Opinion
2017–11910 Docket No. O–8530–17
12-05-2018
In the Matter of Ted FARKAS, Respondent, v. Margaret FARKAS, Appellant.
Heather A. Fig, Bayport, NY, for appellant.
Heather A. Fig, Bayport, NY, for appellant.
ALAN D. SCHEINKMAN, P.J., MARK C. DILLON, HECTOR D. LASALLE, VALERIE BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER
In a family offense proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 8, Margaret Farkas appeals from an order of protection of the Family Court, Suffolk County (Rosann O. Orlando, Ct. Atty. Ref.), dated October 13, 2017. The order, upon a finding that Margaret Farkas committed the family offense of disorderly conduct, made after a fact-finding hearing, directed her, inter alia, to stay away from the petitioner until and including October 13, 2018.
ORDERED that the order of protection is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
The petitioner commenced this family offense proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 8 against the appellant, his wife. After a fact-finding hearing, the Family Court found that the appellant committed the family offense of disorderly conduct on two separate occasions and issued an order of protection, inter alia, directing the appellant to stay away from the petitioner until and including October 13, 2018.
Although the order of protection expired by its own terms on October 13, 2018, the appeal has not been rendered academic in light of the enduring consequences that may flow from a finding that the appellant committed a family offense (see Matter of Veronica P. v. Radcliff A., 24 N.Y.3d 668, 673, 3 N.Y.S.3d 288, 26 N.E.3d 1143 ).
We agree with the Family Court's determination that the petitioner and the appellant were members of the same family or household within the meaning of Family Court Act § 812(1) (see Family Ct. Act § 812[1][b], [e] ; Matter of Gentile v. Torres, 139 A.D.3d 854, 855, 31 N.Y.S.3d 200 ; Matter of Winston v. Edwards–Clarke, 127 A.D.3d 771, 773, 6 N.Y.S.3d 566 ; Matter of Jose M. v. Angel V., 99 A.D.3d 243, 247, 951 N.Y.S.2d 195 ). Accordingly, the court properly determined that it had subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the petition.
Contrary to the appellant's contention, the petitioner's evidence demonstrated that the order of protection issued by the Family Court was the appropriate disposition, since it was reasonably necessary to provide meaningful protection to the petitioner and to eradicate the root of the domestic disturbance (see Family Ct. Act § 842 ; Matter of Shank v. Shank, 155 A.D.3d 875, 876, 63 N.Y.S.3d 719 ; Matter of Mayers v. Thompson, 145 A.D.3d 1010, 1011, 42 N.Y.S.3d 864 ; Matter of Frimer v. Frimer, 143 A.D.3d 895, 897, 39 N.Y.S.3d 226 ; Matter of Monos v. Monos, 123 A.D.3d 931, 932, 999 N.Y.S.2d 131 ).
SCHEINKMAN, P.J., DILLON, LASALLE and BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ., concur.