Opinion
1200643
12-17-2021
Ex parte Walmart Stores, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., et al. In re: Stephen W. Thibodeaux, as personal representative of the Estate of Joy B. Thibodeaux
Mobile Circuit Court, CV-19-902378
PETITION DENIED; NO OPINION.
Parker, C.J., and Shaw, Wise, Bryan, Mendheim, and Stewart, JJ., concur.
Sellers and Mitchell, JJ., dissent.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
BOLIN, JUSTICE.
MITCHELL, Justice (dissenting).
Joy B. Thibodeaux, an employee at an Irvington warehouse operated by Walmart Stores, Inc. ("Walmart"), died after suffering a heart attack while at work. Stephen W. Thibodeaux, the personal representative of Joy's estate, filed a wrongful-death suit in the Mobile Circuit Court, alleging that Joy's death was caused by Walmart's failure to provide appropriate and prompt medical care when she first began experiencing symptoms. Walmart moved for a judgment on the pleadings, arguing that it was entitled to a judgment in its favor based on the exclusive-remedy provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act"), § 25-5-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975. After the trial court denied its motion, Walmart petitioned this Court for mandamus relief. The majority now denies the petition. I respectfully dissent.
In Ex parte Burkes Mechanical, Inc., 306 So.3d 1, 3 (Ala. 2019), an employee brought negligence and wantonness claims alleging that his employer had "failed to furnish appropriate medical care and to provide reasonable and prompt access to qualified health-care providers after [a] workplace accident." A plurality of this Court held that the employer had not demonstrated a clear legal right to the dismissal of those claims based on the exclusive-remedy provisions of the Act. I dissented from that holding, explaining that any injury the employee suffered as a result of the treatment his employer provided in the immediate aftermath of the accident was "an injury arising from his employment." Id. at 7 (Mitchell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). That rationale compels me to dissent here as well, where it is similarly alleged that an employer (Walmart) failed to provide appropriate and prompt medical care to an employee (Joy) following an accident.
The heart attack suffered by Joy may be considered an "accident" under the Act, which defines the term as "an unexpected or unforeseen event, happening suddenly and violently, with or without human fault, and producing at the time injury to the physical structure of the body ... by accidental means." § 25-5-1(7), Ala. Code 1975. See also Ex parte Harris, 590 So.2d 285, 287 (Ala. 1991) (explaining that "[t]he term 'accident' is not a characterization of the method of injury, but the result thereof," and expressly recognizing that a heart attack may indeed be an accident under the Act).
Additionally, this case is indistinguishable from Akins v. Drummond Co., 628 So.2d 591 (Ala. 1993). Like Joy, the employee in Akins died after suffering a heart attack at work, and, as here, there was no allegation that the heart attack was job-related. Id. at 591. The administrator of the decedent's estate sued the employer, alleging that it had "fail[ed] to provide [the decedent] with proper medical care and prompt first aid and [had failed] to notify a doctor after he had suffered the heart attack while working." Id. The employer moved for summary judgment, and the trial court ruled in its favor, holding that the asserted claim was barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Act. This Court unanimously affirmed the judgment on appeal, explaining that due to the employer-employee relationship between the defendant and the decedent, no wrongful-death claim could move forward. Id. at 592. Rather, this Court held, any recovery for the employee's death must come under the Act. Id. That should be the same outcome here.
Courts in other jurisdictions have interpreted their workers' compensation statutes in a similar fashion. See, e.g., Chaney v. Team Techs., Inc., 568 S.W.3d 576, 577 (Tenn. 2019) ("We hold that an injury that is caused by an employer's failure to provide reasonable medical assistance arises out of and in the course of employment when an employee becomes helpless at work because of illness or other cause unrelated to her employment, the employee needs medical assistance to prevent further injury, the employer knows of the employee's helplessness, and the employer can provide reasonable medical assistance but does not do so."); Baiguen v. Harrah's Las Vegas, LLC, 134 Nev. 597, 597, 426 P.3d 586, 588 (2018) (holding that "an injury arising from an employer's failure to provide medical assistance to an employee suffering a stroke arose out of and in the course of the employment").
For these reasons, I would grant Walmart's petition and issue a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to enter a judgment in favor of Walmart on the basis of the Act's exclusive-remedy provisions.