Opinion
NO. WR-65,137-04 NO. WR-65,137-05
12-16-2020
EX PARTE CLINTON LEE YOUNG, Applicant
ON APPLICATIONS FOR POST-CONVICTION WRITS OF HABEAS CORPUS IN CAUSE NOS. CR-27181-D and E IN THE 385TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT MIDLAND COUNTY Per curiam. ORDER
We have before us a subsequent application for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to the provisions of Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 11.071 § 5 (our -05) and a motion to abate his subsequent application currently pending in the trial court (our -04).
Unless otherwise indicated, all future references to Articles are to the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.
In April 2003, a jury found Applicant guilty of the 2001 capital murder of Samuel Petrey. The jury answered the special issues submitted pursuant to Article 37.071, and the trial court, accordingly, set Applicant's punishment at death. This Court affirmed Applicant's conviction and sentence on direct appeal. Young v. State, No. AP-74,643 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 28, 2005) (not designated for publication).
Applicant raised fourteen allegations in his initial habeas application, including allegations that: his punishment was excessive because he did not kill, intend to kill, or anticipate that the victim would be killed; his punishment was excessive because of his youth (just over 18 years of age) and immaturity; his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to discover and present evidence of abuse and for failing to object to the admission of Texas Youth Commission records; and his rights were violated by prosecutorial and police misconduct (Brady claims). This Court adopted the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law and denied relief on Applicant's claims. Ex parte Young, Nos. WR-65,137-01 and WR-65,137-02 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 20, 2006) (not designated for publication).
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). --------
In his first subsequent habeas application, Applicant raised nine additional claims, including more ineffective assistance of counsel claims. He also raised several pro se claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. This application was dismissed because none of the claims met the requirements of Article 11.071 § 5. Id.
On March 25, 2009, Applicant filed in the trial court his second subsequent habeas application. Applicant raised four claims in that application, including assertions that: the prosecution failed to turn over Brady evidence regarding any plea deals or negotiations with his two co-defendants; the prosecution suppressed evidence concerning State witness A.P. Merillat that could have been used to impeach him; the judge who presided over the trial was not impartial; and habeas counsel was ineffective.
This Court dismissed the third and fourth claims, but found that the first two claims met the requirements of Article 11.071 § 5 and remanded those claims to the trial court. Ex parte Young, No. WR-65,137-03 (Tex. Crim. App. June 3, 2009) (not designated for publication). During the remand, Applicant waived the second claim. When the case was returned to this Court, we denied relief on the first claim and dismissed the waived claim. Ex parte Young, No. WR-65,137-03 (Tex. Crim. App. June 20, 2012) (not designated for publication).
On October 2, 2017, Applicant filed his third subsequent habeas application, in which he raised eight claims. Specifically, Applicant claimed that: false or misleading testimony was introduced against him at trial; he is entitled to relief under Article 11.073 because previously unavailable scientific evidence shows he did not cause Petrey's death; he is actually innocent; the prosecution failed to preserve evidence and withheld impeachment and exculpatory evidence from him, in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); trial counsel was ineffective; and the combined errors rendered his trial fundamentally unfair.
This Court held that Applicant failed to make a prima facie case of innocence or a prima facie case that he met the requirements of Article 11.073. Ex parte Young, No. WR-65,137-04 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 18, 2017) (not designated for publication). Further, the Court held that Applicant only met the requirements of Article 11.071 § 5 regarding his first allegation, in which he contended that false or misleading testimony was introduced at trial. Id. Therefore, the Court remanded that claim to the trial court for resolution, where it remains pending. Id.
On August 14, 2020, Applicant filed his fourth subsequent habeas application in the trial court. In this application, Applicant raised three allegations—judicial bias, judicial disqualification, and Brady—all of which rely on Applicant's newly discovered information that one of the prosecutors also worked as a judicial clerk for the trial court judge during Applicant's trial and throughout his writ process. Because this information was not previously ascertainable through the exercise of reasonable diligence, we find that Applicant has met the requirements of Article 11.071 § 5(a)(1), and we remand his claims to the trial court for resolution.
The State further asks us to hold Applicant's third subsequent habeas application in abeyance pending resolution of the claims raised in his most recent application. However, we will take no action on that motion, instead leaving it to the trial judge who is in the best position to determine the order and method of resolution of the issues now before it in Applicant's cases.
IT IS SO ORDERED THIS THE 16TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 2020. Do not publish