Opinion
CR-19-0588
05-29-2020
Ex parte State of Alabama (In re: STATE of Alabama v. Clifton Marshall RIDGEWAY)
*Note from the reporter of decisions: Retired Circuit Judge, William E. Hereford, 30th Judicial Circuit, was appointed to preside over this case upon the recusal of the Circuit Judge in the 41st Judicial Circuit. Pamela L. Casey, dist. atty., 41st Judicial Circuit, Oneonta, for petitioner. Submitted on mandamus petition only.
*Note from the reporter of decisions: Retired Circuit Judge, William E. Hereford, 30th Judicial Circuit, was appointed to preside over this case upon the recusal of the Circuit Judge in the 41st Judicial Circuit.
Pamela L. Casey, dist. atty., 41st Judicial Circuit, Oneonta, for petitioner.
Submitted on mandamus petition only.
PER CURIAM.
The District Attorney for the 41st Judicial Circuit filed this petition for a writ of mandamus requesting that this Court direct Judge William Hereford to vacate his February 9, 2020, order granting Clifton Marshall Ridgeway's motion for new trial. According to the petition, on November 18, 2019, Ridgeway was convicted of capital murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Ridgeway filed a motion for new trial. The trial court held a hearing on the motion for new trial on January 13, 2020, at which the parties and the court agreed to continue the motion to March 10, 2020, to permit the parties time to brief the issues set forth in the motion and for the trial court to enter its order. Ridgeway filed a memorandum of law in support of his motion for new trial on January 27, 2020. Judge Hereford then entered an order on February 9, 2020, granting Ridgeway's motion for new trial. The order did not state the grounds on which the motion was granted. The State filed a motion on February 18, 2020, asking Judge Hereford to reconsider his order granting the motion for new trial. Judge Hereford held a hearing on February 20, 2020, regarding the State's motion, and he denied that motion on February 28, 2020.
The State argues that Judge Hereford exceeded his discretion and usurped the fact-finding province of the judge by granting Ridgeway's motion for new trial. Specifically, the State asserts that the jury's verdict was consistent with the law and supported by the facts presented at trial. Additionally, the State argues that the trial court's admission into evidence of Ridgeway's sister's prior recorded statement was not error and thus does not warrant a new trial. Finally, the State asserts that the District Attorney did not inject her personal opinion as to Ridgeway's guilt during closing arguments as Ridgeway alleged in his motion for a new trial.
In Ex parte King, 23 So. 3d 77 (Ala. 2009), the Alabama Supreme Court severely limited the State's right to seek mandamus relief in those situations where the court has exceeded its jurisdiction. The Supreme Court did leave undisturbed our holding in State v. Grantland, 709 So. 2d 1310 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997), that the State may use an extraordinary petition for a writ of mandamus to seek review of a circuit court's ruling the State believes exceeds the scope of Rule 20.3, Ala. R. Crim. P. However, in this case, the circuit court did not set aside the jury's verdict and vacate Ridgeway's convictions pursuant to Rule 20.3, Ala. R. Crim. P. Judge Hereford granted Ridgeway's timely motion for a new trial. Rule 24.1(c), Ala. R. Crim. P., governs motions for a new trial and specifically provides: "The court may grant a new trial: (1) For the reason that the verdict is contrary to law or to the weight of the evidence; or (2) If for any other reason the defendant has not received a fair and impartial trial." (Emphasis added.)
In State v. Blue, 617 So. 2d 700 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993), this Court held that a writ of mandamus could not be used to consider the merits of a circuit court's ruling on a motion for a new trial. We stated:
" ‘Mandamus will not lie to compel the trial court's exercise of discretion in a particular manner, nor to review the lower court's proceedings for error, nor as a substitute for appeal.’ Ex parte Hooper, 453 So. 2d 1066, 1067 (Ala. 1984). In State v. Waters, 453 So. 2d 1067, 1067-68 (Ala. Cr. App. 1984), this Court held: ‘The petition for writ of mandamus seeking to require a Montgomery Circuit Court judge to vacate and hold for naught his order granting a new trial is hereby denied on authority of Ex parte Hooper, 453 So. 2d 1066 (Ala.1984), holding that mandamus will not lie to compel the trial court's exercise of discretion in a particular manner.’ Here, the trial court did not ‘substitute its judgment for that of the jury in determining credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given the evidence.’ Ex parte Nice, 407 So. 2d 874, 879 (Ala. 1981)."
617 So. 2d at 700. As the United States Supreme Court has noted: "A trial court's ordering of a new trial rarely, if ever, will justify the issuance of a writ of mandamus. ... The authority to grant a new trial ... is confided almost entirely to the exercise of discretion on the part of the trial court. Where a matter is committed to discretion, it cannot be said that a litigant's right to a particular result is ‘clear and indisputable.’ " Allied Chemical Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 36, 101 S.Ct. 188, 66 L.Ed.2d 193 (1980).
