Opinion
No. 1D18-5001
10-21-2020
Leigh FELTEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and David Alan Henson, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Robert "Charlie" Lee, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and David Alan Henson, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Robert "Charlie" Lee, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Per Curiam. Leigh Felten appeals her judgment and sentence, raising two issues. We affirm as to one issue, but her second issue, which is meritorious, requires a remand for the trial court to address Felten's competency to stand trial.
The trial court granted Felten's request for a mental and competency evaluation, but—as the State concedes—the "record does not show ... that the trial court held a competency hearing or entered a written order," thereby necessitating a remand. See Sheheane v. State , 228 So. 3d 1178, 1180–81 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) ("Once reasonable grounds exist to question a defendant's competency, there can be no waiver of the right to independent judicial evaluation and adjudication of competency.").
The State claims that the trial court failed to make a finding that a competency evaluation was even required, but overlooks the fact that the trial court granted Felten's request for a mental health evaluation, specifically to include a competency examination. We must presume, absent proof to the contrary, that the trial court followed the requirements of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.210(b) in granting Felten's motion, which required that Felten's motion establish a "reasonable ground to believe that the defendant is not mentally competent to proceed," thereby necessitating a hearing and, as here, an examination. The trial court, in making the "threshold determination of whether reasonable grounds exist to question a defendant's competency," does not make the "ultimate determination of whether a defendant is competent," which occurs only after evaluation and a hearing. Sheheane , 228 So. 3d at 1179. Moreover, unlike Santiago-Gonzalez v. State , 301 So.3d 157 (Fla. 2020), which involved "oral competency finding[s]" that were "fully supported by the record," and thereby harmless, the record here lacks oral competency findings, a written order of competency, or even a showing that a competency hearing was held, the absence of which would constitute fundamental error. See Sheheane , 228 So. 3d at 1181.
We reverse Felten's judgment and sentence. See Brooks v. State , 180 So. 3d 1094, 1096 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) ("Because there is no indication that the trial court conducted a competency hearing or ruled on Brooks’ competency, we are compelled to reverse the judgments and sentences."). On remand, the trial court shall either provide the missing competency order, perform a nunc pro tunc competency hearing, or, failing both, conduct a new trial. See Walker v. State , 237 So. 3d 1162, 1165 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018). If Felten is found competent on remand, her conviction shall be reinstated. We affirm Felten's other issue on appeal without further discussion.
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings.
Ray, C.J., and Makar and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.