Opinion
23-CV-830 (LTS)
03-13-2023
RAIQUAN K. FALLS, Petitioner, v. PAUL ARTETA, Respondent.
ORDER TO AMEND
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge:
Petitioner, who is currently incarcerated at Orange County Jail, brings this pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus, brought under New York Civil Practice Law & Rules § 7002, challenging his current detention. By order dated March 2, 2023, the Court granted Petitioner's request to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). The Court directs Petitioner to file an amended petition within 60 days of the date of this order as detailed below.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus from a person in custody challenging the legality of his detention on the ground that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). The Court has the authority to review the petition and “award the writ or issue an order directing the respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted, unless it appears from the application that the applicant or person detained is not entitled [to such relief].” 28 U.S.C. § 2243. The Court is obliged, however, to construe pro se pleadings liberally and interpret them “to raise the strongest arguments they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see Green v. United States, 260 F.3d 78, 83 (2d Cir. 2001). Nevertheless, a pro se litigant is not exempt “from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” Triestman, 470 F.3d at 477 (quoting Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983)).
BACKGROUND
Petitioner brings this habeas corpus petition, which is captioned for the New York State Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, asserting that he is being held “illegally, without consent or probable cause,” and seeking to be released from custody. (ECF 1 ¶ 1.) The following facts are drawn from the petition.
Throughout 2021 and 2022, Petitioner was arrested a number of times, and he was arraigned in the City of Newburgh Court in connection with those arrests.(ECF 1 ¶ 6.) Petitioner was “released on his own recognizance on many different instances after his initial release from jail,” but he was repeatedly rearrested and detained. (Id.) For a number of reasons, Petitioner's criminal proceedings were adjourned and stayed multiple times, and Petitioner objected to the delays in his proceedings on speedy trial grounds. In particular, Petitioner objected to requests by his attorneys that his fitness to proceed be examined under N.Y. Criminal Procedure Law § 730. (Id.)
Petitioner previously challenged his custody during 2021 and 2022, in a filing that the Court construed as a petition under Section 2241. See Falls v. Annucci, ECF 1:22-CV-8055, 6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2022) (“Falls I”) (detailing Petitioner's allegations of unlawful custody, alerting Petitioner that the court would construe his submission as a petition under Section 2241 if he did not withdraw it, and granting him leave to file an amended petition to allege exhaustion of state court remedies). Petitioner did not submit an amended petition, and the Court dismissed Falls I without prejudice. ECF 1:22-CV-8055, 7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2023). Petitioner alleges in this petition that he was released while Falls I was pending, suggesting that that is why he did not file an amended petition. (ECF 1 ¶ 2); see also Falls v. Annucci, ECF 1:22-CV-8743, 5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2023) (dismissing petition without prejudice as duplicative of Falls I.)
On October 22, 2022, Petitioner was again released on his own recognizance, and a trial date was set, apparently for November 14, 2022. Petitioner “was advised that his failure to appear for any later scheduled court date would result in a bench warrant for arrest,” but he was not specifically advised that he would “face [a] criminal penalty of bail jumping charges as a result of such failure to appear.” (Id. ¶ 8.) Petitioner failed to appear on November 14, 2022, but he called the court and told an employee in the clerk's office about “his possible anticipated absence.” (Id.) The clerk's office employee informed Petitioner that a “later ‘required date' scheduled in adjournment was set for [his] appearance on December 12, 2022.” (Id.) When Petitioner failed to appear on December 12, 2022, Judge Jude T. Martini issued a bench warrant for his arrest. (Id.)
On December 19, 2022, Petitioner appeared in the Newburgh City Court for a “separate scheduled court date,” apparently in connection with other cases. Petitioner told his Legal Aid attorneys that he was “availab[le] to comply with any mandated court orders,” and he also told them that he was having “adjustment stability issues with respect to steady income, housing, phone service, and transportation.” (Id.) Petitioner was permitted to leave court that day without being apprehended or detained. On December 28, 2022, however, Petitioner was arrested on a bench warrant for bail jumping in the third degree, in connection with his failure to appear in court on December 12, 2022, and he was remanded into custody. At his arraignment on January 6, 2023, Petitioner objected to the arrest, and he entered a not guilty plea. (Id.)
