Farmer v. State

Full title: CHARLES JAMES FARMER, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas, Fourteenth District, Houston

Date published: Jul 31, 2007

No. 14-06-00159-CR (Tex. App. Jul. 31, 2007)

Opinion

No. 14-06-00159-CR

Opinion filed July 31, 2007. DO NOT PUBLISH. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

On Appeal from the 262nd District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 1028994.

Panel consists of Justices FROST, SEYMORE, and GUZMAN.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

CHARLES W. SEYMORE, Justice.

A jury found appellant, Charles James Farmer, guilty of aggravated sexual assault and assessed punishment at confinement for life. In his sole issue, appellant contends the trial court erred by allowing witnesses to testify regarding the complainant's out-of-court statements under the excited-utterance exception to the hearsay rule. Our disposition is based on clearly settled law. Accordingly, we issue this memorandum opinion and affirm. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.

I. BACKGROUND

Appellant was accused of aggravated sexual assault of T.W. who was twenty years-old at the time of the offense. T.W. lived in an apartment with her mother. Appellant lived with his girlfriend in the apartment below. At trial, T.W. testified as follows. During late May 2005, appellant asked T.W. to accompany him to Wal-Mart and advise regarding a gift for his girlfriend. During the trip, appellant asked T.W. if she had a boyfriend and if she was a virgin. Appellant expressed surprise when T.W. informed him that she was a virgin. On May 31, 2005, appellant came to T.W.'s apartment door and asked to borrow some aluminum foil. While she was retrieving the foil, appellant entered the apartment without her permission. He asked T.W. when her mother would return home. Appellant then left T.W.'s apartment without the foil but returned approximately fifteen minutes later. He again asked for foil and entered the apartment without T.W.'s permission. He told T.W. that he had ended his relationship with his girlfriend. T.W. continued packing for an impending move, hoping "it would give him the message that [she] was busy." She wrapped an ornamental dagger in cloth and placed it in a box. When T.W. went into the bedroom, appellant approached her from behind with the dagger in one hand and grabbed her around the neck with his other hand. Appellant pushed T.W. onto the desk and then the bed. Appellant inserted his penis in her mouth, anus, and vagina. Appellant stopped when T.W. told him her mother would be home soon. After appellant left the apartment, T.W. called her brother-in-law, Gerald Bierbaum, and told him she had been raped. Bierbaum called the police while he was driving toward T.W.'s apartment. Upon his arrival, Bierbaum took T.W. from her apartment to a nearby convenience store where he flagged down Officer Reginald Porter, who was responding to the call. Porter spoke with T.W. concerning the details of the incident while she was inside an ambulance. Officer Rhonda Pemberton was also dispatched and arrived shortly after Porter. Pemberton joined Porter and T.W. in the ambulance. T.W. gave Porter and Pemberton a description of the assailant and told them where he lived. Pemberton found appellant at his apartment and brought him to the convenience store where he was positively identified by T.W. At trial, Prior to T.W.'s testimony, the State called Porter, Pemberton, and Bierbaum who testified regarding their conversations with T.W. The jury found appellant guilty of aggravated sexual assault.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In his sole issue, appellant contends the trial court erred by allowing Porter, Pemberton, and Bierbaum to testify regarding of T.W.'s statements under the excited-utterance exception to the hearsay rule. A trial court has broad discretion in determining whether evidence is admissible as an exception to the hearsay-exclusionary rule. See Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 595 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003). The decision to admit or exclude hearsay will not be reversed unless the trial court committed an abuse of discretion. See id. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision to admit evidence lies outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. See Salazar v. State, 38 S.W.3d 141, 153B54 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001).

III. ANALYSIS

Statements made by an out-of-court declarant are generally not admissible unless they fall within a recognized exception to the hearsay rule. See TEX. R. EVID. 801, 802; Apolinar v. State, 155 S.W.3d 184, 186 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005). An excited utterance is "[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition." See TEX. R. EVID. 803(2); Apolinar, 155 S.W.3d at 186. An excited utterance is an exception to the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness. See TEX. R. EVID. 803(2); Apolinar, 155 S.W.3d at 186. The exception is based on the assumption that the declarant is not, at the time of the statement, capable of the kind of reflection that would enable her to fabricate information. See Apolinar, 155 S.W.3d at 186; Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 595. The critical question is whether the declarant was still dominated by the emotion, excitement, fear, or pain of the event when she made the statements. See Apolinar, 155 S.W.3d at 186B87; Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 596. Factors a trial court may also consider include the time elapsed and whether the statements were responses to questions. See Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 596. However, timing of the statements and whether the declarant is responding to questions should be considered with other evidence. See id. Specifically, in this case, appellant argues the statements were not excited utterances (1) because of the amount of time that elapsed between the incident and T.W.'s encounter with the officers; (2) T.W. was not dominated by the emotion, excitement, fear, or pain of the event when she made the statements; and (3) her statements were responsive to questions.

