Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. Nos. JD227848, JD227849
SCOTLAND, P.J.
Petitioner F.A. is the mother of H.S. and S.S., who were two months old and one year old, respectively, when they became dependent children of the court. She seeks an extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452) to vacate juvenile court orders denying petitioner reunification services (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361.5, subds. (b)(5), (b)(6), and (b)(7)) and setting a hearing to determine whether her parental rights should be terminated (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26; further section references are to this code).
Due to delays in the juvenile court concerning preparation of a complete record for review, we stayed the proceedings in the juvenile court to allow this writ petition to be addressed prior to the section 366.26 hearing. We shall now deny the petition and vacate the stay of the juvenile court proceedings.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) placed the two minors in protective custody as a result of information from a hospital examination of H.S., disclosing that the minor suffered non-accidental injuries including a broken arm. DHHS filed petitions alleging both minors were at risk of suffering serious physical harm inflicted non-accidentally by a parent or as a result of a parent’s failure to adequately protect the minors. (§ 300, subds. (a) and (b).) The petitions further alleged that (1) H.S. had suffered severe physical abuse and the parent knew, or reasonably should have known, H.S. was being physically abused and (2) S.S. was at risk of abuse because H.S. had actually suffered physical abuse. (§ 300, subds. (e), (j).)
We summarize the evidence in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s orders. (In re Tracy Z. (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d. 107, 113.)
The parents were the only care providers for H.S. Neither parent had an adequate explanation of how H.S. suffered a broken arm, although they suggested that the minor’s sibling might have been responsible.
Subsequent investigation disclosed that H.S. also suffered a fractured rib, which was healing, and had bruises on her back, dating from about the same time as the rib fracture. Medical assessments revealed the fractures were the result of non-accidental trauma. The parents had no adequate explanation of the additional injuries, and they gave multiple, conflicting conjectures as to the causes.
DHHS urged the denial of reunification services, opining that services would not benefit the parents, who were not positively bonded to either minor and did not take responsibility for the injuries that H.S. had suffered. Records of visitation between the detention hearing and the jurisdiction hearing described parental interaction with the minors as uncomfortable and overwhelmed. The parents lacked understanding of both age-appropriate behavior and how to deal with it, but refused to take direction from the visit observer.
Following a contested jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court reviewed the conflicting testimony and concluded that both the rib fracture, with attendant bruising, and the arm fracture constituted serious physical injury to H.S. The court sustained the amended petitions, finding that H.S. came within the provisions of section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (e) and that S.S. came within the provisions of section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (j).
An addendum report filed prior to the disposition hearing reiterated the earlier reported problems with visitation, i.e., the parents’ inability to respond appropriately to the minors’ needs and the parents’ failure to focus on interaction with both minors rather than other activities. Although the parents had participated in services, each continued to deny responsibility for H.S.’s injuries, instead offering explanations that shifted blame to others.
At the conclusion of the contested disposition hearing, the court found section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(5) and (b)(6) applied, justifying denial of services as to H.S. The court also found section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(6) and (b)(7) applied, justifying denial of services as to S.S. The court further found the parents had not established that reunification was in the best interests of the minors and had not accepted responsibility for the abuse of H.S.
DISCUSSION
I
Petitioner contends the “bypass provision under [section] 361.5[, subdivision ](b)(6) is not applicable to [her].” This provision states in pertinent part: “Reunification services need not be provided to a parent or guardian described in this subdivision when the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence,” that “the child has been adjudicated a dependent... as a result of... severe physical harm to the child, a sibling, or a half sibling by a parent or guardian,” and “the court makes a factual finding that it would not benefit the child to pursue reunification services with the offending parent or guardian.” (Italics added.)
According to petitioner, there is no substantial evidence that she was an “offending parent,” i.e., severe physical abuse was inflicted on the child by the parent’s “act,” “omission,” or “consent” (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(6)). This is so, she argues, because “[n]o one accused [her] of being the source of H.S.’s arm fracture”; she took the child for treatment “as soon as she noticed bruises on H.S.” and, thus, cannot be said to have been a cause of the severe physical abuse “by omission”; and there was “no prior CPS history” and no substantial evidence she noticed bruises on H.S. “indicative of child abuse,” such that it could be said she consented to the infliction of abuse by the minor’s father. She discounts, as hearsay, evidence that she was “in the room when the father picked H.S. up and H.S.’s arm broke.”
We need not address these arguments because only one ground need be established for denial of reunification services (Randi R. v. Superior Court (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 67, 72) and, as we will explain, the record supports the denial of services pursuant to section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(5) and (b)(7).
II
Section 361.5, subdivision (b)(5) provides that reunification services need not be provided to a parent when the juvenile court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that “the child was brought within the jurisdiction of the court under subdivision (e) of Section 300 because of the conduct of that parent[.]”
Here, H.S. was adjudicated a dependent child pursuant to section 300, subdivision (e) because she was a child under the age of five who suffered “severe physical abuse by a parent, or by any person known by the parent, if the parent knew or reasonably should have known that the person was physically abusing the child.”
According to petitioner, she was “‘innocent’” of wrongdoing under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(5) because there was no evidence she reasonably should have known H.S. was being abused. We disagree.
