 8, 2019 Treatment Plan, Dr. Volpe noted that Ms. Felton reported success in using cognitive behavioral therapy techniques, but that “more work [was] needed to improve coping skills in order to reduce mood swings and irritability.” (R. 550). In the April 9, 2019 to June 28, 2019 Treatment Plan, Dr. Volpe noted that Ms. Felton was still trying to utilize relaxation and self-talk techniques to cope with the health, financial and family stressors in her life, but that “she need[ed] to be more consistent in order to reduce emotional reactivity, mood swings and irritability.” (R. 391).

On April 18, 2019, Dr. Hoyle examined Ms. Felton. (R. 407-11). Dr. Hoyle noted that Ms. Felton had normal speech and thought process, was more engaged with respect to mood and affect, and had good or intact insight, judgment, memory, fund of knowledge, and attention and concentration. (R. 410). Dr. Hoyle also noted, however that Ms. Felton's mood instability, crying episodes, and irritability were ongoing and worsening. (R. 410). Also on April 18, 2019, Ms. Felton reported to Dr. Volpe that she had a job interview for a position at McDonald's, and they discussed job interviewing strategies. (R. 405).

In a “Mental Residual Function Capacity Questionnaire” dated July 24, 2019 (the “Questionnaire”), Drs. Hoyle and Volpe evaluated Ms. Felton's mental functioning in terms of the four criteria, known as the “paragraph B” criteria, that the Commissioner uses to determine whether a claimant's mental limitations: (i) understanding, remembering, or applying information; (ii) interacting with others; (iii) concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace and (iv) adapting or managing oneself. (R. 2121-22). See 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, § 12.00(A)(2)(b)). In the Questionnaire, Drs. Hoyle and Volpe opined, inter alia, that Ms. Felton has the following limitations:

- In the area of interacting with others: marked limitations in her abilities to (i) handle conflicts with others, (ii) respond appropriately to requests, suggestions, criticism, correction, and challenges, and (iii) keep social interactions free of excessive irritability, sensitivity, argumentativeness or suspiciousness;

- In the area of concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace: (i) marked limitations in her abilities to initiate and perform a task that she knows how to do, to complete tasks in a timely manner, to ignore or avoid distractions while working, to change activities or work settings without being disruptive, and to work close to or with others without interrupting or distracting them, and (ii) extreme limitations in her abilities to work at an appropriate and consistent pace, to sustain an ordinary routine and regular attendance at work, and to work a full day without needing more than the allotted number or length of rest periods during the day; and

- In the area of adapting and managing oneself: marked limitations in her abilities to (i) respond to demands, (ii) adapt to changes, (iii) manage her psychologically based symptoms, (iv) maintain personal hygiene and attire appropriate to a work setting, and (v) be aware of normal hazards and take appropriate precautions.

(R. 2121-22).

ii. Pamela Jennings, Ph.D. - SSA Consultative Examiner

On July 31, 2017, Pamela Jennings, Ph.D. (“Dr. Jennings”) performed a consultative psychiatric evaluation of Ms. Felton. (R. 369-73). Ms. Felton reported to Dr. Jennings that she had difficulty falling asleep but a normal appetite, and that her “depressive symptoms included a sad mood, psychomotor retardation, crying spells, irritability, concentration difficulties, and social withdrawal.” (R. 369). Ms. Felton said she felt “overwhelmed and frustrated” and that, due to her depression, “she shuts down[.]” (R. 370).

On examination Dr. Jennings found that Ms. Felton was appropriately dressed and fairly groomed, and that she had fluent and expressive speech, coherent thought processes, a depressed affect, intact attention and concentration for simple tasks, impaired memory, and “below average” cognitive functioning. (R. 370-71). Based on her examination and review of Ms. Felton's medical records, Dr. Jennings opined, inter alia, that Ms. Felton had (i) no limitations in her abilities to interact adequately with supervisors, co-workers, and the public, to sustain an ordinary routine and regular attendance at work, and to maintain personal hygiene and appropriate attire, and (ii) moderate limitations in her abilities to use reasoning and judgment to make work-related decisions, to sustain concentration and perform a task at a consistent pace, to regulate emotions, control behavior, and maintain wellbeing. (R. 372). Dr. Jennings concluded that “[t]he results of the examination appear to be consistent with psychiatric and cognitive problems, but in itself this does not appear to be significant enough to interfere with [Ms. Felton]'s ability to function on a daily basis.” (R. 372). She diagnosed Ms. Felton with depressive disorder, and recommended that she continue with her psychiatric treatment and seek vocational training. (R. 372-73).

iii. A. Chapman, Psy.D. - SSA Agency Consultant

Contained in the Commissioner's August 17, 2017 initial-level Disability Determination Explanation is a consultative assessment of Ms. Felton's mental functioning by A. Chapman, Psy.D. (“Dr. Chapman”). (R. 72-73, 76-78). Based on her review of Ms. Felton's medical records, Dr. Chapman opined that Ms. Felton had “moderate” limitations in the areas of understanding, remembering, or applying information, and interacting with others, and “mild” limitations in the areas of concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace, and adapting or managing oneself. (R. 72, 78).

C. Administrative Proceedings

1. The Hearing

Ms. Felton testified about the nature and effects of her physical and mental impairments. She stated that she “can't stand for a long period of time[,]” and, more specifically, that she can stand and sit for no more than 30 minutes at a time. (R. 34, 46, 48-49). When asked to describe a “typical day[,]” Ms. Felton testified that, since having bariatric surgery in March 2019, she would “go to the gym for at least 30 minutes” and the go home to “help my mom with my grandson.” (R. 40; see R. 742, 776). At the gym, where she would go twice a week, Ms. Felton would “do cardio” on a treadmill or bicycle for five to ten minutes, but had to stop because her knee would start to hurt. (R. 43-44, 52). Ms. Felton testified that she could lift “[u]nder ten pounds[,]” but later conceded she could lift her grandson, who weighed roughly 15 pounds. (R. 49).

Regarding her mental impairments, Ms. Felton testified that when her anxiety flares up, she “go[es] off” and “go[es] into a sweat.” (R. 51). She said that “crowds [and] confined places” caused her anxiety to flare up, and that being “left alone” would help the symptoms subside. (R. 51). She also testified that she has difficulty focusing. (R. 55). She listened to music, but was unable to focus on TV or movies. (R. 42).

Vocational expert (“VE”) Mark Pinti also testified at the Hearing. (R. 57-62). The ALJ “proceed[ed] with the presumption of no past relevant work for Ms. Felton[,]” and began his questioning of VE Pinti by asking him to consider a hypothetical individual of Ms. Felton's age, education, and limited work experience with the following limitations:

limited to doing full range of light work,¹prohibited from climbing ladders, ropes or scaffoldings. Further limited to only occasional climbing of ramps and stairs, occasional balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching or crawling, need to avoid concentrated exposure to extreme heat and cold, concentrated exposure to humidity and wetness, concentrated exposure to irritants such as fumes, odors, gas fully ventilated areas, and would also need to avoid concentrated exposure to slippery and uneven surfaces as well as hazardous machinery and unprotected heights and open flames. Would be limited to doing simple routine and repetitive tasks, working in a low-stress job which would be defined as being free of fast-paced production requirements with no hazardous conditions, only occasional decisionmaking required, only occasional changes in the work setting, only occasional interaction with coworkers and supervisors, and no direct interaction with the general public.

(R. 58 (the “Hypothetical”)). VE Pinti testified that the following jobs existed for a person with those Hypothetical limitations: (i) folder, Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) code 89.687066, of which there were 50,000 available positions in the national economy; (ii) packager, DOT code 559.687-074, of which there were approximately 60,000 available positions in the national economy; and (iii) inspector, DOT code 741.687-010, of which there were approximately 100,000 available positions in the national economy. (R. 58-59).

1 “Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though the weight lifted may be very little, a job is in this category when it requires a good deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls. To be considered capable of performing a full or wide range of light work, you must have the ability to do substantially all of these activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(b).

The ALJ then asked the VE if there were jobs available for the same Hypothetical individual who was further limited to sedentary work.²(R. 59). VE Pinti testified that the following three jobs existed for an individual with those limitations: (i) document preparer, DOT code 249.587-018 of which there were approximately 30,000 available positions in the national economy; (ii) a sedentary inspector, DOT code 669.687-014, of which there were approximately 20,000 available positions in the national economy; and (iii) sorter, DOT code 521.687-086, of which there were approximately 5,000 available positions in the national economy. (R. 59).