A. Statements to Officer Reginald Porter

Officer Porter was the first witness called by the State. He testified that he was patrolling on May 30, 2005 when he received a dispatch to investigate a sexual assault. On the way to T.W.'s apartment, Gerald Bierbaum, T.W.'s brother-in-law, motioned for Porter's attention at a convenience store near the apartment. Porter drove into the convenience store parking lot. T.W. was with Bierbaum. Porter spoke with T.W. while she was inside an ambulance. Appellant complains that the court allowed Porter's testimony regarding that conversation. We first note that appellant did not object to all the questions concerning T.W.'s statements to Officer Porter. The record reflects the following:

Q. [State]: What did she tell you [about what happened]?

[Appellant's counsel]: Objection. That's hearsay, your Honor?

The Court: Overruled.

Q. [State]: What did she tell you?

A. [Porter]: She told me she was raped by the man [that] lived in the apartment beneath her.

Q. [State]: Did she say anything else about the rapes in particular?

A. [Porter]: Yes, ma'am. She told me that he used an ornamental dagger. In fact, she was pretty descriptive about the dagger that he used. He held it to her throat after forcing his way inside the apartment door.

Q. [State]: How did she say he got in?

A. She said that he came to the door, knocked on it, and asked to borrow some aluminum foil and she closed the door but not completely to go retrieve the foil. And while she was in the kitchen, he came into the apartment and picked up the dagger and made his approach to her.

Q. [State]: Okay. Did she tell you exactly what he did to her once he had the dagger at her throat?

A. [Porter]: Yes.

Q. [State]: What did [s]he tell you?

[Appellant's counsel]: Object to this entire series of questions, your Honor. May I have a running objection to hearsay?

The Court: You may have a running objection.

[Appellant's counsel]: Thank you.

After appellant received a running objection, Porter testified that T.W. told him appellant placed the dagger to her throat and forced her to perform oral and vaginal sex. T.W. also said she was very frightened because appellant told her he was a member of the Aryan Nation and someone could harm her even if he were in jail. In addition, T.W. described appellant's clothing and underwear. Appellant did not object to the following questions: (1) "Did she say anything else about the rapes in particular?" (2) "How did she say he got in?" and (3) "Did she tell you exactly what he did to her once he had the dagger at her throat?" Consequently, appellant waived any error regarding Porter's responses to these questions and only preserved error regarding his answer to the question "What did she tell you?" and Porter's testimony after appellant received a running hearsay objection. Appellant contends that T.W.'s statements to Porter were not excited utterances because T.W. had "clearly composed herself" and "a significant period of time [had] passed."¹ To the contrary, Porter gave the following testimony regarding their initial conversation: "[T.W.] was very excited, very nervous, almost to the point where her nervousness made me nervous. She was just really excited." This testimony supports a finding that T.W. was still dominated by the physical pain and emotional shock. See Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 596; Ross v. State, 154 S.W.3d 804, 811 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. ref'd) (finding testimony that the declarant was "excited, nervous, and scared" and "`didn't know what to do'" was sufficient to support a finding that he was still dominated by the emotions of the startling event). Furthermore, if the statement is made while the declarant is still in the grip of emotion, excitement, fear, or pain and it pertains to the exciting event, it is admissible even after an appreciable amount of time has elapsed. See Penry v. State, 691 S.W.2d 636, 647 (Tex.Crim.App. 1985); Ross, 154 S.W.3d at 810. Further, at this point in the trial, the court had heard testimony that Porter was dispatched in response to a sexual assault call, met T.W. and her brother-in-law at a convenience store while responding to the call, spoke immediately with T.W., and thought that the sexual assault was "fairly recent." The testimony concerning the amount of time that elapsed was not precise. However, based on the testimony at that point, the trial court could have reasonably concluded the sexual assault occurred within the past few hours.² Considering the amount of time that elapsed between the attack and T.W.'s statements, we conclude that this factor supports admission of T.W.'s statements as excited utterances. Ross, 154 S.W.3d at 811 (holding statements given "a few hours" after startling event were excited utterances); Short v. State, 658 S.W.2d 250, 255 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983), aff'd, 671 S.W.2d 888 (Tex.Crim.App. 1984) (holding four-and-one-half hours was not too long a period between exciting event and a statement made by a child in extreme pain and regarding the cause of his injury). Regardless, the amount of time that elapsed is only a factor to be considered and is not dispositive. Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 596 (holding statements qualified as excited utterances where declarant was scared and tired, and her statements were in response to questions twenty hours after the event). Appellant also contends T.W.'s statements were not excited utterances because they were responsive to Porter's questions. He cites two cases in support of his contention that T.W.'s responses lack spontaneity to qualify as excited utterances. See Hughes v. State, 128 S.W.3d 247, 253 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2003, pet. ref'd); Glover v. State, 102 S.W.3d 754, 765 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2002, pet. ref'd). However, these cases are distinguishable. In Hughes, the statements were made during interviews at a police station that lasted four to six hours. 12 S.W.3d at 253. In Glover, the statements were the complainant's responses to questions by her mother after the mother was informed that someone had engaged in improper sexual contact with the complainant. 102 S.W.3d at 764. The court found that the statements lacked sufficient spontaneity because the questions were specifically intended to elicit details of past events. Id. at 765. In contrast, the evidence reflects that Porter was the first officer to speak with T.W. after the incident. He first spoke with her after she had been placed in an ambulance. The interview was not lengthy or conducted at a police station, as in Hughes. Moreover, when Porter arrived, he knew only that he was responding to a sexual assault call. He had no knowledge of details. Therefore, he was not equipped to ask calculated questions. For these reasons, the trial court's decision that T.W.'s statements qualified as excited utterances was within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Accordingly, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Porter's testimony.

