Opinion
C/A No: 4:08-cv-00270-RBH.
September 10, 2009
ORDER
Introduction
The Plaintiff, Ricardo Facey, who is incarcerated at the Evans Correctional Institution and appearing pro se, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on January 29, 2008. At the time of the complaint, the plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at the Spartanburg County Detention Facility ("SCDF"). Plaintiff alleges constitutional violations arising from his conditions of confinement at the SCDF, false arrest, medical indifference and cruel and unusual punishment. Plaintiff also alleges that he did not receive bond and that the defendants took items from him worth in excess of one hundred thousand dollars. Lastly, Plaintiff has brought claims on behalf of his wife as well. Plaintiff seeks compensation for pain and suffering, return of his property so that he can resume his retail business and compensation for the complaint of forfeiture.
All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to United States Magistrate Thomas E. Rogers III pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), DSC.
The Plaintiff was awaiting trial on the charge of trafficking marijuana. The Plaintiff and his wife were stopped for speeding on 1-85 in Spartanburg County and after receiving consent to search the car, the Highway Patrol confiscated 295 pounds of marijuana.
This matter is before the court on Defendants' [Docket Entry #34] motion for summary judgment which filed with the court on October 3, 2008. The Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation on July 17, 2009, [Docket Entry # 62], recommending that summary judgment be granted and this case dismissed. Plaintiff timely filed Objections on August 14, 2009. [Docket Entry # 70].
Standard of Review
The Magistrate Judge only makes a recommendation to this court. The recommendation has no presumptive weight. The responsibility to make a final determination remains with this court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270 (1976). The court is charged with making a de novo determination of those portions of the report and recommendation to which specific objection is made, and the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, or recommit the matter to him with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The district court is obligated to conduct a de novo review of every portion of the Magistrate Judge's report to which objections have been filed.Id. However, the district court need not conduct a de novo review when a party makes only general and conclusory objections that do not direct the court to a specific error in the Magistrate Judge's proposed findings and recommendations. Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47-48 (4th Cir. 1982).
Discussion
A. Dismissal of claims against Sheriff Wright
The Magistrate Judge recommended that Sheriff Wright be dismissed from the case for lack of personal involvement. Having reviewed the allegations in the complaint, the affidavit provided by Sheriff Wright and the objections raised by the plaintiff to the Report and Recommendation, the court agrees with the determination by the Magistrate.
The only entity involved in the Plaintiff's arrest on February 22, 2007 was the South Carolina Department of Public Safety, more commonly referred to as the South Carolina Highway Patrol. (Wright Aff. ¶ 4.) While the property seized by the Troopers at the scene was turned over to the Spartanburg County Sheriff's Office for safekeeping and testing, neither Wright nor any employee of the Sheriff's department had any involvement in the arrest or confinement at the SCDF. (Id. at ¶ 6.) Plaintiff has failed to establish a factual basis for any claim against Sheriff Wright. Accordingly, the claims against Sheriff Wright are due to be dismissed.
B. Conditions of Confinement
The Plaintiff alleges violations of his constitutional rights due to the conditions of his confinement at the SCDF. Specifically, he asserts that he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment while being detained at the SCDF because he had a shower that did not work and the shower that he was forced to use was not properly equipped for people confined to a wheelchair. He objects to the Magistrate Judge's finding that he provided insufficient evidence that he was denied the minimum measure of life's necessities, or that any of the named defendants engaged in any conduct "for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm would result." See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). After reviewing the Recommendation by the Magistrate Judge, it is apparent that summary judgment should be granted in favor of the Defendants on these issues.
An alleged deprivation of right of a pretrial detainee is examined under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as opposed to the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n. 16 (1979). The proper inquiry under the due process clause is to determine whether the conditions amount to punishment of the detainee. Id. at 535. "In order to establish that a particular condition or restriction of detention constitutes constitutionally impermissible punishment a detainee must show either 1) an expressed intent to punish or 2) a lack of a reasonable relationship to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective, from which a punitive intent may be inferred." Hill v. Nicodemus, 979 F.2d 987, 991 (4th Cir. 1992) (emphasis added) (citing Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 870 (4th Cir. 1988)). To establish the necessary culpable intent, prison officials must act with deliberate indifference to the inmates' suffering.Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1313 (9th Cir) (citingFarmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), as amended, 75 F.3d 448 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 916 (1995)). Particularly, in challenging the prison conditions, the Plaintiff must prove that a "basic need" was deprived and the defendants acted with deliberate indifference. See Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1379 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 949 (1993). To be deliberately indifferent, a prison official "must know of and disregard an objectively serious condition, medical need, or risk of harm." Rish v. Johnson, 131 F.3d 1092, 1096 (4th Cir. 1997). Furthermore, the plaintiff also carries the additional burden of proving that he was significantly injured emotionally or physically from the deliberate indifference to a risk of harm or serious medical. See Strickler, 989 F.2d at 1380-1381.