2 “Sedentary work involves lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time and occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and small tools. Although a sedentary job is defined as one which involves sitting, a certain amount of walking and standing is often necessary in carrying out job duties. Jobs are sedentary if walking and standing are required occasionally and other sedentary criteria are met.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(a).

Next, VE Pinti testified that there were no jobs for an individual whose limitations required them “to be off task more than ten percent of the day outside the regularly scheduled breaks [of] two standard 15-minute breaks and a half hour to an hour meal break between them[.]” (R. 59-60). Similarly, the VE testified that there were no jobs for an individual who would “be absent from work in excess of one day a month on a regular and consistent basis[.]” (R. 60).

2. The ALJ Decision and Appeals Council Review

On September 27, 2019, ALJ Begley issued his Decision finding Ms. Felton not disabled and denying her application for SSI benefits. (R. 10-23). The ALJ followed the five-step disability determination process. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v). At step one, ALJ Begley determined that Ms. Felton had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since May 25, 2017, the application date. (R. 12).

At step two, the ALJ determined that Ms. Felton had four severe impairments: (i) major depressive disorder; (ii) diabetes mellitus; (iii) asthma: and (iv) obesity. (R. 12). ALJ Begley acknowledged that Ms. Felton “was treated for knee pain[,]” but determined that there was “no probative evidence that this impairment more than minimally affect[ed] [her] ability to perform basic work functions, or that it caused limitations for a continuous period of twelve months or more, and thus it [was] not severe.” (R. 13). Specifically, the ALJ noted that, “[a]lthough diagnostic imaging indicated osteoarthritis of the left knee, [Ms. Felton] generally reported that this condition was controlled with cortisone injections, and physical exam generally showed full strength in all extremities with no swelling or muscle atrophy.” (R. 13 (citing R. 378, 582, 637, 656, 689, 849, 865, 879, 890, 903, 1005, 1030, 1607, 1627, 1855)). ALJ Begley also noted that Ms. Felton's “overall physical functioning [was] fully accounted for in the assignment of light exertion with additional postural and workplace environmental limitations.” (R. 13).

At step three, ALJ Begley determined that none of Ms. Felton's impairments met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926 (the “Listings”). (R. 13-15). The ALJ considered, inter alia, whether her major depressive disorder satisfied Listing 12.04, which covers depressive, bipolar, and related disorders. (R. 14-15; see 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, § 12.04). In reaching the conclusion that Ms. Felton's depression was non-severe, ALJ Begley considered whether the “paragraph B” criteria applicable to Listing 12.04 were satisfied.” (R. 14).³To satisfy paragraph B, the mental impairment must result in at least one extreme⁴ or two marked⁵ limitations in four broad areas of functioning. 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, § 12.00(A)(2)(b). The broad areas of functioning are: (1) understanding, remembering, or applying information; (2) interacting with others; (3) concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; and (4) adapting or managing oneself. Id.

3 Listing 12.00 covers “Mental Disorders.” 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, § 12.00. “Paragraph B of each [Section 12] listing (except 12.05) provides the functional criteria [the Commissioner] assess[es] . . . to evaluate how [a claimant's] mental disorder limits [his or her] functioning.” Id. § 12.00(A)(2)(b).

4 An “extreme limitation” is the inability to function independently, appropriately, or effectively, and on a sustained basis. 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, § 12.00(F)(2)(e).

5 A “marked limitation” means one's functioning in this area independently, appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained basis is “seriously limited.” 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, § 12.00(F)(2)(d).

With respect to understanding, remembering, or applying information, ALJ Begley determined that Ms. Felton has a “moderate limitation.” (R. 14).⁶ The ALJ noted that, at the [July 31, 2017 Jennings CE], Ms. Felton “showed cognitive functioning in the below average range, and impaired memory for complex tasks, but also intact memory for simple information and coherent and goal-directed thought processes.” (R. 14 (citing R. 370-71)). ALJ Begley also noted that Ms. Felton's “mental health treatment visits generally showed normal thought process and content, intact associations, normal intellectual functioning, and intact recent and remote memory.” (R. 14 (citing 1096-97; 1125-26)). Finally, the ALJ noted that, in her Function Report, Ms. Felton indicted that she “can follow written and spoken instructions and has no trouble remembering things” (R. 14 (citing R. 204), and that she “did not appear to have serious difficulty understanding the questions asked at the” Hearing “or recalling the information necessary to respond.” (R. 14).

6 A “moderate limitation” means one's functioning in this area independently, appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained basis is “fair.” 20 C.F.R. § Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, § 12.00(F)(2)(c).

In the second functional area-interacting with others-ALJ Begley similarly found that Ms. Felton “has a moderate limitation.” (R. 14). The ALJ noted that, at in her Function Report and at the Hearing, Ms. Felton reported “that she does not like being around people, spends most of her time alone in her room, and can get upset at others easily.” (R. 14 (citing 197-205)). ALJ Begley also noted that Dr. Jennings “observed that [Ms. Felton] had a dysthymic mood and depressed affect, but also that [she] was cooperative, and [demonstrated] appropriate eye contact and normal speech.” (R. 14 (citing R. 370-71)). Finally, the ALJ noted that Ms. Felton's “mental health treatment generally showed cooperative attitude and normal speech” (R. 14 (citing 1096-97; 1125-26)), and that her “psychiatric exams during primary care visits generally showed normal behavior, mood and affect.” (R. 14 citing 1607, 1627, 1938, 1995)).

ALJ Begley also found that Ms. Felton “has a moderate limitation” in the mental functioning area of concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace. (R. 14). He noted that, in her Function Report, Ms. Felton claimed she had no problems paying attention but also claimed she had could not finish tasks that she started. (R. 14 (citing R. 203)). The ALJ also noted that, at Dr. Jennings examination, Ms. Felton “showed difficulty with counting backwards from 100 by sevens, but intact concentration for simple items.” (R. 14 (citing R. 371)). Finally, ALJ Begley noted that Ms. Felton's “mental health treatment visits generally showed good concentration” (R. 14 (citing 1096-97; 1125-26)), and that she “did not appear to have serious difficulty concentrating during the” Hearing. (R. 14).

Last, in the area of adapting or managing oneself, the ALJ found that Ms. Felton has a “mild” limitation. (R. 15).⁷To support this conclusion, ALJ Begley noted that, while Dr. Jennings found Ms. Felton exhibited “poor judgment and poor to fair insight, with a somewhat limited fund of knowledge” at her consultative exam (R. 15 (citing R. 371)), Ms. Felton's treatment records reflected that she generally “showed good judgment and insight.” (R. 15 (citing 1096-97; 1125-26)). Similarly, he noted that Ms. Felton's “psychiatric exams during primary care visits generally showed normal judgment and insight” (R. 15 (citing 1607, 1627, 1938, 1995)), and that Ms. Felton reported that “she can handle activities of daily living without problem, including personal care, cooking, general cleaning, laundry, shopping, managing money, and using public transportation.” (R. 15 (citing R. 371; 197-203)). Finally, the ALJ noted that the Record contained no “evidence of any episodes of decompensation or the need for emergency or inpatient psychiatric treatment[,]” or that M.s Felton was “unable to understand the nature of hazards.” (R. 15).

7 A “mild limitation” means functioning in this area independently, appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained basis is “slightly limited.” 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, § 12.00(F)(2)(b). “If [the Commissioner] rate[s] the degrees of [a claimant's] limitation as ‘none' or ‘mild,' [the Commissioner] will generally conclude that [the claimant's] impairment(s) is not severe, unless the evidence otherwise indicates that there is more than a minimal limitation in [his or her] ability to do basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(d)(1).

ALJ Begley acknowledged that “[t]he limitations identified in the ‘paragraph B' criteria are not a residual functional capacity assessment but are used to rate the severity of mental impairments at steps 2 and 3 of the sequential evaluation process.” (R. 15). The ALJ further acknowledged that “[t]he mental residual functional capacity assessment used at steps 4 and 5 of the sequential evaluation process requires a more detailed assessment.” (R. 15).

