And “[t]he continuing tort doctrine is inapplicable” to exhaustion under Section 12-309. Farris v. District of Columbia, 257 A.3d 509, 516 n.20 (D.C. 2021). The only possible allegations as to which Winston's notice may have been timely are those related to the prison's provision of inedible food, which he says occurred “throughout his time at CDF,” assuming that some unsatisfactory meals continued until his release in December 2022.

St. Bernard Parish Government v. United States, 887 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding that the government's failure to maintain or modify a channel, and its decision to not armor or repair erosion to the banks, was not a taking); see Bench Creek Ranch, LLC v. United States, 855 Fed.Appx. 726 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (holding that the government's failure to prevent wild horses from drinking water on plaintiffs' land did not constitute a taking); Farris v. District of Columbia, 257 A.3d 509, 518 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (holding that the government's failure to maintain an alleyway, which drained onto a plaintiff's property and damaged his home, did not constitute a taking).

On the other hand, where the negligence of the actor consists in a failure to act for the protection or assistance of another, there is normally no liability." Restatement (Second) of Torts ch. 12 scope note to topic 4 (1965); W. Page Keaton, et al. , Prosser and Keaton on Torts § 56 (5th ed. 1984) ("In the determination of the existence of a duty, there runs through much of the law a distinction between action and inaction."); cf. Farris v. District of Columbia , 257 A.3d 509, 522 (D.C. 2021) (McLeese, J., concurring in part) ("[T]he line between acts and omissions can be very difficult to draw."). Consistent with those principles, we have never applied a heightened foreseeability standard when the defendant affirmatively removed a protection against foreseeable crime that a plaintiff had put in place.