Opinion
No. 55/6.
01-15-1924
Ex parte PARAMORE et al.
Klemmer Kalteissen and William D. Danberry, both of New Brunswick, for relator. Joseph E. Strieker, of Perth Amboy, and William L. Bryan, of Donaldsonville, Ga., for State of Georgia.
Where a requisition by the Governor of another state for one charged with murder, and a writ of extradition, are in due form, the only questions presented, on application for writ of habeas corpus, are whether the prisoner is the person named, and whether he is a fugitive from justice of the demanding state.
Application by Silas Paramore, for writ of habeas corpus. Writ dismissed, and applicant remanded.
Klemmer Kalteissen and William D. Danberry, both of New Brunswick, for relator.
Joseph E. Strieker, of Perth Amboy, and William L. Bryan, of Donaldsonville, Ga., for State of Georgia.
BACKES, V. C. Silas Paramore was indicted June 3, 1923, by the grand jury of Seminole county, Ga., for the murder of I. J. Williams in that county. After the allegedmurder, Paramore fled to this state, and was apprehended in Middlesex county. Thereupon the Governor of Georgia requested the Governor of this state to deliver Paramore to J. L. Alday, his agent, to convey him to Georgia. The Governor honored the request. Thereupon Paramore sued out this writ of habeas corpus, praying that he be set at liberty because he fears that if he is returned to Georgie he will be lynched; this fear being based upon alleged threats and demonstrations made against him by some evil disposed people of the community in which he formerly lived, and upon mob violence suffered in the past by persons of the colored race in the state of Georgia. That this plea does not constitute a legal ground for nullifying the Governor's writ of extradition is too plain for discussion. To heed the appeal would be to give the prisoner his absolute freedom—an impossible alternative to a dismissal of the writ.
The requisition and extradition are in due form and the only questions before me are, Is the prisoner the person named in the requisition and extradition? and, Is he a fugitive from justice from the demanding state? The first is admitted. The second cannot be denied, for he was in the vicinity where the murder (if a murder) was committed, and at or about that time he fled from Georgia into this state. See People v. Byrnes, 33 Hun, 98; Re Reggel, 114 U. S. 643, 5 Sup. Ct. 1148, 29 Li. Ed. 250; Hogan v. O'Neill, 255 U. S. 52, 41 Sup. Ct. 222, 65 L. Ed. 497.
The prisoner's counsel seems to labor under the impression that the court may, in the exercise of a sound legal discretion, grant relief, but this is a misconception of the power of the court. The court is controlled by the law, and the law applicable to the case in hand is not in doubt, and the duty of the judge is imperative. A similar appeal to the court based on fear of lynching is reported in United States v. Cooke, 209 Fed. 607, 126 C. C. A. 429, where the writ was dismissed; the court observing that it must be presumed that the demanding state will protect the prisoner from violence and give him a fair trial. See, also, Marbles v. Oreecy, 215 U. S. 63, 30 Sup. Ct. 32, 54 L. Ed. 92.
At the hearing before Governor Silzer on objections to granting the extradition, the reason here assigned was there fully exploited, and the Governor was at pains befor signing the mandate to secure from the Governor of Georgia his personal assurance of safe conduct for the prisoner and a fair trial. Since then I have been informed that the Governor has caused further investigation to be made in the vicinity of the muruer, and that he has received additional assurances that there is no ill feeling against the prisoner in the community. In granting the extradition, the Governor very properly concluded that the fear and apprehension of the prisoner that he would be lynched could not be lawfully entertained by him as a justification for refusing the request of the Governor of Georgia. The United States Constitution and the federal statute made it obligatory upon him to honor the requisition. In re Thompson, 85 N. J. Eq. 221, 96 Atl. 102.
As no legal cause has been assigned in these proceedings to justify judicial interference, the writ will be dismissed, and the prisoner remanded.