ALJ Begley then assessed Ms. Felton's RFC as identical to his Hypothetical, i.e., that she was able:

to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(b) except she can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffoldings. She is further limited to only occasional climbing of ramps and stairs; occasional balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, or crawling; need to avoid concentrated exposure to extreme heat and cold; concentrated exposure to humidity and wetness; concentrated exposure to irritants, such as fumes, odors, gases, poorly ventilated areas; would also need to avoid concentrated exposure to slippery and uneven surfaces as well as hazardous machinery and unprotected heights and open flames; would be limited to doing simple, routine, and repetitive tasks, working in a low stress job, which would be defined as being free of fast paced production requirements, with no hazardous conditions, and only occasional decision making required and only occasional changes in the work setting; only occasional interaction with coworkers and supervisors; [and] no direct interaction with the general public.

(R. 15-16).

In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ evaluated the medical opinions in the Record. (R. 1921). Regarding Ms. Felton's knee impairment, ALJ Begley found persuasive Dr. Ravi's opinion that Ms. Felton “has no limitations in sitting or standing; moderate limitations in walking, bending, pushing, pulling, lifting, and carrying; [and] should avoid squatting[.]” (R. 19 (citing R. 377)). The ALJ credited this opinion “[t]o the extent that [it] signifie[d] that [Ms. Felton] can perform light work with the additional postural and workplace environmental limitations set forth in the [RFC],” because “it is supported by this doctor's physical exam findings and diagnostic imaging and an explanation is provided for why the evidence directs the stated limitations, and it is consistent with the record as a whole, including physical exam findings of normal respiration, normal gait, and full strength and sensation of the extremities without tenderness or edema, the general absence of evidence of significant asthma exacerbations, and the claimant's activities of daily living.” (R. 19-20).

With respect to Ms. Felton's mental impairments, the ALJ considered, inter alia, the opinions of Dr. Hoyle and Volpe in the Questionnaire regarding Ms. Felton's marked limitations in the areas of interacting with others and in adapting or managing herself, and her extreme limitations in concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace. (R. 20). The ALJ found these opinions “unpersuasive because although they are supported by these doctors' mental status exam findings and an explanation for why the evidence directs the stated limitations, they are inconsistent with the record as a whole, which generally demonstrates lesser mental functional limitations, including mental status exam findings in the treatment records of cooperative attitude, normal speech, normal thought process and content, intact associations, good judgment and insight, normal intellectual functioning, intact recent and remote memory, good concentration, and more engaged affect; as well as the routine and conservative mental health treatment.” (R. 20 (citing R. 1096-97, 1125-26, 1607, 1627, 1938, 1995)).

At step four, the ALJ determined that Ms. Felton had no past relevant work. (R. 21). At step five, ALJ Begley determined that, based on Ms. Felton's age, education, work experience, and RFC, jobs existed in significant numbers in the national economy that she can perform. (R. 22). Specifically, relying on VE Pinti's testimony, ALJ Begley found that Ms. Felton could perform the light-level jobs of Folder, Packager, and Inspector. (R. 22). The ALJ also noted that, “[e]ven if [Ms. Felton] was reduced to the sedentary exertion level with the . . . limitations specified in the [RFC], [VE Pinti] specified that [she] could perform” the jobs of Document Preparer, Inspector, and Sorter. (R. 22). Accordingly, the ALJ determined that Ms. Felton had “not been under a disability, as defined in the [Act], since May 25, 2017, the date the application was filed.” (R. 23).

On August 27, 2020, the Appeals Council denied Ms. Felton's request for review of the ALJ Decision. (R. 1-6).

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Standard of Review

Under Rule 12(c), a party is entitled to judgment on the pleadings if she establishes that no material facts are in dispute and that she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Burnette v. Carothers, 1 92 F.3d 52, 56 (2d Cir. 1999); Morcelo v. Barnhart, No. 01 Civ. 743 (RCC) (FM), 2003 WL 470541, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2003).

The Act provides that the Commissioner's findings “as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A court may set aside the Commissioner's decision denying SSI benefits if it is not supported by substantial evidence or was based on legal error. See Moran v. Astrue, 569 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 2009). Judicial review, therefore, involves two levels of inquiry. First, the Court must decide whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standard. See Tejada v. Apfel, 167 F.3d 770, 773 (2d Cir. 1999); Calvello v. Barnhart, No. 05 Civ. 4254 (SCR) (MDF), 2008 WL 4452359, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2008). Second, the Court must decide whether the ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence. Id. “In determining whether substantial evidence exists, a reviewing court must consider the whole record, examining the evidence from both sides, because an analysis of the substantiality of the evidence must also include that which detracts from its weight.” Longbardi v. Astrue, No. 07 Civ. 5952 (LAP), 2009 WL 50140, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2009). Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Burgess v. Astrue, 537 F.3d 117, 127 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted). The substantial evidence test applies not only to the factual findings, but also to the inferences and conclusions drawn from those facts. See, e.g., Carballo ex rel. Cortes v. Apfel, 34 F.Supp.2d 208, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). In determining whether the administrative record contains evidence to support the denial of claims, the Court must consider the whole record, and weigh all evidence to ensure that the ALJ evaluated the claim fairly. See, e.g., Brown v. Apfel, 174 F.3d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 1999). The Commissioner, not the Court, resolves evidentiary conflicts and appraises the credibility of witnesses, including the claimant. See, e.g., Veino v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 578, 588 (2d Cir. 2002); Clark v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 143 F.3d 115, 118 (2d Cir. 1998).

Disability-benefits proceedings are non-adversarial in nature, and therefore, the ALJ has an affirmative obligation to develop a complete administrative record, even when the claimant is represented by counsel. See Lamay v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 562 F.3d 503, 508-09 (2d Cir. 2009). To this end, the ALJ must make “every reasonable effort” to help an applicant get medical reports from her medical sources. 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(b). Ultimately, “[t]he record as a whole must be complete and detailed enough to allow the ALJ to determine the claimant's residual functional capacity.” Casino-Ortiz v. Astrue, No. 06 Civ. 155 (DAB) (JCF), 2007 WL 2745704, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2007). When there are inconsistencies, gaps, or ambiguities in the record, the regulations give the ALJ options to collect evidence to resolve these issues, including recontacting the treating physician, requesting additional records, arranging for a consultative examination, or seeking information from others. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920b.

The Act authorizes the Court to order further proceedings: “The court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see Butts v. Barnhart, 388 F.3d 377, 382 (2d Cir. 2004). If “there are gaps in the administrative record or the ALJ has applied an improper legal standard,” the Court may remand the case for further development of the evidence or for more specific findings. Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 82-83 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Pratts v. Chater, 94 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 1996)). Remand is particularly appropriate where further findings or explanation will clarify the rationale for the ALJ's decision. Pratts, 94 F.3d at 39. If, however, the reviewing court concludes that an ALJ's determination to deny benefits was not supported by substantial evidence, a remand solely for calculation of benefits may be appropriate. See, e.g., Butts, 388 F.3d at 386 (discussing Curry v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 117, 124 (2d Cir. 2000)).

B. Eligibility for Benefits

For purposes of SSI benefits, one is “disabled” within the meaning of the Act, and thus entitled to such benefits, when he or she is “unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(3)(A). The Act also requires that the impairment be “of such severity that [the claimant] is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(3)(B). In reviewing a claim of disability, the Commissioner must consider: “(1) objective medical facts; (2) diagnoses or medical opinions based on those facts; (3) subjective evidence of pain and disability testified to by claimant and other witnesses; and (4) the claimant's background, age, and experience.” Williams ex rel. Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255, 259 (2d Cir. 1988).

Under the applicable regulations, an alleged disability is evaluated under the sequential five-step process set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v). The Second Circuit has described the process as follows:

First, the Secretary considers whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. If not, the Secretary next considers whether the claimant has a “severe impairment” which significantly limits his physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. If the claimant suffers such an impairment, the third inquiry is whether, based solely on the medical evidence, the claimant has an impairment which is listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations. If

the claimant has such an impairment, the Secretary will consider him disabled without considering vocational factors such as age, education, and work experience; the Secretary presumes that a claimant who is afflicted with a “listed” impairment is unable to perform substantial gainful activity. Assuming the claimant does not have a listed impairment, the fourth inquiry is whether, despite the claimant's severe impairment, he has the residual functional capacity to perform his past work. Finally, if the claimant is unable to perform his past work, the Secretary then determines whether there is other work which the Claimant could perform.

