Opinion
NO. 02-17-00013-CR
04-19-2018
SERENA NICOLE FARRIS APPELLANT v. THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
FROM THE 213TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NO. 1444151D MEMORANDUM OPINION
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
Pursuant to a plea-bargain agreement, the trial court convicted appellant Serena Nicole Farris of possessing less than a gram of methamphetamine and sentenced her to 320 days' confinement. With the trial court's permission, Farris appeals the conviction, arguing in two related points that the court erred by denying her motions to suppress evidence that the State obtained in an alleged violation of her constitutional rights. We hold that the trial court did not err by denying the motions to suppress, and we affirm the trial court's judgment.
See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.115(a)-(b) (West 2017).
Background
One day in February 2016, Arlington police officers Andrea Davis and Charles Cisneros received a tip that Farris had an outstanding arrest warrant, that she was likely possessing drugs or drug paraphernalia, and that she could be found at Don's Total Car Care. The officers confirmed that she had a warrant and went to Don's Total Car Care to arrest her. When they arrived, they saw a woman standing outside of a truck with the driver's side door open. They confirmed that the woman was Farris and arrested her.
When Officer Davis asked Farris whether she was possessing anything illegal, she admitted that she had a meth pipe in her bra. Officer Davis seized the pipe. Farris told the officers that the truck belonged to a man who worked at the car care center, and the officers spoke to that man and confirmed that the truck was his. At that time, according to Officer Davis, she
Concerning this question, Officer Davis testified,
[T]he tip had stated she may have drugs or paraphernalia on her person. And, typically, they may hide syringes, or may have syringes or something, broken glass pipe on their person. I do typically ask for my own safety to see if they'll come forward and tell me so that I don't end up harming myself while searching them.In the trial court and on appeal, Farris has not argued that Officer Davis's discovery or seizure of the meth pipe was unconstitutional or that the trial court should have suppressed evidence concerning the meth pipe.
happened to notice on the driver side floorboard in the seat area, there was a jacket there that appeared to [her] to be a female's jacket. Because [she and Officer Cisneros] were going to be leaving the location and taking [Farris] to jail, and the truck didn't belong to [Farris], [Officer Davis] wasn't sure if the jacket was [Farris's] or not. So [Officer Davis] had asked [Farris], as a courtesy, if it was her jacket. She at first didn't answer and just kind of hung her head. And then [Officer Davis] stated it looked like a female's jacket, "Is that yours?" And she then admitted that, yes, it was in fact her jacket.
. . . .
. . . [Officer Davis] grabbed the jacket in order to take it . . . to the jail because it was [Farris's] personal property. And prior to taking anything into the jail, [officers] are required to search it so that there's not any weapons, any contraband taken into the jail. And in searching the pockets [Officer Davis] located [methamphetamine].
A grand jury indicted Farris with possessing methamphetamine. With the assistance of counsel, she filed two motions to suppress evidence. She asked the trial court to exclude evidence of any inculpatory statements she had made and any physical evidence obtained by the police upon her arrest.
The trial court held an evidentiary hearing. When the State asked Officer Davis why she had asked Farris about the jacket, she replied, "I believed it was possibly her personal property, and I didn't want it to get left behind because I did not know . . . if she'd see this friend again to retrieve her jacket. . . . We always make an effort to bring people's personal property with them." Officer Davis explained that if Farris had answered that the jacket was not hers, she would have left it in the truck. On cross-examination, Officer Davis acknowledged that she did not give Farris Miranda warnings before asking her about the jacket. Similar to Officer Davis's testimony, Officer Cisneros testified he construed Officer Davis's question about Farris's jacket as a "courtesy, not so much from a legal authority [but] just 'Hey, you're about to go to jail. Is this your jacket so you can take it with you?"
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1630 (1966).
After Officer Davis and Officer Cisneros testified, Farris argued that the process leading to the officers' seizure of her jacket and their discovery of the methamphetamine inside it violated her rights under the Fifth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and state constitutional and statutory provisions. The State, however, argued that Officer Davis's question about the jacket and the resulting seizure of the jacket did not violate Farris's rights because Officer Davis asked the question as a courtesy and without intending to elicit an incriminating response.
The trial court denied the motions to suppress. The court explained its ruling:
The officer noticed a female's jacket on the driver's side of the truck. [The] [o]fficer asked Defendant if it was her jacket. She did not immediately respond. So the officer informed her that it was a female's . . . jacket. She then claimed ownership of the jacket.
The officer retrieved the jacket and searched it and found a blue zipper pouch with two plastic baggies containing [a] controlled substance.
The question that was asked of the Defendant when the officer asked if it was her jacket was not intended to elicit an incriminating response. There was no reason for the officers at that time to speculate or suspect that the jacket would have drugs [in] it.
