Opinion
WR-76,173-03
10-26-2022
EX PARTE JOSE JUAN CRUZ VARELA, Applicant
Do not publish
ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS CAUSE NO. CR-3003-10-J(3) IN THE 430TH DISTRICT COURT FROM HIGALDO COUNTY
Yeary, J., filed a concurring opinion in which Slaughter, J., joined.
ORDER
Per curiam.
Applicant was convicted of murder and sentenced to 45 years' imprisonment. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction. Varela v. State, No. 13-12-00251-CR (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi-Edinburg, Jan. 9, 2014). Applicant filed this application for a writ of habeas corpus in the county of conviction, and the district clerk forwarded it to this Court. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07.
The habeas court scheduled a hearing for Aug. 19, 2022. The State argued that the court had no authority over the case because it had not timely entered an ODI. The trial court agreed and ordered the district clerk to transmit the case to this Court. The district clerk properly forwarded this application to this Court under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 73.4(b)(5). However, the application was forwarded before the trial court developed the record and made findings of fact and conclusions of law. We remand this application to the trial court to complete its evidentiary investigation and make findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The trial court shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law within ninety days from the date of this order. The district clerk shall then immediately forward to this Court the trial court's findings and conclusions and the record developed on remand, including, among other things, affidavits, motions, objections, proposed findings and conclusions, orders, and transcripts from hearings and depositions. See Tex. R. App. P. 73.4(b)(4). Any extensions of time must be requested by the trial court and obtained from this Court.
Yeary, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Slaughter, J., joined.
Applicant was convicted in 2010 of murder and sentenced to forty-five years' imprisonment. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction in 2014. Varela v. State, No. 13-12-00251-CR, 2014 WL 69543 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi-Edinburg Jan. 9, 2014). In May 2022 Applicant filed an application for writ of habeas corpus in the county of conviction. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07. In his application, he alleges denial of due process, ineffective assistance of counsel, and cumulative prejudice.
Today, the Court remands this prematurely forwarded application to the trial court to complete its evidentiary investigation and make findings of fact and conclusions of law. I join the Court's remand order But I write separately to address my thoughts concerning the doctrine of laches and its possible application to this case See Ex parte Smith, 444 S.W.3d 661 (Tex Crim App 2014) (holding a trial court has the authority to sua sponte consider the doctrine of laches); Ex parte Bazille, __S.W.3d__, No WR-89,851-02, 2022 WL 108348 (Tex Crim App Jan 12, 2022) (Yeary, J, concurring).
The doctrine of laches ought to be considered in a case like this one. Applicant's appeal was finalized in 2014, but this writ application was not filed until eight years later. Consistent with this Court's precedent, the trial court "may sua sponte consider and determine whether laches should bar relief." Smith, 444 S.W.3d at 667. If the trial court does so, it must give Applicant the opportunity to explain the reasons for the delay and give the State's prosecutors and/or former counsel for Applicant an opportunity to state whether Applicant's delay has caused any prejudice to their ability to defend against Applicant's claims. Id. at 670. And ultimately, the trial court may include findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the doctrine of laches in its response to this Court's remand order.
"Our revised approach will permit courts to more broadly consider the diminished memories of trial participants and the diminished availability of the State's evidence, both of which may often be said to occur beyond five years after a conviction becomes final." Ex parte Perez, 398 S.W.3d 206, 216 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Ex parte Steptoe, 132 S.W.3d 434, 437-39 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (Cochran, J., dissenting)).
With these additional thoughts, I join the Court's order.