Bush v. Shalala, 94 F.3d 40, 44-45 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Rivera v. Schweiker, 717 F.2d 719, 722 (2d Cir. 1983)).

At the first four steps, the claimant bears the burden of proof, and at the fifth step, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to demonstrate that there are jobs in the national economy that the claimant can perform. See, e.g., Poupore v. Astrue, 566 F.3d 303, 306 (2d Cir. 2009). In meeting the burden of proof at the fifth step, the Commissioner may usually rely on the grids. See Zorilla v. Chater, 915 F.Supp. 662, 666-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).

IV. DISCUSSION

Ms. Felton asserts five challenges to the ALJ Decision, arguing that: (i) at step two, the ALJ erred in finding Ms. Felton's left knee impairment to be non-severe; (ii) at step three, the ALJ's Paragraph B determinations are not supported by substantial evidence or based on the correct legal standard; (iii) the ALJ failed to apply to apply the correct legal standard in formulating Ms. Felton's RFC; (iv) the ALJ's RFC determination is not supported by substantial evidence; and (v) the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the opinions of Dr. Hoyle and Dr. Volpe. (ECF No. 22 at 18 29). The Court addresses each argument in turn.

A. Step-Two Severity Determination as to Ms. Felton's Knee Impairment

1. The Parties' Arguments

Ms. Felton argues that, “[a]t step two of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ erred in finding [her] left knee derangement to be not ‘severe.'” (ECF No. 22 at 18). She notes that, at a November 2018 visit, Ms. Felton's doctor described her left knee osteoarthritis as “end stage” and that knee replacement surgery was discussed. (Id. (quoting R. 656, 1729)). She also notes that she received steroid injections for pain relief in December 2017 and August 2018, and that she testified at the Hearing that “her knee pain was problematic for her.” (Id. (citing R. 45, 581, 637)).

The Commissioner argues that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's step two determination that Ms. Felton's knee impairment was not severe, and that Ms. Felton has failed to prove that the Record evidence “compelled the ALJ to reach a different result.” (ECF No. 28 at 18-19). Specifically, the Commissioner notes that the ALJ “acknowledged that diagnostic imaging indicated osteoarthritis, but also considered evidence that injections improved [Ms. Felton]'s knee pain and that physical exams repeatedly showed full extremity strength, with no swelling or atrophy.” (Id. at 18 (citing R. 13)). The Commissioner also cites Record evidence showing that Ms. Felton “regularly exercised throughout the relevant period, and that [she] reported to a cardiologist in January 2019 that she could walk as far as she wants with no significant symptoms.” (Id. at 18-19 (citing R. 17)). Finally, the ALJ argues that, “[i]n any event, the decision makes clear that the ALJ ‘fully accounted' for the evidence pertaining to Plaintiff's knee impairment in formulating the RFC.” (Id. at 19 (citing R. 13, 16-21)).

2. Legal Standard

A severe impairment is one that “significantly limits [a claimant's] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities[.]” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). The Commissioner defines “basic work activities” as “the abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs[,]” and provides the following examples: (i) physical functions such as walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying, or handling; (ii) capacities for seeing, hearing, and speaking; (iii) understanding, carrying out, and remembering simple instructions; (iv) use of judgment; (v) responding appropriately to supervision, co-workers and usual work situations; and (vi) dealing with changes in a routine work setting. 20 C.F.R. § 416.922 (b). The claimant bears the burden of presenting evidence to establish severity. 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(a)(2)(i). “When the record contains conflicting medical evidence, it is ‘within the province of the ALJ to resolve' those conflicts.” Tammy R. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 20-CV-796 (JLS), 2021 WL 2885878, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. July 9, 2021) (quoting Veino, 312 F.3d at 588).

“An ALJ's decision at step two that an impairment is not severe must be ‘supported by ‘substantial evidence' in the record as a whole.'” Suzanne H. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 20-CV-0684 (WBC), 2021 WL 5309718, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2021) (quoting Veino, 312 F.3d 578, 586 (2d Cir. 2002)). “A step two finding that a plaintiff's impairment ‘is non-severe is not supported by substantial evidence [when] the evidence on which it is based is inconsistent with evidence that [the plaintiff's impairment] significantly impaired her ability to do basic work activities.'” Id. (quoting Parker-Grose v. Astrue, 462 Fed.Appx. 16 17-18 (2d Cir. 2012)). Conversely, “[a] step two error is not reversible and does not necessitate remand where the record is devoid of evidence that the allegedly omitted impairments were severe.” Guerra v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 16-CV-991, 2018 WL 3751292, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2018), aff'd sub nom. Guerra v. Saul, 778 Fed.Appx. 75 (2d Cir. 2019). Similarly, “the failure to list an impairment as ‘severe' is a harmless error if the ALJ ultimately considered the impairment within the RFC determination.” Dixon v. Berryhill, No. 17 Civ. 0334 (AJP), 2017 WL 3172849, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 2017) (collecting cases); see Thomas v. Saul, No. 19 Civ. 6990 (MKV) (RWL), 2020 WL 5754672, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2020) (“But even if the ALJ fails to expressly address a non-severe impairment when assessing the RFC (or even errantly classifies a severe impairment as non-severe), that lapse is harmless error if the ALJ later properly considers the totality of the claimant's limitations in determining the RFC.”), adopted sub nom. Thomas v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2020 WL 4731421 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2020).

3. Application

The Court agrees with the Commissioner that the ALJ's Step Two determination does not warrant remand. As discussed above, the ALJ acknowledged the evidence that Ms. Felton “was treated for knee pain” and that “diagnostic imaging indicated osteoarthritis of the left knee” (R. 13 (citing R. 582)), but contrasted that with evidence showing Ms. Felton “generally reported that this condition was controlled with cortisone injections” and that “physical exam generally showed full strength in all extremities with no swelling or muscle atrophy.” (R. 13 (citing R. 378, 582, 637, 656, 689, 849, 865, 879, 890, 903, 1005, 1030, 1607, 1627, 1855)). As the Commissioner notes, the ALJ also noted elsewhere in the Decision that “the extent of [Ms. Felton]'s activities of daily living, including frequently exercise, taking care of an infant grandchild, interviewing for a job at McDonalds, and handling activities of daily living without problem, including personal care, cooking, general cleaning, laundry, shopping, managing money, and using public transportation, are inconsistent with her allegations of disabling physical . . . limitations.” (R. 17 (citing R. 197-205; 405; 847, 880); see R. 19). Moreover, the ALJ noted that Ms. Felton reported to her cardiologist in January 2019 that “she can walk as far as she wants with no significant symptoms.” (R. 17 (citing R. 1856)). The Court finds that this constitutes substantial evidence to support the ALJ's determination that Ms. Felton's left knee impairment was not severe. See Stephens v. Colvin, 200 F.Supp.3d 349, 357 (N.D.N.Y. 2016) (rejecting challenge to step-two severity determination were the plaintiff's own statements “contradicted the notion that his knee impairment significantly limits his ability to do basic work”); see also James K. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:19-CV-1332 CJS, 2021 WL 1175899, at *11 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2021) (rejecting challenge to step-two severity determination where the plaintiff effectively asked the Court to “re-weigh the evidence, since there was evidence from which the ALJ could have found that Plaintiff's impairment was severe”).

In any event, any error at step two with respect to Ms. Felton's knee condition was harmless, because Ms. Felton's “overall physical functioning [was] fully accounted for in the assignment of light exertion with additional postural and workplace environmental limitations.” (R. 13). As the Commissioner correctly notes, the ALJ incorporated significant physical restrictions in the RFC, including limitations for climbing, kneeling, crouching, and crawling. (R. 15). Moreover, based on VE Pinti's testimony, the ALJ identified several sedentary level positions that Ms. Felton could perform despite her limitations. (R. 22). “Because [Ms. Felton's knee] condition was considered during the subsequent steps, any error was harmless.” O'Connell v. Colvin, 558 Fed.Appx. 63, 65 (2d Cir. 2014); see Tammy R. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 20-CV-796 (JLS), 2021 WL 2885878, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. July 9, 2021) (finding that “the restriction to light work with postural modifications accommodated Plaintiff's bilateral knee osteoarthritis”).

