Opinion
NO. 01-16-00673-CR
01-24-2017
EX PARTE BLAS ORLANDO MEDINA
On Appeal from the County Criminal Court at Law No. 14 Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2091460
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Blas Orlando Medina, appeals from the trial court's order denying habeas corpus relief pursuant to Article 11.09 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Medina contends that he was not properly informed of the immigration consequences of his 1998 guilty plea to the misdemeanor offense of driving while intoxicated, in violation of Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 376, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010). But Padilla, which established a new rule requiring counsel to inform defendants of the risk of deportation when entering guilty pleas, does not apply retroactively to cases that became final prior to its holding. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order denying Medina's application.
Background
Appellant, Blas Orlando Medina, is a citizen of El Salvador who was granted political asylum in November 1988 and has been granted Temporary Protection Status since 2001. In 1995, Medina pleaded guilty to the offense of burglary of a vehicle. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.04 (West 2011). Later, in August 1998, Medina pleaded guilty to the offense of driving while intoxicated and, in accordance with his agreement with the State, was sentenced to 15 days' confinement in the Harris County Jail. See TEX. PENAL CODE Ann. § 49.04 (West Supp. 2016). Medina did not appeal his DWI conviction, served his 15-day sentence, and the judgment subsequently became final.
In May 2016, almost eighteen years after his DWI conviction became final, Medina filed an application for writ of habeas corpus claiming that (1) his Temporary Protection Status renewal was denied and is currently pending appeal and (2) his 1998 DWI guilty plea was involuntary and marred by ineffective assistance of counsel because he was not advised of immigration consequences of his guilty plea. At a July 20, 2016 hearing on the application, the trial court issued an order denying the application. The record contains a docket sheet entry for the hearing with a handwritten notation stating that "[Defendant's] Atty. did not show for hearing. Laches applies. Writ denied." On August 19, 2016, Medina filed a notice of appeal from the denial of his habeas application.
Discussion
Medina's habeas application asserts involuntary plea and ineffective assistance of counsel claims based upon Padilla v. Kentucky, in which the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment requires an attorney for a criminal defendant to provide advice about the risk of deportation arising from a guilty plea. 559 U.S. 356, 130 S.Ct. 1473. But Medina's DWI conviction became final in 1998 and it is well-settled law that Padilla created a "new rule" of constitutional procedure that does not apply retroactively to convictions that became final before the Supreme Court handed down Padilla in 2010. See Chaidez v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 1103, 1105 (2013); State v. Guerrero, 400 S.W.3d 576, 588 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Ex parte De Los Reyes, 392 S.W.3d 675, 679 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Because Padilla does not apply retroactively to Medina's 1998 DWI conviction, Medina "is not entitled, as a matter of constitutional law, to habeas-corpus relief based on a failure by either an attorney or the trial judge to warn him about collateral deportation consequences." Guerrero, 400 S.W.3d at 588. "Nor was he entitled to such admonishments before . . . his guilty plea could be recognized as intelligent and voluntary." Id.
Because Medina's DWI conviction became final before Padilla was decided, pre-Padilla law applies to his habeas application in this case. See Ex Parte Luna, 401 S.W.3d 329, 334 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.). Under applicable pre-Padilla law, "while the Sixth Amendment assures an accused of effective assistance of counsel in criminal prosecutions, this assurance does not extend to 'collateral' aspects of the prosecution." Ex parte Morrow, 952 S. W.2d 530, 536 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Immigration consequences of a guilty plea were considered a collateral matter; therefore, Medina's plea would not be rendered involuntary even if his attorney was deficient in informing him of the consequences. See State v. Jimenez, 987 S.W.2d 886, 888-89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) ("That a guilty plea may result in deportation is generally considered a collateral consequence."); Luna, 401 S.W.3d at 334 ("Immigration consequences of a guilty plea are considered collateral; therefore, [applicant's] plea would not be rendered involuntary under the United States or Texas Constitutions even if his attorney was deficient in informing him of the consequences.").
Accordingly, because Medina had no constitutional right to be informed about collateral immigration consequences of his guilty plea, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Medina's habeas application. See Luna, 401 S.W.3d at 334- 35. We need not address whether laches applies. See Calloway v. State, 743 S.W.2d 645, 652 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) ("If the decision is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case it will not be disturbed.").
Conclusion
Because Padilla does not apply retroactively to Medina's 1998 DWI conviction, Medina is not entitled to habeas-corpus relief based on a failure by either his attorney or the trial judge to warn him about collateral immigration consequences of his guilty plea. See Guerrero, 400 S.W.3d at 588. The trial court's denial of Medina's application for writ of habeas corpus is affirmed.
PER CURIAM Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Jennings and Bland. Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).