Opinion
No. 108711.
March 6, 1999.
April 9, 1999.
Leave to Appeal Denied April 9, 1999:
The cause having been briefed and orally argued, the order of September 29, 1998, ante, 872, granting leave to appeal is vacated, and leave to appeal is denied because the Supreme Court is no longer persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed. Reported below: 220 Mich. App. 92.
I would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. I believe that it erroneously concluded that MCL 257.252d; MSA 9.1952(4) requires that the owner of a vehicle, stored long-term to preserve criminal evidence, must pay for the storage.
This case involved statutory interpretation, which is a question of law subject to de novo review. Oakland Co. Bd. of Co. Rd. Comm'rs. v. Michigan Property Casualty Guaranty Ass'n, 456 Mich. 590, 610 (1998). The primary goal of judicial interpretation is to determine and carry out the Legislature's intent in writing a statute. Frankenmuth Mut Ins Co v. Marlette Homes, Inc, 456 Mich. 511, 515 (1998). Courts presume the Legislature intended a plainly expressed meaning, and refrain from speculating regarding its probable intent beyond the words plainly expressed in the statute. In re Schnell, 214 Mich. App. 304, 310 (1995). Courts are precluded from reading anything into a statute outside the manifest intent of the Legislature as derived from the statute itself. In re S R, 229 Mich. App. 310, 314 (1998). In addition, a statutory provision is read within the context of the entire statute to produce an harmonious whole. Weems v. Chrysler Corp, 448 Mich. 679, 699-700 (1995). Finally, if literal construction of a statute produces unreasonable or unjust results, a court may depart from a literal construction. Rowell v. Security Steel Processing Co, 445 Mich. 347, 354 (1994).
Nation v. W D E Electric Co, 454 Mich. 489, 494 (1997).
MCL 257.252d; MSA 9.1952(4) provides:
(1) A police agency or a governmental agency designated by the police agency may provide for the immediate removal of a vehicle from public or private property to a place of safekeeping at the expense of the registered owner of the vehicle in any of the following circumstances:
* * *
(e) If the vehicle must be seized to preserve evidence of a crime, or when there is reasonable cause to believe that the vehicle was used in the commission of a crime.
In this case, the Court of Appeals appropriately concluded that "the statute clearly addresses situations where a vehicle is impounded in connection with a criminal prosecution." 220 Mich. App. 92, 95 (1996). It then emphasized the absence of any language limiting the "time frame" of such "safekeeping" and observed that criminal proceedings frequently are not completed until months after the underlying incident. However, the Court of Appeals erred when it assumed that the Legislature contemplated that, when vehicles are stored for extended periods pursuant to § 252d(1)(e), their owners are responsible for the storage costs. Id.
Although the plain language of § 252d(1)(e) provides that the registered owner is responsible for the expense of "the immediate removal of a vehicle from public or private property to a place of safekeeping," it makes no provision for impoundment expenses associated with lengthy criminal proceedings. MCL 257.252d(1); MSA 9.1952(4)(1). Contrary to the Court of Appeals opinion, such a provision should not be read into the statute on the basis of mere speculation regarding the probable intent of the Legislature.
Instead, the provision should be read within the context of the entire statute to produce a harmonious whole. Section 252d(2)(c) states that the police agency that authorized the removal of a vehicle "shall" do the following:
If the vehicle has not been redeemed within 10 days after moving the vehicle, send to the registered owner . . . a notice that the vehicle has been removed; however, if the police agency informs the owner or operator of the vehicle of the removal and the location of the vehicle within 24 hours after the removal, and if the vehicle has not been redeemed within 30 days and upon complaint from the towing service, the police agency shall send the notice within 30 days after the removal. . . . The notice form shall contain the following information:
* * *
(vi) The procedure to redeem the vehicle. . . . [MCL 257.252d(2)(c); MSA 9.1952(4)(2)(c).]
Section 252d(2) provides that a registered owner: (1) may redeem his vehicle within ten days; or (2) if he does not redeem it within ten days, must be notified of the procedure for redeeming it, unless he was notified within twenty-four hours of its removal; or (3) if he received notice of its removal within twenty-four hours and failed to redeem it within thirty days, must be notified of the procedure for redeeming it within thirty days. Id. The appeals court concluded that the thirty-day notice provision was not "triggered" in this case, because a "hold" had been placed on the vehicle to preserve it as evidence. However, § 252d(2) makes no provision for impoundment expenses associated with lengthy criminal proceedings or any "triggering" mechanism. Its plain language states that an owner is entitled to notice of the procedure for redeeming a vehicle, at the very most, within thirty days of its removal.
Finally, although the statute also provides "and upon complaint from the towing service," literal construction of this provision would create an unjust result MCL 257.252d(2)(c); MSA 9.1952(4)(2)(c). It would be unreasonable to conclude that the Legislature intended that notice of the procedure for redeeming a vehicle should depend on the towing service that is accruing storage expenses. Moreover, a police agency could not "send the notice within 30 days after the removal" if it was forced to wait for a complaint from the towing service.
CAVANAGH, J.
I join in the statement of Justice KELLY.
Reconsideration denied June 4, 1999.
ACIA continues to argue that MCL 257.252d; MSA 9.1952(4) required plainiff to provide a notice in conformity therewith within 30 days of the remival of the vehicle. However, the vehicle at issus was unavailable for redemption at the time the 30-day notice would have been due. This fact made it impossible to send a notice that conformed with subsections (vi) (specifying the procedure to redeem the vehicle) and (ix) (warning of the possibility of sale upon failure to redeem the vehicle or request a hearing within 20 days) at that time. Therefore, by its terms, § 252d's 30-day notice requirement was not triggered because there was not complaint from the towing company at that time.
CAVANAGH and KELLY, JJ.
We would grant reconsideration and would decide this case by opinion.