B. Step Three Determination

1. The Parties' Arguments

Ms. Felton argues that, “[a]t step three of the sequential evaluation, the ‘paragraph B' findings for paragraphs B2 [interacting with others], B3 [concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace] and B4 [adapting and managing oneself] are not supported by substantial evidence and not based on [the] correct legal standard.” (ECF No. 22 at 19-23). To support her argument that the ALJ failed to apply the correct legal standard, Ms. Felton notes that the ALJ “did not discuss any of the examples” that are included in the Commissioner's Regulations to “illustrate the nature” of each mental functioning area. (Id. at 20, 22, 23; see 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, §§ 12.00(E)(2)-(4)).

The Commissioner argues that substantial evidence supports that ALJ's conclusion that the severity of Ms. Felton's mental impairments did not meet or equal Listing 12.04. (ECF No. 28 at 20-23). Specifically, the Commissioner argues that “the ALJ considered the four functional areas in detail and explained why Plaintiff's impairments did not satisfy the listing's B criteria.” (Id. at 20).

2. Legal Standard

As discussed above (see § III.B supra), at step three, the claimant has the burden of establishing that his impairments met or equaled the criteria for an impairment in the Listings. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d). In order to demonstrate that an impairment matches a Listing, the claimant must show that her impairment meets all of the specified medical criteria. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d). To make this showing, the claimant must present medical findings that are supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. 20 C.F.R. § 416.921. “If a claimant's impairment ‘manifests only some of those criteria, no matter how severely,' the impairment does not qualify.” Duffy v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 17 Civ. 3560 (GHW) (RWL), 2018 WL 4376414, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2018), (quoting Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530 (1990)). “An ALJ's unexplained conclusion step 3 step three of the analysis may be upheld where other portions of the decision and other ‘clearly credible evidence' demonstrate that the conclusion is supported by substantial evidence.” Ryan v. Astrue, 5 F.Supp.3d 493, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (quoting Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 469 (2d Cir.1982)); see Pena Lebron v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 18 Civ. 125 (BCM), 2019 WL 1429558, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2019) (“Even the absence of an express rationale from the ALJ does not prevent a court from upholding the ALJ's determination regarding a plaintiff's claimed listed impairments, if portions of the ALJ's decision and the evidence before him indicate that his conclusion was supported by substantial evidence.”) (citation and alterations omitted).

To satisfy Listing 12.04, a claimant must provide medical findings of a depressive disorder or bipolar disorder, and satisfy either the “paragraph B” criteria or the “paragraph C” criteria. 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, § 12.04.⁸ Ms. Felton challenges the ALJ's determination with respect to paragraphs (B)(2), (B)(3), and (B)(4). Accordingly, the Court limits its analysis to these paragraphs.

8 ALJ Begley found that Ms. Felton's major depressive disorder did not satisfy the paragraph C criteria. (R. 15). Ms. Felton does not challenge-and the Court finds no reason to disturb-this determination.

a. Interacting with others

“This area of mental functioning refers to the abilities to relate to and work with supervisors, co-workers, and the public.” 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, § 12.00(E)(2). The Commissioner's Regulations provide the following examples to “illustrate the nature” of this mental functioning area:

Cooperating with others; asking for help when needed; handling conflicts with others; stating your own point of view; initiating or sustaining conversation; understanding and responding to social cues (physical, verbal, emotional); responding to requests, suggestions, criticism, correction, and challenges; and keeping social interactions free of excessive irritability, sensitivity, argumentativeness, or suspiciousness.

Id.

b. Concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace

“This area of mental functioning refers to the abilities to focus attention on work activities and stay on task at a sustained rate.” 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, § 12.00(E)(3). The Commissioner's Regulations provide the following examples to “illustrate the nature” of this mental functioning area:

Initiating and performing a task that you understand and know how to do; working at an appropriate and consistent pace; completing tasks in a timely manner; ignoring or avoiding distractions while working; changing activities or work settings without being disruptive; working close to or with others without interrupting or distracting them; sustaining an ordinary routine and regular attendance at work; and working a full day without needing more than the allotted number or length of rest periods during the day.

Id.

c. Adapting and managing oneself

“This area of mental functioning refers to the abilities to regulate emotions, control behavior, and maintain well-being in a work setting.” 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, § 12.00(E)(4). The Commissioner's Regulations provide the following examples to “illustrate the nature” of this mental functioning area:

Responding to demands; adapting to changes; managing your psychologically based symptoms; distinguishing between acceptable and unacceptable work performance; setting realistic goals; making plans for yourself independently of others; maintaining personal hygiene and attire appropriate to a work setting; and being aware of normal hazards and taking appropriate precautions.

Id.

3. Application

As a threshold matter, Ms. Felton's argument that the ALJ failed to apply the correct legal standard at step three lacks merit. (ECF No. 22 at 19-23). As discussed above, the ALJ considered the four areas of four broad areas of functioning set forth in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, § 12.00(A)(2)(b). (R. 14-15). While Ms. Felton argues that the ALJ failed to apply the “correct legal standard” because he “did not discuss any of the examples” set forth in the Commissioner's Regulations (ECF No. 22 at 20, 22, 23), she cites no authority-and the Court is aware of none-requiring an ALJ to explicitly discuss these examples. Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ applied the correct legal standard at step three.

a. Interacting with others

The Court agrees with the Commissioner that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's determination that Ms. Felton's ability to interact with others was only moderately limited. The ALJ acknowledged that Ms. Felton does not like crowds, spends most of her time alone, and can get upset at others easily. (R. 14). The ALJ also noted, however, that Ms. Felton was generally cooperative and showed normal speech, behavior, mood, and affect during psychiatric exams. (R. 14 (citing R. 370-71, 1096-97, 1125-26, 1607, 1627, 1938, 1995)). Ms. Felton also reported that she enjoys spending time with family and can take public transportation and go shopping. (R. 200-01). Thus, despite Ms. Felton's subjective complaints, and Drs. Hoyle and Volpe's opinion that she is markedly limited in this area, the Court finds that the Record contains substantial evidence to support the ALJ's conclusion. See Bonilla Mojica v. Berryhill, 397 F.Supp.3d 513, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (finding ALJ properly found moderate limitation in interacting with others where, despite “evidence that [the plaintiff's] anxiety prevent[ed] her from being in large crowds or taking buses or trains,” the record contained evidence that the plaintiff used public transportation, went, grocery shopping, enjoyed spending time with her children).

b. Concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace

The Court also agrees with the Commissioner that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's determination that Ms. Felton's ability to concentrate, persist, and maintain pace was only moderately limited. The ALJ noted that, in her Function Report, Ms. Felton claimed she had no problems paying attention but also claimed she had could not finish tasks that she started. (R. 14 (citing R. 203)). The ALJ also noted that, at Dr. Jennings exam, Ms. Felton “showed difficulty with counting backwards from 100 by sevens, but intact concentration for simple items.” (R. 14 (citing R. 371)). Finally, ALJ Begley noted that Ms. Felton's “mental health treatment visits generally showed good concentration” (R. 14 (citing 1096-97; 1125-26)), and that she “did not appear to have serious difficulty concentrating during the” Hearing. (R. 14). The Court finds that this Record evidence constituted substantial evidence to support the ALJ's conclusion. See Bonilla Mojica, 397 F.Supp.3d at 532 (ALJ properly found moderate limitation in concentrating, persisting, or maintaining where the plaintiff reported “no difficulties concentrating on television news stories, indicating some ability to focus, and she was noted as being “alert and oriented at multiple appointments and examinations”) (citations omitted).

c. Adapting and managing oneself

Finally, the Court agrees with the Commissioner that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's determination that Ms. Felton's ability to adapt and manage herself was only mildly limited. In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ noted that “mental status exams during mental health treatment visits generally showed good judgment and insight” (R. 15 (citing R. 1096-97, 1125-26)), and that “psychiatric exams during primary care visits generally showed normal judgment and insight.” (R. 15 (citing R. 1607, 1627, 1938, 1995)). The ALJ also noted that Ms. Felton reported that “she can handle activities of daily living without problem, including personal care, cooking, general cleaning, laundry, shopping, managing money, and using public transportation.” (R. 15 (citing R. 197-205, 371). The Court finds that this Record evidence constituted substantial evidence to support the ALJ's conclusion. See Bonilla Mojica, 397 F.Supp.3d at 533 (ALJ properly found moderate limitation in concentrating, persisting, or maintaining where the plaintiff “indicated that she has the ability to pay bills and manage finances, dress and groom herself daily, and use public transportation”).