The Court finds that the officer's action was reasonable under the circumstance[s], and the Court will deny [the] Motion to Suppress . . . .
After the trial court's suppression ruling, Farris entered into a plea-bargain agreement in which she pleaded guilty to possessing less than a gram of methamphetamine and confessed to that offense in exchange for the State's recommendation of a 320-day sentence. The trial court found her guilty and sentenced her in accordance with the agreement. With the trial court's permission, she brought this appeal.
The Trial Court's Suppression Rulings
In her first point on appeal, Farris contends that the trial court erred by denying suppression of her statement that the jacket belonged to her. In her second point, she argues that the trial court erred by denying suppression of physical evidence—the jacket and the methamphetamine contained within it.
Farris briefs the points together; she does not argue that the seizure of her jacket and the methamphetamine contained within it was improper for any reason other than an alleged violation of Miranda. She emphasizes that she was in custody when Officer Davis asked her about the jacket, and she reasons that the question about the jacket was impermissible absent the administration of Miranda warnings. She asserts that the "pivotal issue in this appeal" is the validity of the trial court's finding that Officer Davis's question about the jacket did not qualify as "interrogation" subject to Miranda's requirements.
We express no opinion on the validity of Farris's premise that a violation of her Fifth Amendment right to avoid compelled self-incrimination under Miranda would justify the suppression of physical evidence discovered by the police after she admitted that the jacket belonged to her.
Standard of review
We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence under a bifurcated standard of review. Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). In reviewing the trial court's decision, we do not engage in our own factual review. Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); Best v. State, 118 S.W.3d 857, 861 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.). The trial judge is the sole trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 24-25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000), modified on other grounds by State v. Cullen, 195 S.W.3d 696 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Therefore, we give almost total deference to the trial court's rulings on (1) questions of historical fact, even if the trial court's determination of those facts was not based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor, and (2) application-of-law-to-fact questions that turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673; Montanez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 101, 108-09 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Johnson v. State, 68 S.W.3d 644, 652-53 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); see also Alford v. State, 358 S.W.3d 647, 653 (Tex. Crim. App.) ("The decision as to whether custodial questioning constitutes 'interrogation' under Miranda is a mixed question of law and fact, and we defer to the trial court's fact findings that turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor."), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 815 (2012).
Stated another way, when reviewing the trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. Wiede, 214 S.W.3d at 24; State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). When the trial court makes explicit fact findings, we determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, supports those fact findings. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d at 818-19. We then review the trial court's legal ruling de novo unless its explicit fact findings that are supported by the record are also dispositive of the legal ruling. Id. at 818. We must uphold the trial court's ruling if it is supported by the record and correct under any theory of law applicable to the case. State v. Stevens, 235 S.W.3d 736, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Miranda's requirements
In Miranda, the Supreme Court held that to comply with a defendant's privilege against compelled self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment, the government may not use "statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards." 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S. Ct. at 1612; see U.S. Const. amend V; Campbell v. State, 325 S.W.3d 223, 233 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, no pet.) ("The need for Miranda warnings arises when a person has been subjected to a custodial interrogation."); see also Herrera v. State, 241 S.W.3d 520, 526 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (explaining that the defendant bears the initial burden of proving a custodial interrogation). Those safeguards include familiar warnings and admonitions: the defendant has a right to remain silent, any statement may be used as evidence against him, and he has a right to an attorney's presence. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S. Ct. at 1612.
The trial court found that Farris was in custody when Officer Davis asked her about her jacket; the State does not contest that finding, and we likewise conclude that Farris was in custody. The critical question in this appeal is whether the question qualified as an "interrogation" under Miranda.
Interrogation means express questioning that the police should know is likely to elicit an incriminating response or any words or actions by the police that the police should know will do so. State v. Cruz, 461 S.W.3d 531, 536 & n.15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (citing Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 1689-90 (1980)); see also United States v. Briggs, 273 F.3d 737, 741 (7th Cir. 2001) (explaining that "not all direct questions constitute 'interrogation'" and that only questions that are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect are improper without the administration of Miranda warnings). Interrogation does not include questions that serve a legitimate administrative need and that are normally attendant to arrest and custody. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 456, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1975 (2013) (recognizing that a police officer's questions reasonably related to administrative concerns are not subject to Miranda); Cruz, 461 S.W.3d at 537; Cross v. State, 144 S.W.3d 521, 524 n.5 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); see Bridgewater v. State, No. 02-05-00114-CR, 2006 WL 1714322, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 22, 2006, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication) ("Questioning normally attendant to arrest and custody is not interrogation.").
