Opinion
NO. WR-78,114-02
11-11-2020
EX PARTE RONALD JAMES HAMILTON, JR.
ON APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS CAUSE NO. 0901049-A IN THE 180TH DISTRICT COURT HARRIS COUNTY Per curiam. YEARY and NEWELL, JJ., concur. ORDER
This is a subsequent application for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to the provisions of Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 11.071, § 5.
On November 6, 2002, applicant entered a plea of guilty to the November 7, 2001 murder of Ismail Matlkah during the commission of a convenience store robbery (the "Yellowstone murder.") The trial court instructed the jury to find applicant guilty of the offense of capital murder committed in the course of committing or attempting to commit a robbery. At punishment, the jury answered the special issues submitted pursuant to Article 37.071, and the trial court, accordingly, set applicant's punishment at death. This Court affirmed applicant's conviction and sentence on direct appeal. Hamilton v. State, No. AP-74,523 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 13, 2004)(not designated for publication).
This Court denied applicant's initial post-conviction application for writ of habeas corpus. Ex parte Hamilton, No. WR-78,114-01 (Tex. Crim. App. June 25, 2015)(not designated for publication). Applicant's instant post-conviction application for writ of habeas corpus was received in this Court on December 11, 2017.
Applicant presents three allegations in his subsequent application. On September 12, 2018, we found that one allegation satisfied the requirements for consideration of a subsequent application under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 11.071, § 5. We remanded claim number one, that recently tested fingerprint evidence establishes Applicant's innocence of an extraneous capital murder introduced at punishment, to the trial court for consideration.
Applicant's Claim No. 1 set out in full:
Recently tested fingerprint evidence establishes Applicant's innocence of an extraneous capital murder. Applicant's Eighth Amendment and Due Process rights were violated because the jury was presented with materially inaccurate, false, and misleading evidence regard that extraneous capital murder. Additionally, the prosecution's misleading statements regarding the existence of a plea deal with a co-defendant Shawon Smith allowed the inaccurate, misleading, and false evidence to go uncorrected.
On remand, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing. The trial court adopted Applicant's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law recommending that the relief sought be granted.
On post-conviction habeas review, the convicting court is the "original factfinder," and this Court is the "ultimate factfinder." Ex parte Chavez, 371 S.W.3d 200, 207 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). This Court ordinarily defers to the habeas court's fact findings, particularly those related to credibility and demeanor, when those findings are supported by the record. Ex parte Navarijo, 433 S.W.3d 558, 567 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (citing Ex parte Weinstein, 421 S.W.3d 656, 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)). We similarly defer to a habeas judge's ruling on mixed questions of law and fact if the resolution of those questions turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Weinstein, 421 S.W.3d at 664. However, "[w]hen our independent review of the record reveals that the trial judge's findings and conclusions are not supported by the record, we may exercise our authority to make contrary or alternative findings and conclusions." Ex parte Reed, 271 S.W.3d 698, 727 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). We review de novo both pure questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact that do not depend upon credibility and demeanor. Weinstein, 421 S.W.3d at 664.
With respect to the substantive analysis of a due-process false-evidence claim, this Court has recognized that the use of material false evidence to procure a conviction violates a defendant's due-process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. See Weinstein, 421 S.W.3d at 665; Chavez, 371 S.W.3d at 207-210; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV; Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935). A conviction based on such materially false evidence results in a due-process violation, regardless of whether the falsity of the evidence is known to the State at the time of trial. Ex parte Ghahremani, 332 S.W.3d 470, 478 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Ex parte Robbins, 360 S.W.3d 446, 460 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
However, in order to be entitled to post-conviction habeas relief on the basis of false evidence, an applicant must show that: (1) false evidence was presented at his trial and (2) the false evidence was material to the jury's verdict of guilt. See Weinstein, 421 S.W.3d at 659, 665. An applicant must prove both prongs of his false-evidence claim by a preponderance of the evidence. See id.
Applicant's instant habeas claim revolves around the 40-ounce Schlitz malt liquor bottle recovered from the "Holman murder" scene in 2002 (the complained-of extraneous capital murder used by the State as part of its future dangerousness case). He argues that because recent fingerprint testing in 2017 identified another person as having handled the bottled, the State presented false evidence, and, therefore, he is innocent of the Holman murder. But the State's trial evidence about the fingerprints was consistent with the fingerprint evidence developed at the habeas stage.
Investigating Houston Police Detective Connie Park testified at trial that the Holman fingerprint evidence—including that found on the 40-ounce bottle—did not "tie back" to applicant or his co-defendant in the Yellowstone murder, Shawon Smith. The habeas evidence merely confirmed Park's testimony by specifying whose prints they were—not applicant's or Smith's. Since the jury heard the "essence" of the habeas evidence—that the prints on the bottle were not applicant's or Smith's—applicant has not established the falsity of the State's trial evidence. See Ex parte De La Cruz, 466 S.W.3d 855, 866-67 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (because jury heard the first medical examiner's opinion, which conflicted with the eyewitness's testimony, and resolved the conflict against applicant, post-conviction evidence of an additional gunshot wound, viewed in light of the totality of the record, failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence the eyewitness's testimony gave the jury a false impression, and this Court denied habeas relief).
Further, applicant fails to show that this bottle or the print recovered from it is material to the identity of the Holman shooter. See U.S. v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (evidence is material when there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the outcome of the trial would have been different); Quinones v. State, 592 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (when determining materiality, any omission must be evaluated in the context of the entire record). No one identified the bottle in question as having been handled by the shooter. And the witness who testified in the habeas hearing that the shooter handled a bottle just before the shooting equivocated about that assertion.
Regarding the existence of a plea deal with co-defendant Smith, because the prosecution's statements to the trial court about its plea deal with Smith were not testimony, nor heard by the jury, applicant is not entitled to relief on a claim that the State presented false testimony based on the prosecution's statements. See Ex parte Ghahremani, 332 S.W.3d 470,479 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (in determining whether particular piece of testimony has been demonstrated to be false, relevant question is whether the testimony, taken as a whole, gives the jury a false impression). Notwithstanding that, applicant nevertheless still fails to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the State misled the trial court or misrepresented any information. See Ex parte Kimes, 872 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (applicant has burden of proof in post-conviction habeas proceeding).
Having reviewed the record in this case, we reject the convicting court's findings and conclusions as they are not supported by the record or law, and deny claim number one. Applicant's remaining claims regarding a conflict of interest between his and is co-defendant's counsel, and the ineffective assistance of his trial cancel are procedurally barred. We dismiss claims 2 and 3 as an abuse of the writ under Article 11.071 §5(a)(1) without reviewing the merits of the claims raised.
IT IS SO ORDERED THIS THE 11th DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2020. Do Not Publish