Opinion
3D23-1323
03-13-2024
Deron Oniel Facey, Appellant, v. The State of Florida, Appellee.
Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Shannon Hemmendinger, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Jennifer A. Davis, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
An appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Lower Tribunal No. F22-16165 Carmen Cabarga, Judge.
Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Shannon Hemmendinger, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Jennifer A. Davis, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Before LINDSEY, MILLER, and LOBREE, JJ.
MILLER, J.
Appellant, Deron Oniel Facey, challenges judgments rendered after a jury found him guilty of assault upon a person 65 years of age or older and resisting an officer without violence. The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in excluding evidence of the nature of the victim's prior felony convictions. For the reasons that follow, we discern no abuse of discretion and affirm.
BACKGROUND
The victim was housesitting for an acquaintance when Facey appeared at the residence armed with a machete. An altercation ensued, and law enforcement responded. Facey resisted arrest, and he was charged by amended information with attempted robbery, aggravated assault upon a person 65 years of age or older, and resisting an officer without violence. He filed a speedy demand, and the case proceeded to trial.
The victim took the stand and, during cross-examination, admitted he had previously been convicted of nine felonies. He further volunteered that "none . . . were violent for real." Contending that the latter statement "opened the door," the defense attorney requested permission to delve into the nature and circumstances of the convictions. Upon ascertaining that none were violent, the trial court prohibited further questioning on the subject. Facey was convicted of the two misdemeanors, and this appeal ensued.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review trial court decisions on the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion, as limited by the Florida Evidence Code. See White v. State, 993 So.2d 611, 613 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008).
ANALYSIS
Under Florida law, the credibility of a witness may be impeached under certain closely circumscribed conditions "by evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime." § 90.610(1), Fla. Stat. (2023). The authorized method is well-established. An attorney "is permitted to attack the [witness's] credibility by asking whether the [witness] has ever been convicted of a felony or a crime involving dishonesty or false statement, and how many times." Gavins v. State, 587 So.2d 487, 489 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).
It is axiomatic that, "[i]f the witness admits to or testifies accurately to the number of convictions, the witness may not be questioned further regarding prior convictions, nor questions as to the nature of the crimes." Spradling v. State, 211 So.3d 1144, 1145 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) (citing Gavins, 587 So.2d at 489); see also Atis v. State, 32 So.3d 81, 84 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) ("[W]hen a witness has been convicted of a felony, the other party may not inquire further into whether the felony involved dishonesty or false statement because doing so 'would have the impermissible and unintended effect of elevating certain felonies over others.'") (quoting Bobb v. State, 647 So.2d 881, 884 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)). An exception to this general rule is implicated when a witness "open[s] the door" to a broader inquiry. Rogers v. State, 964 So.2d 221, 223 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). The door is deemed to have been opened when the witness "attempts to mislead or delude the jury about his [or her] prior convictions." Fotopoulos v. State, 608 So.2d 784, 791 (Fla. 1992). In these narrow circumstances, further inquiry is authorized to dispel any misleading impression. See id.
Turning to the case at hand, the victim readily admitted to his prior convictions, and his gratuitous characterization is borne out by the undeveloped record before us. Accordingly, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion in curtailing the cross-examination. See Ross v. State, 913 So.2d 1184, 1186 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (noting counsel "is not allowed to delve into the nature of a [witness's] prior convictions or the circumstances surrounding them"); Rogers, 964 So.2d at 223 (upholding trial court's decision to confine cross-examination and prohibit "questions about the nature of [the witness's] prior convictions"); Stallworth v. State, 53 So.3d 1163, 1166 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (finding trial court erred in allowing State to question witness regarding felony record because he did not deny prior convictions or number of convictions and did not mislead jury).
Affirmed.