The parents were the sole caretakers of the minors. Medical opinions confirmed H.S.’s rib fracture and bruising were caused by squeezing force to the chest, and the arm fracture required significant snapping force; thus, both were non-accidental injuries. Although appellant did not know the rib was fractured until H.S. was scanned for child abuse, appellant did know of the multiple bruises on a seven-week-old child, which should have raised concerns of physical abuse. The parents’ explanations of the events surrounding the injuries were conflicting. Petitioner insisted she did not harm H.S., but at various times blamed S.S., relatives, and the father. At other times, petitioner insisted the father did not harm H.S., and she said she did not know how the injuries occurred. The father first said he did not know how H.S.’s injury occurred, then admitted he may have grabbed her in a way that caused her arm to be broken. The doctor who examined H.S. at the hospital felt the father’s demonstration of how he picked up the minor did not actually explain the injury, and it was not S.S. who inflicted it. The parents said their doctor suggested that S.S. could have inflicted the multiple bruises on the back of seven-week-old H.S. However, nothing in the doctor’s records suggests that there was a suspected cause of the injuries or that S.S. was at all involved. From all of the conflicting, blame-shifting statements made by both parents, the juvenile court reasonably could infer the father inflicted serious injuries on H.S., and petitioner knew about it. Thus, the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom support a finding that H.S. came within the provisions of section 300, subdivision (e). Accordingly, the court could deny services to both parents as to H.S. pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(5).
Because section 361.5, subdivision (b)(5) justified the denial of services to both parents as to H.S., the juvenile court also was justified in denying them reunification services as to S.S. pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(7), which states that services need not be provided when the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that “the parent is not receiving reunification services for a sibling or a half sibling of the child pursuant to paragraph... (5)” of subdivision (b) of section 361.5. (In re Kenneth M. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 16, 21-22.)
There is no merit in petitioner’s assertion that the juvenile court’s “written order did not reference the bypass provision under [section] 361.5[, subdivision ](b)(7) so reunification services must be provided for S.S.” The court’s oral pronouncement of its orders clearly included this basis for denial of services. (People v. Smith (1983) 33 Cal.3d 596, 599.)
III
We also reject petitioner’s contention that the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying services.
Petitioner points out that section 361.5, subdivision (c) states that reunification services shall be denied for a parent described in subdivisions (b)(5) and (b)(7) “unless the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that reunification is in the best interest of the child.” In her view, it was in the best interest of both H.S. and S.S. to be reunified with petitioner because the children were “closely and positively attached to her”; “discrepancies concerning the supervising social worker’s... reports” “affected her opinion on [petitioner’s] interactions with H.S. and S.S.” and suggested the social worker was simply “waiting for something negative to report; and petitioner had “received above average scores in her parenting class,” thus indicating that reunification services would be likely to prevent reabuse.
When services are denied pursuant to subdivision (b)(5) of section 361.5, the juvenile court “shall not order reunification... unless it finds that, based on competent testimony, those services are likely to prevent reabuse... or that failure to try reunification will be detrimental to the child because the child is closely and positively attached to that parent.” (§ 361.5, subd. (c).)
Petitioner tried to show through her therapist’s testimony that she had successfully completed therapy and, thus, services were likely to prevent reabuse. The juvenile court specifically found the therapist’s testimony that petitioner was successful in therapy was not competent testimony within the meaning of section 361.5, subdivision (c), in part, because therapy had only recently addressed H.S.’s abuse. The therapist had based her conclusion on petitioner’s acknowledgment of the bare fact that abuse had occurred, but the therapist also reported petitioner’s several conflicting explanations of how it occurred, including that she had been in the room and saw the father injure H.S. Petitioner testified about what she had learned in services but also said she did not believe the father broke H.S.’s arm. The court found her testimony was disingenuous and not credible.
Petitioner had completed a parenting class, but visitation notes demonstrate she was unable to apply the information in visits. For example, she focused on S.S., leaving H.S. to the father’s care; she did not apply techniques other than feeding to soothe H.S. when H.S. cried, even when the visit supervisor made other suggestions; and she allowed H.S. to be left unattended during photo sessions with S.S. The juvenile court reasonably could conclude that this further demonstrated that services for petitioner were unlikely to prevent reabuse.
The evidence of visitation notes also undermined any claim of close positive attachment between petitioner and H.S. It was apparent that petitioner’s primary focus was S.S., and petitioner rarely engaged H.S. during visits. Both parents often spent time taking photographs while ignoring H.S. There was no evidence of any significant bond between petitioner and H.S. That the visits were pleasant for H.S. is insufficient. The notes, which include both positive and negative interactions, fully support the social worker’s reports which concluded H.S. was not positively bonded to petitioner.
Because both parents were properly denied services for H.S. pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(5), the provisions of subdivision (b)(7) applied to deny services as to the sibling, S.S. The juvenile court could not order reunification for S.S. unless it found by clear and convincing evidence that reunification was in her best interest. (§ 361.5, subd. (c).) Petitioner bore the burden of establishing best interest and failed to do so. (Evid. Code, § 500.) In therapy, petitioner had not addressed H.S.’s abuse, rendering her unable to protect either child, and in visits, petitioner was unable to apply to her interaction with S.S. the techniques learned in parenting class. Visit records showed that, despite instruction and suggestions during visits, petitioner was unable to set limits for S.S., to treat her in an age appropriate manner, or to respond appropriately when S.S was behaving badly. Instead, petitioner blamed the foster mother for S.S.’s acting out and screaming when S.S. was frustrated in visits.
Based upon the totality of the evidence, the juvenile court reasonably concluded that reunification services for petitioner were not in S.S.’s best interest.
DISPOSITION
The petition is denied. Having served its purpose, the previously ordered stay of the juvenile court proceedings in this case is vacated.
We concur: SIMS , J., BUTZ , J.