Here, Judge Hereford did not rule on the motion for a new trial after his jurisdiction had expired nor was the motion untimely filed. Therefore, pursuant to the Alabama Supreme Court's decision in Ex parte King and this Court's decision in State v. Blue, this petition for a writ of mandamus is hereby denied.
PETITION DENIED.
Windom, P.J., and Kellum and Cole, JJ., concur. Minor, J., concurs specially, with opinion. McCool, J., dissents, with opinion.
MINOR, Judge, concurring specially. I concur in this Court's denial of the petition for a writ of mandamus filed by the District Attorney for the 41st Judicial Circuit asking this Court to direct the Blount Circuit Court to vacate its February 2020 order granting Clifton Marshall Ridgeway's motion for a new trial. I write specially to urge the Alabama Supreme Court or the Alabama Legislature to require a trial court to state its reasons for granting a motion for a new trial.
The State has limited circumstances under which it may seek appellate review, and this Court's ability to grant mandamus relief is limited to " ‘exceptional circumstances which amount to judicial usurpation of power’ " or " ‘to prevent a gross disruption in the administration of criminal justice.’ " Ex parte King, 23 So. 3d 77, 78-79 (Ala. 2009) (quoting Ex parte Nice, 407 So. 2d 874, 879 (Ala. 1981) (emphasis omitted in King )). A ruling on a motion for a new trial "is confided almost entirely to the exercise of discretion on the part of the trial court." Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 36, 101 S.Ct. 188, 66 L.Ed.2d 193 (1980). When, as is the case here, there is no oral or written statement of reasons for the trial court's ruling, it is nigh impossible for the State to show that the trial court's granting of a motion for a new trial is a "judicial usurpation of power" or "a gross disruption in the administration of criminal justice."
The Alabama Supreme Court has required a trial court to make findings when a defendant supports a new-trial motion with evidence but the motion is denied by operation of law. This requirement serves the interest of judicial economy and helps a defendant secure meaningful appellate review. Other states have imposed a similar requirement for a trial court's ruling on a motion for a new trial. Alabama likewise should do so.
See, e.g., Edgar v. State, 646 So. 2d 683, 687 (Ala. 1994) ("We hold that where, as here, a criminal defendant's motion for a new trial is denied under the provisions of Rule 24.4, Ala. R. Crim. P., without an affirmative statement by the trial judge giving the ruling a presumption of correctness and the defendant supports his new trial motion by evidence that was not presented at trial, and that evidence, if not controverted by the State, will entitle him to a new trial, the denial by operation of law should be reversed and the case remanded for the trial court to conduct a hearing on his motion for new trial and then enter an order either granting or denying the motion."). See also Benjamin v. State, 889 So. 2d 610, 612 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003).
Unlike a criminal defendant, the State, as noted, has a limited right to appeal. Because that right is so limited, I do not share the dissenting opinion's view that this Court may use its supervisory power to require the trial court to do something that it is otherwise not required to do. A petitioner seeking the extraordinary writ of mandamus must show, among other things, "a clear legal right to the relief sought" and "an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so." Ex parte Wyre, 74 So. 3d 479, 480–81 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011) (citing State v. Williams, 679 So. 2d 275 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996) ). There simply is no legal requirement that the trial court explain why it granted a motion for a new trial, and, as far as I am aware, neither this Court nor the Alabama Supreme Court has ever imposed such a requirement.
See, e.g., Rule 6.431(B), Mich. Ct. Rules, Crim. P. ("The court must state its reasons for granting or denying a new trial orally on the record or in a written ruling made a part of the record."); Rule 33(c)(3), Tenn. R. Crim. P. ("In ruling on the motion for a new trial, the court--on motion by either party--shall make and state in the record findings of fact and conclusions of law to explain its ruling on any issue not determined by the jury."); Rule 7.5(d), Wash. Super. Ct. Crim. R. ("In all cases where the court grants a motion for a new trial, it shall, in the order granting the motion, state whether the order is based upon the record or upon facts and circumstances outside the record which cannot be made a part thereof. If the order is based upon the record, the court shall give definite reasons of law and facts for its order. If the order is based upon matters outside the record, the court shall state the facts and circumstances upon which it relied."). Cf. Rule 32.7(d), Ala. R. Crim. P. (requiring the trial court to enter "specific findings of fact relating to each material issue of fact presented" at an evidentiary hearing on a Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P., petition).
As a former prosecutor, I understand the conundrum of trying to attack a trial court's unexplained ruling to meet the extraordinary requirements for the issuance of a writ of mandamus. A simple change to the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure or the Code of Alabama could alleviate this problem. And such a change would promote the interest of judicial economy and enable meaningful review of a trial court's action on a petition for a writ of mandamus.
