Pursuant to § 8-74-104 (1986 Repl. Vol. 3B), the Panel may affirm, modify, reverse, or set aside a hearing officer's decision based on the evidence in the record. The Panel's authority is similar to an appellate court's authority and is governed by the Administrative Procedure Act, § 24-4-105, C.R.S. (1988 Repl. Vol. 10A). Federico v. Brannan Sand Gravel Co., 788 P.2d 1268 (Colo. 1990). Section 24-4-105(15)(b), C.R.S. (1988 Repl. Vol. 10A) provides, in part:
The distinction between evidentiary facts and ultimate conclusions of fact is not always clear. Federico v. Brannan Sand Gravel Co., 788 P.2d 1268, 1272 (Colo. 1990). In general, however, evidentiary facts are the detailed factual or historical findings upon which a legal determination rests.
The courts of other states have also concluded that the termination of an employee during the course of a labor dispute entitles the claimant to unemployment compensation benefits. See Federico v. Brannan Sand Gravel Company, 788 P.2d 1268, 1273 (Colo. En Banc 1990) ("We conclude that an employee involved in a labor dispute is entitled to unemployment compensation benefits when the employer-employee relation has been terminated with respect to that employee. "); Christianson v. Geo. A. Hormel Company, 404 N.W.2d 334, 337-38 (Minn.App. 1987) (claimant was entitled to unemployment benefits because his actions resulting in his termination during the course of a strike did not constitute misconduct).
Other courts have, for varying reasons, concluded that permanent replacement severs the causal connection between the unemployment and the labor dispute thereby removing the bar to unemployment benefits. See, e.g., Ruberoid Co. v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 59 Cal.2d 73, 27 Cal.Rptr. 878, 378 P.2d 102, 105 (1963) (applying a two-part test for determining whether permanently replaced workers remained disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits: first prong of test inquires into whether the worker's unemployment was voluntary or volitional; second prong inquires into whether the labor dispute or the employer's actions was the cause of the unemployment); Federico v. Brannan Sand Gravel Co., 788 P.2d 1268, 1271 (Colo. 1990) (holding that whether the employer-employee relationship has been severed is a fact question and an offer to return to work and a refusal to accept the work are not prerequisites to a finding of termination); Plymouth-Stamping, Div. of Eltec Corp. v. Lipshu, 436 Mich. 1, 461 N.W.2d 859, 875 (1990) (holding that actual permanent replacement of striking employees ends the "cause" of their original unemployment); Wohlert Special Prods. v. Michigan Employment Sec. Comm'n, 202 Mich. App. 419, 509 N.W.2d 825, 828 (1993) (clarifying that the rule in Michigan is that the striking employees must be actually permanently replaced before one can say the cause of the claimant's unemployment is no longer the work stoppage) vacated, 447 Mich. 1022, 527 N.W.2d 514, 514 (1994) (remanding to agency for fact-finding on availability of work); Mississippi Employment Sec. Comm'n v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 604 So.2d 215, 217 (Miss. 1992) (holding permanent replacement alters the cause of the claima
Ultimate facts, which are "conclusions of law or mixed questions of law and fact that are based on evidentiary facts and determine the rights and liabilities of the parties," require less deference by the Panel to the hearing officer. Federico v. Brannan Sand & Gravel Co., 788 P.2d 1268, 1272 (Colo. 1990). The Panel is entitled to make its own determination as to ultimate facts, so long as that determination "has a reasonable basis in law and is supported by substantial evidence in the record."
Additionally, a court is not bound to follow federal law in construing a state statutory scheme when no authority is found or cited by the parties indicating that federal law prevails. Brannan Sand Gravel Co. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 762 P.2d 771, 774 (Colo.App. 1988), aff'd sub nom. Federico v. Brannan Sand Gravel Co., 788 P.2d 1268 (Colo. 1990). Thus, a court may refuse to engraft a federal statutory scheme, with its distinct definitions, policies, and concepts, onto a related state statutory scheme when the court discerns no compelling policy reason to do so.
§ 25-4-78(1), Ala. Code 1975. The states that apply a "stoppage of work" interpretation to their statutes reason that the employer's replacement of striking workers terminates their status as employees and that an employer-employee relationship is an essential element of a labor dispute. See Arvin N. Am. Automotive v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Dep't of Employment Training Services, 598 N.E.2d 532, 537 (Ind.Ct.App. 1992) ("[A]n employer's act of permanently replacing striking workers severs the employer-employee relationship thereby removing the statutory labor dispute disqualification."); Federico v. Brannan Sand Gravel Co., 788 P.2d 1268, 1273 (Colo. 1990) ("We conclude that an employee involved in a labor dispute is entitled to unemployment compensation benefits when the employer-employee relation has been terminated with respect to that employee. The employer-employee relationship can be terminated by the permanent replacement of the employee.
The Colorado Court of Appeals, in construing the Colorado version of the labor dispute disqualification statute, held that the employment relationship is terminated when a striking employee is permanently replaced. Brannan Sand Gravel Co. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 762 P.2d 771, 774 (Colo.Ct.App. 1988), aff'd sub nom. en banc, Federico v. Brannan Sand Gravel Co., 788 P.2d 1268 (Colo. 1990). Such a construction, the court found,
¶ 42 In contrast, findings of ultimate fact "are ‘conclusions of law and fact that are based on evidentiary facts and determine the rights and liabilities of the parties,’ [which] require less deference" by the agency to the hearing officer. Colo. Custom Maid, LLC v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off. , 2019 CO 43, ¶ 12, 441 P.3d 1005 (quoting Federico v. Brannan Sand & Gravel Co. , 788 P.2d 1268, 1272 (Colo. 1990) ). ¶ 43 If the agency improperly substitutes its own findings of evidentiary fact for those of the ALJ, the agency exceeds its statutory authority.
However, we review de novo the hearing officer's and the Panel's ultimate conclusions of fact. Commc'ns Workers of Am. 7717 v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office , 2012 COA 148, ¶ 7, 292 P.3d 1127 (citing Federico v. Brannan Sand & Gravel Co. , 788 P.2d 1268, 1272 (Colo.1990) ) (ultimate conclusions of fact are conclusions of law or mixed questions of law and fact which determine the parties' rights and liabilities and which are generally phrased in the language of the controlling statute or legal standard). The determination as to whether a claimant was "at fault" for the separation from employment is an ultimate legal conclusion that we likewise review de novo.