"In applying this caselaw to the circumstances before us, we recognize, 'Each case of alleged error in the admission of a fingerprint record taken pursuant to another criminal offense and prior to the charge for which the accused is presently on trial must be judged upon its own merits.' Buchannon v. State, 554 So.2d 477, 480 (Ala.Cr.App.) (quoting Woodson v. State, 405 So.2d 967, 969 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 405 So.2d 969 (Ala. 1981)), cert. denied, 554 So.2d 494 (Ala. 1989), overruled on other ground by Pardue v. State, 571 So.2d 333 (Ala. 1990). We start with the premise that '[t]he mere existence of recorded fingerprints does not per se imply the existence of a criminal record.'
In applying this caselaw to the circumstances before us, we recognize, "Each case of alleged error in the admission of a fingerprint record taken pursuant to another criminal offense and prior to the charge for which the accused is presently on trial must be judged upon its own merits." Buchannon v. State, 554 So.2d 477, 480 (Ala.Cr.App.) (quotingWoodson v. State, 405 So.2d 967, 969 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 405 So.2d 969 (Ala. 1981)), cert. denied, 554 So.2d 494 (Ala. 1989),overruled on other ground by Pardue v. State, 571 So.2d 333 (Ala. 1990). We start with the premise that "[t]he mere existence of recorded fingerprints does not per se imply the existence of a criminal record."Brown, 369 So.2d at 884.
In a case which considered the possible prejudicial effect of the introduction into evidence of a defendant's fingerprint card, this court, per Judge Bowen, noted that "The mere existence of recorded fingerprints does not per se imply the existence of a criminal record." Woodson v. State, 405 So.2d 967, 968 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 405 So.2d 969 (Ala. 1981), quoting Brown v. State, 369 So.2d 881, 884 (Ala.Cr.App. 1979). In concluding that there was no error in the admission of the defendant's fingerprint card in Woodson, this court reasoned as follows:
"The general rule . . . is that the admission of a defendant's fingerprint identification card is not impermissibly prejudicial to the defendant where the card was altered prior to its introduction so that it did not disclose the defendant's criminal record." Woodson v. State, 405 So.2d 967, 968 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, Ex parte Woodson, 405 So.2d 969 (Ala. 1981). The fact that the fingerprint card was made at the Birmingham City Jail does not, in and of itself, imply the existence of a past criminal record.
In Woodson v. State, 405 So.2d 967 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 405 So.2d 969 (Ala. 1981), we set forth the following general rule for the admission of fingerprint cards: "[T]he admission of a defendant's fingerprint identification card is not impermissibly prejudicial to the defendant where the card was altered prior to its introduction so that it did not disclose the defendant's criminal record.
We have repeatedly held that it is not the province of this court to reweigh the evidence presented at trial. E.g., Franklin v. State, 405 So.2d 969, 964 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert denied, 405 So.2d 966 (Ala. 1981); Crumpton v. State, 402 So.2d 1081, 1065 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 402 So.21 1088 (Ala. 1961); Nobis v. State, 401 So.2d 191, 198 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert, denied, 401 So.2d 204 (Ala.l981). '"[T]he credibility of witnesses and the weight or probative force of testimony is for the jury to judge and determine."'
" Baldwin v. State, 456 So.2d 117, 121 (Ala.Cr.App. 1983), affirmed, 456 So.2d 129 (Ala. 1984), affirmed, 472 U.S. 372, 105 S.Ct. 2727, 86 L.Ed.2d 300 (1985). The effect of this rule on the admission of fingerprint cards was addressed by this court in Woodson v. State, 405 So.2d 967 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 405 So.2d 969 (Ala. 1981), wherein we stated: "The general rule . . . is that the admission of a defendant's fingerprint identification card is not impermissibly prejudicial to the defendant where the card was altered prior to its introduction so that it did not disclose the defendant's criminal record.
Consequently, the finding of voluntariness must be upheld unless palpably contrary to the weight of the evidence. Woodson v. State, 405 So.2d 967 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, Ex parte Woodson, 405 So.2d 969 (Ala. 1981); Thompson v. State, 347 So.2d 1371 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, Ex parte Thompson, 347 So.2d 1377 (Ala. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1018, 98 S.Ct. 740, 54 L.Ed.2d 765 (1978). "(I)t is not unusual for the voluntariness inquiry to present conflicting evidence.