McCOOL, Judge, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from this Court's denial of the State's petition for a writ of mandamus in which the State asked this Court to direct the trial court to vacate its order granting Clifton Marshall Ridgeway's motion for a new trial. I would require the trial court to at least state its reasons for granting the motion for a new trial. Furthermore, I urge the Alabama Legislature or the Alabama Supreme Court to provide the State the right to appeal an order granting the defendant a new trial.
According to the mandamus petition, Ridgeway was convicted of capital murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Ridgeway filed a motion for new trial in which he provided three reasons for granting the motion. After the trial court held a hearing on the motion for a new trial and Ridgeway filed a memorandum of law in support of his motion, the trial court entered an order granting Ridgeway's motion for a new trial. The order did not state the grounds on which the motion was granted. The State filed a motion to reconsider. After conducting a hearing on that motion, the trial court denied the motion to reconsider and, again, did not state its reasons for doing so.
The Alabama Supreme Court has stated:
" ‘In Alabama, the State has a limited right to appeal’ in a criminal case. State v. A.R.C., 873 So. 2d 261, 266 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003).
" ‘The State's power to appeal from an adverse ruling in a criminal case is governed by § 12–12–70(c), Ala. Code 1975 (providing that an appeal may be taken from a judgment declaring an ordinance or statute invalid); § 12-22–91, Ala. Code 1975 (providing that an appeal may be taken from a judgment holding an indictment or information unconstitutional); and by Rule 15.7, Ala. R. Crim. P. (providing that appeals may be taken from certain pre-trial orders).'
" Ex parte Sullivan, 779 So. 2d 1157, 1160 n.2 (Ala. 2000)."
Ex parte King, 23 So. 3d 77, 78-79 (Ala. 2009). Currently, an order granting a motion for a new trial is not appealable.
Nevertheless, " ‘[t]he Court of Criminal Appeals has authority to issue such remedial and original writs as are necessary to give it a general superintendence and control of the circuit courts in criminal matters, over which it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction.’ " King, 23 So. 3d at 79 (quoting Ex parte Nice, 407 So. 2d 874, 876 (Ala. 1981) ). As Judge Minor points out in his special writing, this Court's ability to grant mandamus relief to the State is limited to " ‘exceptional circumstances which amount to judicial usurpation of power’ " or " ‘to prevent a gross disruption in the administration of criminal justice.’ " King, 23 So. 3d at 79 (quoting Nice, 407 So. 2d at 878-79 ). However, when there is no oral or written statement of reasons for the trial court's ruling, it is impossible for this Court to fulfill its function as a supervisory court and to review whether the trial court's granting of a motion for a new trial was a "judicial usurpation of power" or "a gross disruption in the administration of criminal justice." I do not believe that this Court must wait on the Alabama Supreme Court or the Alabama Legislature to require the trial court to simply state its reasons for granting a motion for a new trial, which would allow this Court to fulfill its basic function of supervision and review. Because I believe that this Court can and should require the trial court to state its reasons for granting a motion for a new trial so that we can conduct our review, I dissent.
I also note that the following sentence in this Court's opinion denying the State's mandamus petition is overly broad: "In Ex parte King, 23 So. 3d 77 (Ala. 2009), the Alabama Supreme Court severely limited the State's right to seek mandamus relief to those situations where the court has exceeded its jurisdiction." King, which relies on Nice, did not limit the State's right to seek mandamus relief to only those situations in which the trial court has exceeded its jurisdiction. Instead, as stated earlier, King limited the State's right to seek mandamus relief to "exceptional circumstances which amount to judicial usurpation of power" or "to prevent a gross disruption in the administration of criminal justice." The limitations stated in King would include situations in which the trial court has exceeded its jurisdiction but could also include other situations. Further, I note that King did not involve the granting of a motion for a new trial. Rather, King involved the trial court's denial of the State's pretrial motion in limine. On the other hand, Nice did involve the trial court's grant of the defendant's motion for a new trial, and the Supreme Court held that mandamus relief for the State was appropriate where the trial court's grant of the motion was based on its belief that testimony of the victim was "dubious." Nice, 407 So. 2d at 876.
Furthermore, I urge the Alabama Legislature or the Alabama Supreme Court to provide the State the right to appeal an order granting the defendant a new trial. This procedure would provide for more thorough and meaningful review of the trial court's action. As the Alabama Supreme Court stated in Nice, "the authorization of an appeal by the State, whether by statute or court rule, would be the best procedure, but the absence of the right of an appeal by the State cannot restrict the right of the Court of Criminal Appeals to exercise its superintendence and control over inferior jurisdictions in criminal matters." 407 So. 2d at 878.