Opinion
WR-94,412-03 WR-94,412-04
03-29-2023
EX PARTE MARK JAMES HLAS, JR., Applicant
Do not publish
ON APPLICATIONS FOR WRITS OF HABEAS CORPUS CAUSE NOS. 23738 HC-2 & 25039 HC-2 IN THE 6TH DISTRICT COURT FROM LAMAR COUNTY
ORDER
PER CURIAM
In 2010, Applicant was convicted for failure to comply with sex offender registration requirements and sentenced to two years' imprisonment. In 2013, Applicant was convicted for failure to comply with sex offender registration requirements with a previous conviction and sentenced to six years' imprisonment. He did not appeal his convictions. Applicant filed these applications for writs of habeas corpus in the county of conviction, and the district clerk forwarded them to this Court. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07.
Applicant contends, among other things, that his pleas were involuntary because he was admonished incorrectly as to the degree and punishment range for the offenses. He alleges that his 2004 Arkansas conviction for Sexual Indecency of a Child carried a ten-year sex offender registration requirement; therefore, his 2010 failure-to-register conviction was only a state jail felony and his 2013 failure-to-register conviction was only a third degree felony. Applicant has alleged facts that, if true, might entitle him to relief. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). Accordingly, the record should be developed. The trial court is the appropriate forum for findings of fact. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07, § 3(d). The trial court shall order trial counsel to respond to Applicant's claims. In developing the record, the trial court may use any means set out in Article 11.07, § 3(d). If the trial court elects to hold a hearing, it shall determine whether Applicant is indigent. If Applicant is indigent and wants to be represented by counsel, the trial court shall appoint counsel to represent him at the hearing. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 26.04. If counsel is appointed or retained, the trial court shall immediately notify this Court of counsel's name.
The trial court shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether Applicant's pleas were involuntary. The trial court shall obtain copies of the judgment for Applicant's 2004 Arkansas conviction for Sexual Indecency of a Child in cause no. 2003-102 and make specific findings as to whether Applicant was under a lifetime duty to register as a sex offender or whether his duty lasted for ten years from the date of his release. The trial court shall then make specific findings as to whether Applicant was admonished of the correct offense level for both his 2010 and 2013 failure-to-register convictions. The trial court may make any other findings and conclusions that it deems appropriate in response to Applicant's claims.
The trial court shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law within ninety days from the date of this order. The district clerk shall then immediately forward to this Court the trial court's findings and conclusions and the record developed on remand, including, among other things, affidavits, motions, objections, proposed findings and conclusions, orders, and transcripts from hearings and depositions. See Tex. R. App. P. 73.4(b)(4). Any extensions of time must be requested by the trial court and obtained from this Court.
Yeary, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Slaughter, J., joined.
Applicant was convicted in 2010 for failure to comply with sex offender registration requirements and sentenced to two years' imprisonment. In 2013, Applicant was convicted for failure to comply with sex offender registration requirements with a previous conviction and sentenced to six years' imprisonment. Applicant did not appeal his convictions.
In January of 2023, Applicant filed these applications for writs of habeas corpus in the county of conviction. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07. Applicant attacks his 2010 conviction in one application and attacks his 2013 conviction in the other application. In his applications, he alleges that his guilty pleas for both convictions were involuntary.
Today, the Court remands these applications to the convicting court to further develop the record. I join the Court's remand order. But I write separately to address my thoughts concerning the doctrine of laches and its possible application to this case. See Ex parte Smith, 444 S.W.3d 661 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (holding a convicting court has the authority to sua sponte consider the doctrine of laches); Ex parte Bazille, ___ S.W.3d ___, No. WR-89,851-02, 2022 WL 108348 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 12, 2022) (Yeary, J., concurring).
The doctrine of laches ought to be considered in a case like this one. Applicant pled guilty in 2010 and in 2013, but Applicant did not file these writ applications until almost thirteen and ten years later, respectively. The record is also silent regarding circumstances that may excuse Applicant's delay, and at least some explanation for the long delay in filing should be provided.
"Our revised approach will permit courts to more broadly consider the diminished memories of trial participants and the diminished availability of the State's evidence, both of which may often be said to occur beyond five years after a conviction becomes final." Ex parte Perez, 398 S.W.3d 206, 216 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Ex parte Steptoe, 132 S.W.3d 434, 437-39 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (Cochran, J., dissenting)).
Consistent with this Court's precedent, the convicting court "may sua sponte consider and determine whether laches should bar relief." Smith, 444 S.W.3d at 667. If the convicting court does so, it must give Applicant the opportunity to explain the reasons for the delay and give the State's prosecutors and/or former counsel for Applicant an opportunity to state whether Applicant's delay has caused any prejudice to their ability to defend against Applicant's claims. Id. at 670. And ultimately, the convicting court may include findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the doctrine of laches in its response to this Court's remand order.
With these additional thoughts, I join the Court's order.