Opinion
No. WR-59,692-02
Filed: April 26, 2006. DO NOT PUBLISH.
On Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus from Harris County.
STATEMENT
The applicant has filed an application for writ of habeas corpus alleging an unconstitutional imposition of sex offender requirements as a condition of his parole release. I agree with the majority that we should deny this application. I write separately to explain why. The applicant was convicted of burglary of a habitation with intent to commit indecency with a child in 1976. In 1980, the applicant had completely discharged his sentence and was released from prison. The applicant was convicted in 1989 of a felony drug offense and was sentenced to twenty-years imprisonment. In 2000, the Board of Pardons and Paroles voted to release him, but then withdrew its decision after the applicant refused to participate in a sex offender treatment program. In 2001, he filed a writ alleging the unconstitutional imposition of sex offender requirements as a condition for parole eligibility on a controlled substance conviction. While the trial court was considering the 2001 writ, the applicant was released on mandatory supervision from the controlled substance conviction. One of the conditions of his mandatory supervision was that he participate in the sex offender treatment program and register as a sex offender. Consequently, the applicant has filed this writ, claiming that the sex offender registration and treatment conditions of supervised release were unconstitutional as applied to him, because he discharged his sentence for the sexual offense in 1980, before the registration requirements even came into being. Under the current application, we are unable to examine the merits of the applicant's claim, because the current writ challenges the sexual offender conditions as attachments to his 1976 sexual offense, cause number 245666. The conditions that the applicant complains of, however, are actually conditions of release to cause number 549944, the drug offense. If the complaint were that the sex offender conditions were improperly attached to the drug offense, the applicant's claim might be colorable. Because the applicant improperly complains of the release requirements as attached to the earlier, discharged, sexual offense, rather than the drug offense, I am voting to deny the application. With these comments, I join the majority.
See Ex parte Liggins, 182 S.W.3d 928 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006).