Opinion
WR-28,073-02
10-04-2023
EX PARTE JAMES REYOS, Applicant
Do not publish
On Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Cause No. A-14,583-B in the 70th District Court from Ector County
OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Applicant was convicted of murder and sentenced to 38 years' imprisonment. The Eighth Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction. Reyes v. State, No. 08-83-0026-CR (Tex. App.-El Paso, Nov. 21, 1984). Applicant filed this application for a writ of habeas corpus in the county of conviction, and the district clerk forwarded it to this Court. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07.
Applicant contends that he is actually innocent. Based on the record, the trial court has determined that Applicant has established by clear and convincing evidence that he is actually innocent.
We agree. Relief is granted. Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Ex parte Tuley, 109 S.W.3d 388 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). The judgment in cause number A-14,583 in the 70th District Court of Ector County is set aside, and Applicant is remanded to the custody of the Sheriff of Ector County to answer the charges as set out in the indictment. The trial court shall issue any necessary bench warrant within ten days from the date of this Court's mandate.
Copies of this opinion shall be sent to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Correctional Institutions Division and the Board of Pardons and Paroles.
Yeary, J., filed a concurring opinion.
Applicant was convicted of murder and sentenced to thirty-eight years' imprisonment in 1983. His conviction was affirmed by the Eighth Court of Appeals the following year. Reyos v. State, No. 08-83-0026-CR (Tex. App.-El Paso, Nov. 21, 1984). Applicant made this application this year, in 2023, on the grounds that new evidence proves he is actually innocent.
Today the Court grants Applicant post-conviction habeas relief based on his claim of actual innocence. In my view, Applicant has satisfied the burden established in Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). The new fingerprint evidence alone is enough to reach that conclusion. Where my thinking differs is that the Court declares Applicant to be “actually innocent” by virtue of meeting this standard alone. For reasons that I have expressed before, I disagree with the Court's use of the term “actually innocent” when granting relief under Elizondo; simply satisfying the Elizondo burden is not enough to prove literal “actual innocence.” See Ex parte Cacy, 543 S.W.3d 802, 803 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (Yeary, J., concurring) (“The Elizondo standard, on its face, does not really focus on innocence per se. It is, instead, an exceedingly high burden by which an applicant must show that, if newly available evidence were added to the evidentiary mix, no reasonable jury would have found the State's case to have been compelling enough to defeat the systemic presumption of innocence.”).
Because I am persuaded Applicant has met his burden under Elizondo, I respectfully concur.