Opinion
Case No. A4-04-19
May 25, 2004
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR REMAND FOR FURTHER ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
Summary:
The plaintiff appealed the denial of her application for disability benefits under the Social Security Act. The Government subsequently filed a Motion for Remand for Further Administrative Action, the basis being that it had yet to locate the plaintiff's file. The Court denied the Government's motion, and instead granted the Government an additional sixty days to determine whether it can locate the plaintiff's file.
Before the Court is the Defendant's Motion for Remand for Further Administrative Action filed on May 10, 2004. The defendant, the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, seeks remand pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 52 U.S.C. § 405(g). For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies the Commissioner's motion.
I. BACKGROUND
After reviewing the scant information available to the Court in this file, it appears that on March 20, 2003, the plaintiff, Deborah L. Farstad, was denied benefits under the Social Security Act after an administrative hearing. On January 31, 2004, the Appeal Council affirmed the decision to deny benefits. Farstad then filed the current action with this Court on March 9, 2004. The next substantive entry in the file is the Commissioner's request for a remand. The Commissioner has not yet answered the complaint.
In the motion for remand, the Commissioner asserts that she is unable to locate the claim file in this matter and requests a remand to search for the file. In addition, the Commissioner states that if the file cannot be located within a reasonable amount of time, the file will be reconstructed.
Farstad opposes the Commissioner's motion and she contends that she is entitled to a full and fair review and not to a "reconstruction" generated by the Commissioner. She asks the Court to enter a default judgment in her favor and order benefits to be paid to her based on her claimed disability.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
The "exclusive methods by which a district court may remand to the [Commissioner] are set forth in sentence four and sentence six of § 405(g)." Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 296 (1993). "Sentence six remands may be ordered in only two situations: where the [Commissioner] requests a remand before answering the complaint, or where new, material evidence is adduced that was for good cause not presented before the agency." 509 U.S. 292, 296, n. 2. Sentence 6 of Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 52 U.S.C. § 405(g), states, in part, "the Court may, on motion of the Commissioner made for good cause shown before he files his answer, remand the case to the Commissioner for further action by the Commissioner. . . ." The Commissioner cites to the legislative history of the 1980 amendments to the Social Security Act for examples of what constitutes "good cause." The legislative history reveals the following:
Such a situation is an example of what could be considered "good cause" for remand. Where, for example, the tape recording of the claimant's oral hearing is lost or inaudible, or cannot otherwise be transcribed, or where the claimant's files cannot be located or are incomplete, good cause would exist to remand the claim to the Commissioner for appropriate action to produce a record.
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 96-944. 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 59 (1980). Thus, the Commissioner has proffered a seemingly valid reason for remand — the fact Farstad's file cannot be located.
In her response, Farstad contends that the appropriate action is a sanction rather than a remand. Farstad cites to LaBonne v. Heckler, 574 F. Supp. 1016, 1021 (D. Minn. 1984) for the proposition that the Social Security Administration's inability to located files may create a prima facie case for interim benefits. LaBonne was a collection of five social security cases in which the government had failed to file timely answers to the complaints. As to plaintiff LaBonne, the Commissioner filed a motion to remand after the period for filing an answer had passed. 574 F. Supp. 1016, 1018. Prior to the Commissioner's motion to remand, the Court had granted the Commissioner's two requests for an extension, and more than eight months had passed since the complaint was filed. Id. at 1019. The Court granted LaBonne interim benefits and found the delay in the case was precipitated by a "breakdown in the agency's mechanisms for handling appeals." Id. at 1021.
Farstad's case is factually distinct from the LaBonne case. Here, the Commissioner filed her motion for remand within sixty days of the filing of Farstad's complaint. There has not been the egregious disregard of the Court's deadlines like there was in LaBonne. In addition, the Commissioner has stated she is currently unable to locate Farstad's file but would like more time to search.
According to 52 U.S.C. § 405(g), it is within the Court's discretion to remand the case to the Commissioner for further action by the Commissioner. The Court finds that granting the Commissioner's motion to remand would be premature because the Commissioner has not determined that the file is unrecoverable. Rather than remand the matter at this time, the Court will grant the Commissioner an additional sixty (60) days to determine whether she is able to locate Farstad's file. The Court will not order interim benefits.
III. CONCLUSION
The Court DENIES the Defendant's Motion for Remand for Further Administrative Action (Docket No. 3). However, the Court grants the Commissioner an additional sixty (60) days to determine whether she is able to locate Farstad's file. If at the conclusion of the sixty days the Commissioner is still unable to locate Farstad's file, the Commissioner may resubmit an appropriate motion at that time.