Larry Powers, Director of the SCDF, attests in his affidavit to the fact that he makes every possible accommodation for inmates with special needs. (Powers Aff. ¶ 5.) Powers further states in his affidavit that since the Plaintiff was confined to a wheelchair, he was given a single occupancy cell assignment which includes a private shower with a built-in seat. (Id.) Furthermore, Powers states that even when the Plaintiff served time in Administrative Segregation for failing to follow the rules and regulations and the orders of officers, he continued to be housed in a cell with a private shower that had a built-in seat and only had to shower with the general population while his personal shower was being repaired. (Id. at ¶¶ 4, 5.) The Plaintiff has not alleged that he was deprived of a shower or any other basic need.
In his objections, the Plaintiff relies on the copies of his grievances to establish his claim that the SCDF was not equipped for an inmate with special needs. However, he has not alleged that he was deprived a shower or any other basic need. In response to the Plaintiff's grievances, Powers indicates that when the Plaintiff complained about the shower, it was properly addressed in a timely manner. (Id. at ¶ 6.) Powers also told the Plaintiff to ask for assistance anytime he needed it, but the Plaintiff never did so. (Id.)
The Plaintiff's grievances are insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to the Defendants' alleged deliberate indifference because they do not prove that the defendants knew of and disregarded an objectively serious condition, medical need, or risk of harm or that the Defendants failed to provide for a basic need of the Plaintiff. Moreover, the Plaintiff has not proven that he was significantly injured emotionally or physically from the alleged deliberate indifference to withstand the motion for summary judgment.
C. Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs
The Magistrate Judge recommends that this claim be dismissed and summary judgment entered because the plaintiff has not shown that the Defendants were personally involved with the denial, delay or interference of his medical treatment. After reviewing the record, it is the opinion of this court that the Plaintiff has not met the burden of proving that any of the named Defendants were personally involved with any denial or delay of treatment or that they acted with deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's medical condition. The named Defendants in the case are not medical personnel and further, only one of the Defendants, Larry Powers, had a supervisory position over the Plaintiff's pretrial detainment at the SCDF.
To establish a deliberate indifference to medical needs claim under § 1983 against non-medical supervisory prison personnel, the Plaintiff must prove (1) the supervisory defendants failed promptly to provide an inmate with needed medical care, (2) that the supervisory defendants deliberately interfered with the prison doctors' performance, or (3) that the supervisory defendants tacitly authorized or were indifferent to the prison physicians' constitutional violations. See Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 854 (4th Cir. 1990). "Supervisory liability based upon constitutional violations inflicted by subordinates is based, not upon notions of respondeat superior, but upon a recognition that supervisory indifference or tacit authorization of subordinate misconduct may be a direct cause of constitutional injury." Id. (citing Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 372 (4th Cir. 1984)).
The Plaintiff has failed to prove that Powers, in his supervisory position at SCDF, failed to promptly provide medical care, deliberately interfered with the physician's performance or tacitly authorized any unconstitutional conduct. In his objection to summary judgment, the Plaintiff has relied upon grievances to prove that Powers acted with deliberate indifference by denying access to his medication, but the grievance forms reveal that the Plaintiff had actual knowledge of the SCDF rules and that he could not keep his medication in his cell. This is not a situation where supervisory personnel of the prison denied the Plaintiff medical care or deliberately denied him medication. The Plaintiff had access to his medication through the proper channels and it was his choice to not follow the rules regarding disbursement of his medication. The Plaintiff has failed to come forward with sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact on this issue and therefore the Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.
D. Qualified Immunity
The Magistrate Judge recommends that the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity in their individual capacity because the plaintiff has failed to show that any of the defendants violated his constitutional or statutory rights. The court agrees with this determination.
"Government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The court has reviewed the Plaintiff's objections and finds they are without merit. As discussed above, the Plaintiff has failed to offer evidence of a genuine issue of material fact in regard to these issues and therefore the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
E. Pendent Jurisdiction
To the extent that the Plaintiff's complaint may have raised any additional state law claims, the Magistrate Judge recommended they should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held that "the federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction." McQuillen v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 112 F.2d 877, 881 (4th Cir. 1940). The court may decline to exercise jurisdiction over pendent state claims if "the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
Conclusion
After a review of the case law and the record before it, the court overrules the Plaintiff's objections and incorporates by reference the Report and Recommendation [Docket Entry # 62] of the Magistrate Judge. Accordingly, the Defendants' [Docket Entry #34] motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED and the Plaintiff's claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are hereby DISMISSED with prejudice. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), Plaintiff's state law claims, if any, are DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.IT IS SO ORDERED.