B. Statements to Officer Rhonda Pemberton

Officer Pemberton was the second witness called by the State. She and her partner joined Officer Porter at the convenience store. She was present during part of Porter's conversation with T.W. Pemberton's testimony regarding T.W.'s description of the man who assaulted her was admitted as an excited utterance. Specifically, Pemberton testified that T.W. described the suspect as a white male who had tattoos and short hair. She also testified that T.W. said she believed he lived in apartment 195, which was below her apartment. Appellant contends Pemberton did not give "any useful information" regarding the time between the offense and T.W.'s statements. However, Pemberton testified that she believed the sexual assault "had just occurred." At this point in the trial, the judge had already heard Porter's testimony concerning the time between the sexual assault and the statements as previously discussed and testimony about T.W.'s demeanor. Furthermore, Pemberton testified that when she arrived, T.W. appeared to be "upset because of the sexual assault." Finally, as we have already explained, time is a factor to be considered by the court; however, it is not dispositive. Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 596. Accordingly, the trial court acted within its discretion by concluding that T.W. was still under the physical and emotional stress of the excitement caused by the event or condition when she made the statements described by Pemberton.

C. Statements to Gerald Bierbaum

Gerald Bierbaum was the third witness called by the State. He testified that T.W. called him immediately after the sexual assault. She told him that she had been raped and said, "Come get me. Come get me right now. He's still here. He's still here. He's right here." Appellant contends T.W.'s statements were not excited utterances because Bierbaum testified T.W.'s demeanor was "absolutely flat, no emotion." However, appellant does not refer to the entirety of Bierbaum's testimony. Bierbaum testified that he had known T.W. since she was five years-old and that he "had never heard her like that" when she called him. Her voice was "absolutely flat, just absolutely no emotion." He explained that she was "beyond upset." She was "just absolutely flat and in shock" about what had just happened. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Bierbaum's testimony regarding T.W.'s statements because she was still dominated by the emotions, excitement, fear, or pain of the event.³

D. Confrontation Clause

In a sub-issue, appellant also contends his Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine witnesses was violated when the trial court allowed Porter, Pemberton, and Bierbaum to testify regarding T.W.'s statements. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. However, at trial, appellant failed to object on the ground that admission of the statements constituted a denial of his right to confront and cross-examine witnesses.⁴ Appellant's objection was based solely on hearsay grounds. By failing to object on confrontation clause grounds, appellant failed to preserve this argument for review. See TEX. R. APP. PROC. 33.1(a); Bunton v. State, 136 S.W.3d 355, 369 (Tex.App.-Austin 2004, pet. ref'd)). Appellant's sole issue is overruled, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.