In Bridgewater, after the police arrested Bridgewater for soliciting prostitution from his car, an officer asked him whether he needed anything out of the car such as medication or money, and he responded that there was "something" in his car. 2006 WL 1714322, at *1. The officer searched the car and found a gun and controlled substances. Id. On appeal from Bridgewater's convictions for unlawfully possessing the gun and the controlled substances, we held that the officer's question was "not of a constitutionally-suspect interrogative nature." Id. at *4.
More specifically, several courts have concluded that inquiries intended to safeguard or inventory a defendant's personal property do not generally qualify as interrogation under Miranda. See, e.g., United States v. Conley, 156 F.3d 78, 84 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that an officer's question about ownership of money that the officer found in the defendant's wallet was not interrogation under Miranda because it was an "informational inquiry incident to the arrest, as opposed to a query designed to induce an inculpatory remark"); United States v. Regilio, 669 F.2d 1169, 1177 (7th Cir. 1981) (stating that "inventorying of a suspect's property" is "not interrogation"), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1133 (1982); United States v. La Monica, 472 F.2d 580, 581 (9th Cir. 1972) (holding that there was no violation of Miranda when the "officer who asked [the defendant] about [a] receipt was not seeking evidence but was trying to identify and inventory [the defendant's] personal effects"); Arizona v. Hollins, No. 1 CA-CR 15-0222, 2016 WL 3030122, at *3 (Ariz. Ct. App. May 26, 2016) (not designated for publication) (explaining that "[g]enerally, police may ask a question of a person in custody as to ownership of property to ensure that the property is safeguarded," but holding that the police's questions concerning a defendant's ownership of property despite his repeated denials of ownership constituted interrogation).
The Supreme Court has recognized the government's interests in safeguarding an arrestee's property and in preventing false claims by an arrestee about property. Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 646, 103 S. Ct. 2605, 2609 (1983).
Analysis
Farris contends that Officer Davis's question about her jacket constituted interrogation under Miranda because Officer Davis,
who had admitted experience in narcotics cases, should have known—especially in response to a tip that a subject would "likely" be in possession of drugs and/or paraphernalia, and given that a glass pipe was already discovered on [Farris's] person—that individuals possessing such contraband are known to hide it in their clothes. Therefore, it is incredulous for the officer to not have in mind that pressing the subject to claim the jacket would reasonably likely lead to an incriminating response.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's suppression ruling and to its express finding that there was "no reason for the officers . . . to speculate or suspect that the jacket would have drugs in it," we cannot agree with Farris's assertions. Officer Davis testified that after she received a tip about Farris's warrant and her possible possession of drugs or paraphernalia, she found Farris standing between the truck's open driver's side door and the driver's seat, arrested her for the warrant, found a meth pipe in her bra, learned that the truck was not hers, and began leading her away from the truck. At that time, Officer Davis could have reasonably believed that both parts of the tip she had received—that Farris had a warrant and was possibly possessing drugs or paraphernalia—had been confirmed and resolved. Officer Davis testified that she asked Farris about the jacket as a "courtesy" because the truck was not Farris's, because Farris would soon be taken to jail, and because she did not know when Farris would see the owner of the truck again to retrieve the jacket. Officer Davis explained, "We always make an effort to bring people's personal property with them."
We hold that the trial court could have reasonably relied on Officer Davis's testimony to find that she should not have known that her question about the jacket was likely to elicit an incriminating response or lead to incriminating evidence. See Cruz, 461 S.W.3d 531, 536 & n.15. We also hold that the trial court could have rationally found that Officer Davis's question was reasonable and permissible because it was administrative and attendant to Farris's arrest and custody. Id. at 537; see Conley, 156 F.3d at 84.
Farris relies on our sister court's opinion in Ramirez v. State, 105 S.W.3d 730, 735 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, no pet.), to argue that Officer Davis's question constituted interrogation under Miranda. There, after an officer saw marijuana residue and drug paraphernalia inside the defendant's garage and detained the defendant, the officer asked the defendant, "Is there anything else I'm going to find in there that's illegal, any more marijuana?" Id. at 736. The defendant responded by directing the officer to marijuana inside a cooler. Id. The Austin court held that the officer's question constituted interrogation under Miranda. Id. at 741.
Any comparison between Ramirez and this case is inapposite. The question there expressly asked about the discovery of incriminating evidence; the question here did not. Nothing within Ramirez supports a conclusion that Officer Davis's question to Farris constituted interrogation under Miranda.
For all of these reasons, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling and its explicit findings, we hold that the trial court did not err by denying Farris's motions to suppress that each hinged on her argument that Officer Davis interrogated her without giving Miranda warnings. We overrule her two points.
Conclusion
Having overruled both of Farris's points, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
/s/ Wade Birdwell
WADE BIRDWELL
JUSTICE PANEL: GABRIEL, KERR, and BIRDWELL, JJ. DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b) DELIVERED: April 19, 2018