Opinion
Civil Action 22-CV-211
02-07-2022
THOMAS FELDSER, Plaintiff, v. CURRAN FROMHOLD CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM
RUFE, J.
Thomas Feldser, a pretrial detainee housed at the Philadelphia Industrial Correctional Center, filed this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The only named Defendant is Curren-Fromhold Correctional Facility (“CFCF”). Feldser also seeks to proceed in forma pauperis and has submitted a copy of his institutional account statement. For the following reasons, the Court will grant Feldser leave to proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss his Complaint without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.
I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
Feldser's allegations are extremely brief. He alleges that in December 2020 “I got COVID-19, then they sent me to the Detention Center with no medical help.” He seeks $2 million in money damages.
Complaint [Doc. No. 2] at 5. The Court adopts the pagination supplied by the CM/ECF docketing system.
Complaint [Doc. No. 2] at 5.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court grants Feldser leave to proceed in forma pauperis because it appears that he is incapable of paying the fees to commence this civil action. Accordingly, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) requires the Court to dismiss the Complaint if it fails to state a claim. Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which requires the Court to determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” “At this early stage of the litigation, [the Court will] accept the facts alleged in [the plaintiff's] pro se complaint as true, draw all reasonable inferences in [the plaintiff's] favor, and ask only whether that complaint, liberally construed, contains facts sufficient to state a plausible [] claim.'” Conclusory allegations do not suffice; they must be supported by at least some alleged facts. As Feldser is proceeding pro se, the Court construes his allegations liberally.
However, because he is a prisoner Feldser will be obligated to pay the filing fee in installments in accordance with the Prison Litigation Reform Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b).
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) (“the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.”)
See Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999).
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations omitted).
Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021) (quotations omitted)
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir. 2013)).
III. DISCUSSION
The Court understands Feldser to be asserting a constitutional claim based on a lack of medical care when he contracted Covid-19. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 allows state actors and officials to be sued in federal court for violations of federal rights. “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.”
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Feldser's Complaint must be dismissed because the only party he has named, CFCF, is not a “person” as that term is used in § 1983, and so cannot be sued under that statute. “A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs.” However, because Feldser may be able to assert a plausible claim against a person under § 1983 based on a lack of medical treatment, the dismissal of the Complaint will be without prejudice. Feldser will be granted an opportunity to file an amended complaint to cure this defect.
See Cephas v. George W. Hill Corr. Facility, No. 09-6014, 2010 WL 2854149, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 20, 2010) (holding that a prison in Delaware County, Pennsylvania was not a legal entity that could be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Miller v. Curran-Fromhold Corr. Facility, No. 13-7680, 2014 WL 4055846, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 13, 2014) (citing Mitchell v. Chester Cty. Farms Prison, 426 F.Supp. 271 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (holding that CFCF is not a “person” that can be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988); see also Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207) (“Personal involvement requires particular ‘allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence.'”).
To state a constitutional claim based on the failure to provide medical treatment, a prisoner must allege facts indicating that one or more prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994) (describing the “deliberate indifference” standard). A prison official is not deliberately indifferent “unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. “A medical need is serious . . . if it is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.” Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987) (quotations omitted). Deliberate indifference is properly alleged “where the prison official (1) knows of a prisoner's need for medical treatment but intentionally refuses to provide it; (2) delays necessary medical treatment based on a non-medical reason; or (3) prevents a prisoner from receiving needed or recommended medical treatment.” Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). A serious medical need exists where “failure to treat can be expected to lead to substantial and unnecessary suffering.” Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 946 F.2d 1017, 1023 (3d Cir. 1991). Allegations of medical malpractice and mere disagreement regarding proper medical treatment are insufficient to establish a constitutional violation. See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235 (3d Cir. 2004).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss Feldser's Complaint without prejudice. An appropriate Order follows with additional instruction on amendment.