C. RFC Determination

1. The Parties' Arguments

Ms. Felton makes two challenges to the ALJ's RFC determination. First, she argues that ALJ Begley “did not apply the correct legal standard in formulating Ms. Felton's” RFC. (ECF No. 23 at 22). Specifically, she argues that the ALJ was required, but failed, to “set forth the RFC on a function-by-function basis.” (Id. a 24). She claims the ALJ “was bound to make specific findings for the amount of time that [she] could site, stand, and walk[,]” but “failed to do so.” (Id.) She also argues that the RFC determination was improper because it was “not narratively discussed.” (Id.) She claims that “the ALJ set forth the RFC in one paragraph” and then “did not discuss it” or “identify any specific evidence supporting each finding.” (Id.)

Second, Ms. Felton argues that the ALJ's RFC determination “is not supported by substantial evidence.” (ECF No. 22 at 25). With respect to the physical RFC determination, she claims that “while light work requires the ability to be on one's feet, standing or walking for most of an 8-hour workday,” and the ability to lift and carry up to 20 pounds, the ALJ did not identify in the decision evidence supporting that conclusion.” (Id.) With respect to the mental RFC determination, she argues that the ALJ failed to “present evidence to support his conclusion that [she] could perform, on a full-time and ongoing basis, work that was ‘limited to simple, routine, and repetitive tasks' and ‘low stress' defined by the ALJ as ‘being free of fast paced production requirements, with no hazardous conditions, and only occasional decision making', ‘only occasional changes in the work setting' ‘only occasional interaction with co-workers and supervisors' and ‘no direct interaction with the general public.'” (ECF No. 22 at 25 (quoting R. 15-16)). She also argues that remand is warranted because “the ALJ did not include findings as to time off task or frequency of absences from work”. (Id.)

The Commissioner argues that the ALJ's RFC determination was supported by substantial evidence and free of legal error. (ECF No. 28 at 23-28). Specifically, the Commissioner argues that the ALJ was not required to make a function-by-function analysis, and that, contrary to Ms. Felton's argument, the ALJ did provide a narrative discussion of his RFC determination. (Id. at 26-27). The Commissioner also argues that the ALJ properly “laid out his rationale and summarized the evidence that informed the RFC.” (Id. at 27).

2. Legal Standard

The RFC determination represents “the most [a claimant] can still do despite [her] limitations,” based on all the relevant evidence in the record. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1). It reflects the Commissioner's assessment of “the ‘nature and extent' of a claimant's physical limitations and capacity for work activity on a regular and continuing basis.” Elliott v. Colvin, No. 13-CV-2673 (MKB), 2014 WL 4793452, at *19 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2014) (quoting 20 CFR § 404.1545(b)). “The RFC determination is reserved to the Commissioner.” Ramirez v. Saul, No. 20 Civ. 2922 (NSR) (JCM), 2021 WL 4943551, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2021) (citing Monroe v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 676 Fed. App'x 5, 8 (2d Cir. 2017)).

“The RFC determination ‘must be set forth with sufficient specificity to enable [the Court] to decide whether the determination is supported by substantial evidence.'” Acevedo v. Saul, No. 20 Civ. 8027 (GWG), 2021 WL 6110933, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2021) (quoting Ferraris v. Heckler, 728 F.2d 582, 587 (2d Cir. 1984). “While an ALJ will consider medical opinions on a plaintiff's functioning, ultimately the ALJ is tasked with reaching an RFC assessment based on the record as a whole.” McKnight v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 17 Civ. 1054 (CS) (JCM), 2018 WL 4062705, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2018) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 404.1545(a)(3), 404.1546(c)). “It is the Commissioner's role to weigh medical opinion evidence and to resolve conflicts in that evidence.” Milliken v. Saul, No. 19 Civ. 09371 (PED), 2021 WL 1030606, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2021) (citing Cage v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 692 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2012)). “It is ultimately the claimant's burden to prove that [he or she] should have a more restrictive RFC than the one assessed by the ALJ.” Villalobo v. Saul, No. 19 Civ. 11560 (CS) (JCM), 2021 WL 830034, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2021) (citing Smith v. Berryhill, 740 Fed.Appx. 721, 726 (2d Cir. 2018)).

3. Application

Ms. Felton's argument that the ALJ failed to “apply the correct legal standard” in formulating her RFC lacks merit. (ECF No. 22 at 23). With respect to her argument that, as a matter of law, the ALJ was required to engage in a function-by-function assessment of her RFC, “[t]he Second Circuit does not require that an RFC assessment always be made on a function-by-function basis.” Gilliam v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 17 Civ. 3764 (ER) (BCM), 2018 WL 9837921, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2018) (citing Cichocki v. Astrue, 729 F.3d 172, 177 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that “remand is not necessary merely because an explicit function-by-function analysis was not performed”)). Rather, “[t]he ALJ's RFC determination will be upheld so long as it ‘affords an adequate basis for meaningful judicial review, applies the proper standards, and is supported by substantial evidence.'” Id. (quoting Cichocki, 729 F.3d at 177).

Ms. Felton's argument that the ALJ “did not set forth a narrative discussion of the residual functional capacity findings . . . [is] similarly unavailing.” Gilliam, 2018 WL 9837921, at *13. Contrary to her assertion that “the ALJ set forth the RFC in one paragraph” and then “did not discuss it” or “identify any specific evidence supporting each finding” (ECF No. 23 at 22), ALJ Begley's RFC determination was followed by nearly six pages of narrative discussion supporting that determination. (R. 16-21). “This discussion provided an adequate basis for meaningful judicial review, and was therefore sufficient to meet ALJ [Begley]'s obligations under SSR 96-8p.” Frazier v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 16 Civ. 4320 (AJP), 2017 WL 1422465, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2017) (rejecting argument that ALJ failed to provide a e a “narrative discussion explaining the evidentiary basis for the RFC” where the RFC determination was followed by three pages of narrative discussion); see Cichocki, 729 F.3d at 177; Evans v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 110 F.Supp.3d 518, 540-41 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).

Turning to the substance of the RFC determination, the Court agrees with the Commissioner that substantial evidence supported ALJ Begley's RFC determination. In his discussion of Ms. Felton's physical RFC, the ALJ noted that Ms. Felton's “physical exams generally showed unremarkable findings, including normal gait, normal respiration, full range of motion of the joints, and no edema or tenderness of the extremities.” (R. 17 (citing 689, 849, 865, 879, 890, 903, 1005, 1030; 1607, 1627, 1855)). The ALJ noted that Ms. Felton reported to her cardiologist that “she can walk as far as she wants with no significant symptoms.” (R. 17 (citing R. 1856)). Moreover, the ALJ found the RFC determination to be consistent with Ms. Felton's activities of daily living, noting that she regularly exercises, is able to cook, do dishes, and get her children ready for school in the morning, interviewed for a job at McDonald's, and can handle activities of daily living without problem, including personal care, cleaning, laundry, shopping, managing money, and using public transportation. (R. 19 (citing R. 371)). Finally, the ALJ relied on Dr. Ravi's opinion that Ms. Felton has no limitations in sitting or standing, and moderate limitations in walking, bending, pushing, pulling, lifting, and carrying. (R. 19-20).

“[C]ourts within the Second Circuit have found that a doctor's assessment of ‘mild' and ‘moderate' limitations supportive of an RFC for light work.” Bethany A. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:20-CV-1267 (WBC), 2022 WL 170405, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2022) (collecting cases); see White v. Berryhill, 753 Fed.Appx. 80, 82 (2d Cir. 2019) (consultative physician opinion that plaintiff had moderate limitations in standing, sitting, and performing “other activities” supported RFC for light work); Henderson v. Saul, 788 F. App'x. 86, 87 (2d Cir. 2019) (substantial evidence supporting RFC determination allowing for light work included medical opinion evidence of mild-to-moderate limitations for prolonged walking); Renee L. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 5:20-CV-00991 (TWD), 2022 WL 685285, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2022) (“Courts in this circuit have consistently found that moderate limitations in a plaintiff's ability to perform exertional activities are consistent with an RFC for light work.”) (collecting cases).

