Farrin v. Harlow

1 Citing case

  1. Brown v. Brown

    524 A.2d 1184 (D.C. 1987)   Cited 16 times
    Concluding that "a claimant against a sibling's estate for the reasonable value of services performed for that sibling during his or her lifetime should have the burden to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, the existence of either an express or implied agreement that he or she expected to be paid and that the decedent intended to make payment" and noting that requiring " ‘clear and convincing’ evidence of a contract ... would create too difficult a barrier for recovery where it is merited, indeed a barrier higher than is common in civil litigation"

    Bloomgarden v. Coyer, 156 U.S. App.D.C. 109, 116, 479 F.2d 201, 208 (1973) (footnote omitted) (adopted in H.G. Smithy Co. v. Washington Medical Center, 374 A.2d 891, 893 (D.C. 1977); see also TVL Associates v. A M Construction Corp., 474 A.2d 156, 159 (D.C. 1984). When, however, there is an applicable presumption that the services were rendered gratuitously — as occurs, for example, in the context of a parent-child relationship, see Tuohy v. Trail, 19 App. D.C. 79 (1901) — a promise to pay obviously cannot be implied by the mere rendition and acceptance of valuable services. The presumption itself, as a matter of law, negates any implication that "it would be unjust for the recipient to retain the benefit conferred" without paying for it. H.G. Smithy Co., 374 A.2d at 895; see also Farrin v. Harlow, 62 App.D.C. 314, 67 F.2d 580 (1933) (where plaintiffs rendered nursing services for eleven years to decedent, to whom they were not related but with whom they lived as a family, court, without explicitly invoking presumption, concluded services were gratuitous, not contractual). It follows, then, that when a presumption of gratuity is applicable — as the trial court held in this case — a claimant may only recover, if at all, by rebutting that presumption with evidence of an express contract or a contract implied in fact. B.