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Faulkner v. McKelvey

Supreme Court of Georgia
Oct 11, 1950
61 S.E.2d 478 (Ga. 1950)

Opinion

17256.

OCTOBER 11, 1950.

Specific performance — nonsuit. Before Judge Paschall. Bartow Superior Court. July 11, 1950.

J. L. Davis, for plaintiff.

Finley Henson, for defendants.


An instrument headed "Georgia, Bartow County," agreeing to convey "the brick store building, known as the old Post Office Building," contained a key which, when aided by proper extrinsic evidence, would be sufficient to identify the land in question.

No. 17256. OCTOBER 11, 1950.


W. H. Faulkner sued Mrs. Katherine E. McKelvey for specific performance of a contract to convey realty. The petition contained a detailed description of the property. The trial judge excluded the contract as evidence, on the ground that the description of the realty as set forth in the contract was insufficient to furnish a key to its identification, and also excluded certain oral testimony offered for the purpose of identifying the realty.

The written contract was headed "Georgia, Bartow County," and the realty was described as "the brick store building, known as the old Post Office Building." It was a one-year rent contract with an option to purchase, and expired April 5, 1949. The oral testimony offered would have shown that the optionor owned only one brick store building in Bartow County known as the Old Post Office Building, and that was a described building in Kingston.


Definiteness of the description of land in a contract for purchase, is measured by the same yardstick as that contained in a deed. Harper v. Kellar, 110 Ga. 420 ( 35 S.E. 667). Where an instrument is headed "Georgia, Bartow County," it is presumed that the land is located in that county. Horton v. Murden, 117 Ga. 72 (3) ( 43 S.E. 786). The instrument must disclose what the intention of the maker was with respect to the quantity and location of the land referred to. Andrews v. Murphy, 12 Ga. 431; Mull v. Allen, 202 Ga. 176, 179 ( 42 S.E.2d 360). The quantity of land agreed to be conveyed under the option here is such as is covered by a brick building, and is therefore definitely ascertainable even though there is no reference to its dimensions or shape. The property being presumed to be in Bartow County, as to its specific location therein, parol testimony that Mrs. McKelvey owned only one such described building in that county, with additional testimony as to its exact whereabouts, would identify the land in question. The contract, by its heading, establishing that the premises were in Bartow County, and the description being "the brick store building, known as the old Post Office Building," contained a key which, when aided by proper extrinsic evidence, would be sufficient to identify the land in question. Huntress v. Portwood, 116 Ga. 351 (3), 356 ( 42 S.E. 513); Clark v. Cagle, 141 Ga. 703 (2) ( 82 S.E. 21); Blumberg v. Nathan, 190 Ga. 64 ( 8 S.E.2d 374); Gainesville Midland R. Co. v. Tyner, 204 Ga. 535 (2) ( 50 S.E.2d 108).

Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur.


Summaries of

Faulkner v. McKelvey

Supreme Court of Georgia
Oct 11, 1950
61 S.E.2d 478 (Ga. 1950)
Case details for

Faulkner v. McKelvey

Case Details

Full title:FAULKNER v. McKELVEY et al

Court:Supreme Court of Georgia

Date published: Oct 11, 1950

Citations

61 S.E.2d 478 (Ga. 1950)
61 S.E.2d 478

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