Ms. Felton's challenge to the ALJ's mental RFC determination is equally unavailing. She argues that the ALJ failed to “present evidence to support his conclusion that [she] could perform, on a full-time and ongoing basis, work that was ‘limited to simple, routine, and repetitive tasks' and ‘low stress' defined by the ALJ as ‘being free of fast paced production requirements, with no hazardous conditions, and only occasional decision making', ‘only occasional changes in the work setting' ‘only occasional interaction with co-workers and supervisors' and ‘no direct interaction with the general public.'” (ECF No. 22 at 25 (quoting R. 15-16)). “However, an ALJ need not call out every moderate limitation by name, provided that the RFC appropriately reflects such limitations.” Landers v. Colvin, No. 14-CV-1090S, 2016 WL 1211283, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2016) (citing Crawford v. Astrue, No. 13-CV-6068P, 2014 WL 4829544, at *23 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2014) (“although the ALJ did not discuss the moderate limitations assessed by [non-examining psychiatrist], he incorporated moderate limitations into his RFC by restricting [plaintiff] to jobs that require an individual to understand, remember and carry out simple instructions”). Here, “[t]he determination that [Ms. Felton] is limited to ‘simple, repetitive, and routine tasks' accounts for [her] limitations as to maintaining attention and concentration, performing activities within a schedule, and maintaining regular attendance[,]” and “the limitation to a ‘low contact work environment' accounts for [her] moderate social limitations.” Id.; see Sipe v. Astrue, 873 F.Supp.2d 471, 481 (N.D.N.Y. 2012) (moderate limitations in “relating to instructions, concentration, attendance” consistent with unskilled work); Wasiewicz v. Colvin, No. 13-CV-1026S, 2014 WL 5465451, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2014) (ALJ accounted for moderate social limitations by requiring “no more than occasional contact with the public, coworkers, or supervisors”); Reilly v. Colvin, No. 1:13-CV-00785 MAT, 2015 WL 6674955, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2015) (“a limitation to only ‘occasional' or ‘limited' contact with others has been found sufficient to account for moderate limitations in social functioning”).

The fact that “the ALJ did not include findings as to time off task or frequency of absences from work” also does not warrant remand. (ECF No. 22 at 25). While Drs. Hoyle and Volpe opined that Ms. Felton had an extreme limitation in her ability to sustain an ordinary routine and regular attendance at work, and to work a full day without needing more than the allotted number or length of rest periods during the day, the ALJ found that opinion unpersuasive because it was inconsistent with the Record as a whole. As discussed in more detail below (see § IV.D.3, infra), the Court finds that the ALJ's decision in that respect was proper. And contrary to Drs. Hoyle and Volpe's opinion, Dr. Jennings opined that “[t]here is no evidence of limitation sustaining an ordinary routine and regular attendance at work.” (R. 372). Cf. Griffel v. Berryhill, No. 16-CV-1772 (MKB), 2017 WL 4286254, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2017) (remanding based on “ALJ's omission of [the] Plaintiff's likely absences from work” based on, inter alia, “the lack of a contradictory medical opinion”).

In effect, Ms. Felton's challenges to the ALJ's RFC determination amount to the contention that the ALJ should have interpreted the evidence of her physical and mental impairments differently. As noted above, however, this Court's task “is limited to determining whether substantial evidence exists to support the ALJ's fact-finding; it may not reweigh evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ where the evidence is susceptible of more than one interpretation.” Almodovar v. Berryhill, No. 17 Civ. 8902 (BCM), 2019 WL 1313883, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2019) (citing Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm'r, 683 F.3d 443, 448 (2d Cir. 2012)).

D. Evaluation of Medical Opinion Evidence

1. The Parties' Arguments

Ms. Felton argues that the ALJ's rejection of Drs. Hoyle and Volpe's opinions in the Questionnaire was “not supported by substantial evidence.” (ECF No. 22 at 25). Specifically, Ms. Felton argues that, in violation of the Commissioner's regulations, the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the consistency of Drs. Hoyle and Volpe's opinions with the Record as a whole. (Id. 23-24). She acknowledges that the ALJ cited evidence in support of his finding that Drs. Hoyle and Volpe's opinions were not consistent with the Record, but argues that “none of these items contradict” the doctors' opinion. (Id. at 28).

The Commissioner argues that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's evaluation of the Questionnaire. (ECF No. 28 at 28). The Commissioner argues that “the ALJ acted within his discretion in finding unpersuasive the [Questionnaire] and sufficiently articulated the reason for that conclusion. (Id. at 29).

2. Legal Standard

For benefits applications filed before March 27, 2017, the SSA's regulations required an ALJ to give more weight to those physicians with the most significant relationship with the claimant. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927; see also Taylor v. Barnhart, 117 Fed.Appx. 139, 140 (2d Cir. 2004). Under this “Treating Physician Rule,” an ALJ was required to “give good reasons” Kevin E. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:19-CV-593 (EAW), 2021 WL 1100362, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2021) (quoting former 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)), if he or she determined that a treating physician's opinion was not entitled to “controlling weight,” or, at least, “greater weight” than the opinions of non-treating and non-examining sources. Gonzalez v. Apfel, 113 F.Supp.2d 580, 588-89 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). In addition, under the Treating Physician Rule, a consultative physician's opinion was generally entitled to “little weight.” Giddings v. Astrue, 333 Fed.Appx. 649, 652 (2d Cir. 2009).

On January 18, 2017, the SSA published comprehensive revisions to the regulations regarding the evaluation of medical evidence, revisions that were applicable to applications filed on or after March 27, 2017. See Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 F. R. 5844-01, 2017 WL 168819 (Jan. 18, 2017). These new regulations reflect a departure from a perceived hierarchy of medical sources. See id. The regulations now provide that an ALJ need “not defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), including those from [a claimant's] medical sources.”⁹ 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a). See Young v. Kijakazi, 20 Civ. 3604 (SDA), 2021 WL 4148733, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2021). Instead, an ALJ must consider all medical opinions in the record and “evaluate the persuasiveness” based on five “factors”: (1) supportability, (2) consistency, (3) relationship with the claimant, (4) specialization, and (5) any “other” factor that “tend[s] to support or contradict a medical opinion.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a)-(c)(1)-(5).

9 The new regulations define “prior administrative medical finding” as:

[A] finding, other than the ultimate determination about whether you are disabled, about a medical issue made by our Federal and State agency medical and psychological consultants at a prior level of review (see § 416.1400) in your current claim based on their review of the evidence in your case record, such as: (i) The existence and severity of your impairment(s); (ii) The existence and severity of your symptoms; (iii) Statements about whether your impairment(s) meets or medically equals any listing in the Listing of Impairments in Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; (iv) If you are a child, statements about whether your impairment(s) functionally equals the listings in Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; (v) If you are an adult, your [RFC]; (vi) Whether your impairment(s) meets the duration requirement; and (vii) How failure to follow prescribed treatment (see § 416.930) and drug addiction and alcoholism (see § 416.935) relate to your claim.

20 C.F.R. § 416.913(a)(5).

The ALJ's duty to articulate a rationale for each factor varies. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1520c(a)-(b). Under the new regulations, the ALJ must “explain,” in all cases, “how [he or she] considered” both the supportability and consistency factors, as they are “the most important factors.” Id. § 416.920c(b)(2); see Young, 2021 WL 4148733, at *9 (describing supportability and consistency as “the most important” of the five factors); Amber H. v. Saul, No. 3:20-CV-490 (ATB), 2021 WL 2076219, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. May 24, 2021) (noting that the two “most important factors for determining the persuasiveness of medical opinions are consistency and supportability,” the “same factors” on which the Treating Physician Rule was based); Rivera, 2020 WL 8167136, at *13 (explaining that supportability and consistency are the “most important” factors under 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)). As to supportability, “the strength of a medical opinion increases as the relevance of the objective medical evidence and explanations presented by the medical source increase.” Vellone v. Saul, No. 20 Civ. 261 (RA) (KHP), 2021 WL 319354, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2021) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(1), 416.920c(c)(1)); see Rivera, 2020 WL 8167136, at *16 (noting that supportability “has to do with the fit between the medical opinion offered by the source and the underlying evidence and explanations ‘presented' by that source to support [his or] her opinion”) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(1)). Consistency “is an all-encompassing inquiry focused on how well a medical source is supported, or not supported, by the entire record.” Vellone, 2021 WL 319354, at *6.