In this petition, Petitioner alleges that he cannot be prosecuted for bail jumping because he was “involuntarily arrested before the expiration of the 30-day grace period following the alleged failure to appear on the ‘required date' set by the court.” (Id.) Citing to New York Penal Law § 215.55, Petitioner asserts that the “issuance of a warrant letter constitutes a consent to adjournment of the ‘required date' of appearance within the meaning of” the statute, and “provides a criminal defendant a 30-day grace period in which to voluntarily appear and precludes [Petitioner's] involuntary return or arrest, prior to the running of such 30 days.” (Id.) Petitioner further alleges that he was not provided with a copy of the “accusatory instrument.” (Id.) According to the petition, “no appeal has been taken” in connection with his current detention on the bail jumping charge. (Id. ¶ 7.)
DISCUSSION
A. Pretrial habeas corpus relief
To the extent that Plaintiff seeks release from state pretrial detention, the appropriate vehicle for such relief is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See, e.g., Clemente v. Conn., No. 3:21-CV-0408, 2022 WL 527757, at *1 (D. Conn. Jan. 27, 2022); Fullwellen v. City of New York, No. 21-CV-7219, 2021 WL 4940984, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2021); Robinson v. Sposato, No. 11-CV-0191, 2012 WL 1965631, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. May 29, 2012); see also Hoffler v. Bezio, 831 F.Supp.2d 570, 575 (N.D.N.Y. 2011), aff'd on other grounds, 726 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2013); Marte v. Berkman, No. 11-CV-6082, 2011 WL 4946708, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2011), aff'd on other grounds sub nom., Marte v. Vance, 480 Fed.Appx. 83 (2d Cir. 2012) (summary order).
Although Petitioner filed this matter as a state petition under Section 7002, and captioned it for the state court, the Court concludes that the application should be construed as a petition brought under Section 2241. If Petitioner does not want to pursue relief under Section 2241, he may notify the Court in writing within 30 days that he wishes to withdraw the application. See Simon v. United States, 359 F.3d 139, 140 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that district courts must provide notice and opportunity to withdraw before recharacterizing a motion as brought under Section 2241). If Petitioner does not inform the Court of his intent within 30 days, the application will be designated as a petition under Section 2241.
As previously noted, the petition filed in Falls I was also brought under Section 7002, and the order to amend issued in Falls I alerted Petitioner that his submission would be construed as a petition under Section 2241 if he did not withdraw it. ECF 1:22-CV-8055, 6.
Petitioner may choose not to proceed with this Section 2241 petition because a second Section 2241 petition of this sort might trigger the successive petition restrictions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. See Simon, 359 F.3d at 143-44.
B. Exhaustion of State Court Remedies
Before seeking Section 2241 habeas corpus relief in the federal courts, a petitioner first must exhaust his available state court remedies. See United States ex rel. Scranton v. New York, 532 F.2d 292, 294 (2d Cir. 1976) (“While [Section 2241] does not by its own terms require the exhaustion of state remedies as a prerequisite to the grant of federal habeas relief, decisional law has superimposed such a requirement in order to accommodate principles of federalism.”). Here, Petitioner states that he has not filed any appeals in this matter, suggesting that he has not exhausted his state court remedies. (ECF 1 ¶ 7.) Petitioner may be in the process of exhausting his claims in the state courts, as the petition in this matter is captioned for the state courts. If Petitioner files an amended Section 2241 petition and alleges facts showing that he is currently challenging his current detention in the state courts, the Court will deny the petition without prejudice as prematurely filed.
C. Leave to Amend Petition
Petitioner proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. As district courts generally grant a self-represented party an opportunity to amend, unless amendment would be futile, see Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988), the Court finds that it would not be futile to grant Petitioner leave to submit an amended petition. Should Petitioner decide to file an amended petition, he must state his grounds for relief and detail the steps he has taken to exhaust his grounds in his ongoing criminal proceedings. If he is unable to exhaust his grounds in the state courts, he must state facts explaining the reasons why he is unable to do so. Petitioner is advised that an amended petition will completely replace the original petition.
CONCLUSION
The Court recharacterizes the petition as brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Petitioner shall have 30 days to inform the Court whether he intends to withdraw this petition.
The Court grants Petitioner 60 days to file an amended petition containing the information specified above. The amended petition must be submitted to the Pro Se Intake Unit, be captioned as an “Amended Petition,” and bear the same docket number as this order. Once submitted, the amended petition will be reviewed, and if proper, the case will be reassigned to a district judge in accordance with the procedures of the Clerk's Office. If Petitioner fails to comply with this order within the time allowed, and cannot show good cause to excuse such failure, the petition will be denied without prejudice. An order to answer will not issue at this time. An Amended Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 form is attached to this order.
Because the petition makes no substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right, a certificate of appealability will not issue. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253.
The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
SO ORDERED.