Opinion
April 3, 1995
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Queens County (Smith, J.).
Ordered that the order is modified by deleting the provision thereof which vacated that portion of the judgment which granted an annulment to the plaintiff; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Queens County, for further proceedings on the issue of child support and other disputed economic issues, if any.
It is well settled that a party attempting to vacate a default judgment must establish both a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious cause of action (see, Sayagh v Sayagh, 205 A.D.2d 678; Kellerman v Kellerman, 203 A.D.2d 533, 534). However, this rule is not "applied with equal rigor in matrimonial actions where the State's interest in the marital res and allied issues * * * have called forth a more liberal approach, favoring dispositions on the merits" (Shaw v Shaw, 97 A.D.2d 403, 406; see also, Anderson v Anderson, 144 A.D.2d 512; Junowicz v Junowicz, 132 A.D.2d 527). The determination of what constitutes a reasonable excuse lies within the sound discretion of the Supreme Court (see, Sayagh v Sayagh, supra; Black v Black, 141 A.D.2d 689). Here, while the defendant's excuse for failing to answer the complaint was questionable, she did, arguably, present a meritorious defense to the Supreme Court's award of child support; namely, a 1992 order of the Family Court awarding her a much greater amount of support. Therefore, based upon our liberal policy of vacating default judgments in matrimonial actions and our deference to the Supreme Court, we find that the Supreme Court properly vacated the economic portion of the judgment of annulment (see, Otto v Otto, 150 A.D.2d 57, 60; see also, Schorr v Schorr, 213 A.D.2d 621; Wayasamin v Wayasamin, 167 A.D.2d 460, 462; Meisl v Meisl, 153 A.D.2d 839, 840). However, the defendant offered no defense to the plaintiff's allegation of fraud and, therefore, the Supreme Court should not have vacated that portion of the judgment which granted an annulment to the plaintiff (see, Schorr v Schorr, supra; Wayasamin v Wayasamin, supra; Meisl v Meisl, supra). Mangano, P.J., Lawrence, Copertino, Krausman and Goldstein, JJ., concur.