As to the three remaining factors-relationship with the claimant, specialization, and “other”-the ALJ is required to consider, but need not explicitly discuss, them in determining the persuasiveness of the opinion of a medical source. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(2). If the ALJ finds two or more medical opinions to be equally supported and consistent with the record, but not identical, the ALJ must articulate how he or she considered those three remaining factors. See id. § 416.920c(b)(3).

Thus, “[a]lthough the new regulations eliminate the perceived hierarchy of medical sources, deference to specific medical opinions, and assigning ‘weight' to a medication opinion, the ALJ must still ‘articulate how [he or she] considered the medical opinions' and ‘how persuasive [he or she] find[s] all of the medical opinions.'” Andrew G. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:19-CV-942 (ML), 2020 WL 5848776, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2020) (quoting 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920c(a), (b)(1)). “The ALJ need not discuss all of the factors described in the regulations but must, as to each opinion or prior administrative medical finding, ‘explain how [he or she] considered the supportability and consistency factors.” Rivera, 2020 WL 8167136, at *14 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(2)). “If the ALJ fails adequately to ‘explain the supportability or consistency factors,' or bases [his] explanation upon a misreading of the record, remand is required.” Id. (quoting Andrew G., 2020 WL 5848776, at *9)).

Several opinions among the district courts within the Second Circuit applying the new regulations have concluded that “the factors to be considered in weighing the various medical opinions in a given claimant's medical history are substantially similar” to the former Treating Physician Rule. Acosto Cuevas v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 20 Civ. 502 (AJN) (KHP), 2021 WL 363682, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2021) (surveying district court cases in the Second Circuit considering the new regulations); see Prieto v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 20 Civ. 3941 (RWL), 2021 WL 3475625, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2021) (noting that under both the Treating Physician Rule and the new regulations, “an ALJ's failure to properly consider and apply the requisite factors is grounds for remand”); Dany Z. v. Saul, No. 2:19-CV-217 (WKS), 2021 WL 1232641, at *12 (D. Vt. Mar. 31, 2021) (surveying Second Circuit district courts that “have concluded that the factors are very similar to the analysis under the old [Treating Physician] [R]ule”); Andrew G., 2020 WL 5848776, at *5 (noting that “consistency and supportability” were “the foundation of the treating source rule”); see also Brianne S. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 19-CV-1718 (FPG), 2021 WL 856909, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2021) (remanding to ALJ with instructions to provide explicit discussion of supportability and consistency of two medical opinions, because ALJ's “mere[] state[ment]” that examining physician's opinion was not consistent with overall medical evidence was insufficient).

3. Application

The Court agrees with the Commissioner that the ALJ properly evaluated the opinions of Drs. Hoyle and Volpe under the new regulations. After providing a detailed summary of the Record evidence pertaining to Ms. Felton's mental impairments, the ALJ found the opinions in the Questionnaire regarding Ms. Felton's marked limitations in interacting with others and in adapting or managing herself, and her extreme limitations in concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace were:

unpersuasive because although they are supported by these doctors' mental status exam findings and an explanation for why the evidence directs the stated limitations, they are inconsistent with the record as a whole, which generally demonstrates lesser mental functional limitations, including mental status exam findings in the treatment records of cooperative attitude, normal speech, normal thought process and content, intact associations, good judgment and insight,

normal intellectual functioning, intact recent and remote memory, good concentration, and more engaged affect; as well as the routine and conservative mental health treatment.

(R. 20 (citing R. 1096-97, 1125-26, 1607, 1627, 1938, 1995)).

As set forth above, this Court's review of the ALJ Decision “is limited to determining whether the [Commissioner's] conclusions were supported by substantial evidence in the record and were based on a correct legal standard.” Selian v. Astrue, 708 F.3d 409, 417 (2d Cir. 2013). Under this standard, “once an ALJ finds facts, [the court] can reject those facts ‘only if a reasonable factfinder would have to conclude otherwise.'” Herrera v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 20 Civ. 7910 (KHP), 2021 WL 4909955, at *9-10 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2021) (quoting Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm'r, 683 F.3d 443, 448 (2d Cir. 2012) (per curiam)) (holding that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's RFC assessment where the ALJ “grappled with inconsistent records,” noted and discussed conflicting evidence, including objective tests, the claimant's statements, “and arrived at a decision based on the record as a whole”).

Here, ALJ Begley evaluated the Questionnaire based on the correct legal standard, that is, 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a). Specifically, the ALJ considered the opinions in the Questionnaire in accordance with 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a), and articulated how he considered the supportability and consistency factors. (R. 16, 19). Ms. Felton does not-and cannot-argue otherwise. Instead, she argues that the ALJ's articulated basis was not supported by substantial evidence.

The ALJ's evaluation of the opinions in the Questionnaire was also supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ acknowledged that the doctors' exam findings generally supported the opinions, but ultimately concluded that they were “inconsistent with the record as a whole, which generally demonstrates lesser mental functional limitations.” (R. 20 (citing R. 1096-97, 1125-26, 1607, 1627, 1938, 1995)). Ms. Felton argues that “none of [the cited] items contradict” the Questionnaire. (ECF No. 22 at 28). Having reviewed the evidence. however, the Court disagrees.

For example, during her April 18, 2019 examination of Ms. Felton, Dr. Hoyle noted that Ms. Felton had normal speech and thought process, was “more engaged” with respect to mood and affect, and had good or intact insight, judgment, memory, fund of knowledge, and attention and concentration. (R. 1096-97). The ALJ reasonably concluded that these findings-made just three months before Drs. Hoyle and Volpe provided the Questionnaire-contradict the doctors' opinions as to Ms. Felton's marked and extreme limitations. Similarly, at a psychiatric exam performed during an August 14, 2017 primary care visit, Ms. Felton showed normal judgment, insight, mood, and affect. (R. 162). Accordingly, Ms. Felton's argument that none of these records contradict the Questionnaire is overstated.

Moreover, as the Commissioner correctly points out (ECF No. 28 at 29, “[o]bjective evidence elsewhere in the record likewise bely the[] [] limitations” opined by Drs. Hoyle and Volpe. John W. v. Kijakazi, No. 5:20-CV-01180 (BKS), 2022 WL 768672, at *14 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2022) (upholding supportability and consistency determinations as to persuasiveness of treating physician's opinion based on evidence elsewhere in the record). For example, ALJ Begley noted that, during her consultative psychological evaluation of Ms. Felton, Dr. Jennings found her to be “cooperative and her manner of relating was adequate.” (R. 18 (citing R. 369-73)). Ms. Felton also reported to Dr. Jennings that “she can handle activities of daily living without problem, including personal care, cooking, general cleaning, laundry, shopping, managing money, and using public transportation.” (R. 19 (citing R. 371)). As the ALJ observed, “[t]hese activities require an ability to . . . complete simple and well-known mental tasks in a familiar and unhurried environment with limited social interaction.” (R. 19).

Although there may be some Record evidence that is consistent with the opinions in the Questionnaire, it is not for this Court to “reweigh th[e] evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ where,” as here, “the evidence is susceptible of more than [one] interpretation.” Rivera v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 368 F.Supp.3d 626, 642 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). Rather, “once an ALJ finds facts, [the Court] can reject those facts only if a reasonable factfinder would have to conclude otherwise.” Brault, 683 F.3d at 448(internal citation omitted). Accordingly, “this Court cannot say that no reasonable factfinder could have reached the ALJ's conclusions about [the plaintiff's] RFC . . . . Thus, this Court must affirm the findings.” Herrera, 2021 WL 4909955, at *11 (citing Brault, 683 F.3d at 448; Jones v. Sullivan, 949 F.2d 57, 59 (2d Cir. 1991)). The Court therefore finds that ALJ Begley evaluation of the Questionnaire was supported by substantial evidence and consistent with the Record.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, I respectfully recommend that Ms. Felton's Motion be DENIED, the Commissioner's Motion be GRANTED, and the case be DISMISSED.

NOTICE OF PROCEDURE FOR FILING OBJECTIONS TO THIS REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

The parties shall have fourteen (14) days (including weekends and holidays) from service of this Report and Recommendation to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See also Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d) (adding three additional days when service is made under Fed.R.Civ.P. 5(b)(2)(C), (D) or (F)). A party may respond to another party's objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Such objections, and any response to objections, shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d), 72(b). Any requests for an extension of time for filing objections must be addressed to Chief Judge Swain.

FAILURE TO OBJECT WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL RESULT IN A WAIVER OF OBJECTIONS AND WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d), 72(b); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).